GHSA-84C9-QQPQ-2PQ5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 17:29 – Updated: 2026-10-23 17:29
VLAI
Summary
obsidian-tc tokens can access arbitrary configured vaults
Details

Impact

Tool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied input.vault against the caller's bound vault (ctx.vaultId); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault by passing input.vault, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (resources/read was the only surface that already guarded this.)

Patches

Fixed in 1.3.1 (the fix was developed on the v1.3.0 tag, which never published to npm; 1.3.1 is the first published release with the fix). Upgrade to >= 1.3.1.

Workarounds

Run a single vault per server process, or isolate each tenant on a separate process/credential.

Fix

A central input.vault === ctx.vaultId guard was added in dispatch before the scope check.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "obsidian-tc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77366"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-23T17:29:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T18:17:23Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nTool dispatch did not check the caller-supplied `input.vault` against the caller\u0027s bound vault (`ctx.vaultId`); the folder ACL was a single global instance and the JWT carried no vault claim. As a result, **any valid token could read, write, or delete any configured vault** by passing `input.vault`, defeating multi-tenant isolation across ~90 tool sites. (`resources/read` was the only surface that already guarded this.)\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.3.1** (the fix was developed on the `v1.3.0` tag, which never published to npm; 1.3.1 is the first published release with the fix). Upgrade to `\u003e= 1.3.1`.\n\n### Workarounds\nRun a single vault per server process, or isolate each tenant on a separate process/credential.\n\n### Fix\nA central `input.vault === ctx.vaultId` guard was added in dispatch before the scope check.",
  "id": "GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5",
  "modified": "2026-10-23T17:29:17Z",
  "published": "2026-10-23T17:29:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-84c9-qqpq-2pq5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/72"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/38b4992e87dc2715564236e1a42d005ab05a0194"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.3.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-77366"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "obsidian-tc tokens can access arbitrary configured vaults"
}



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