GHSA-848M-R628-VRXW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 20:07 – Updated: 2026-09-04 20:07An authenticated user scoped to one namespace/database could invoke a custom API (DEFINE API) belonging to a different namespace/database, reaching another tenant's endpoint.
The route /api/{namespace}/{database}/{endpoint} took the namespace and database from the URL and applied them to the caller's session before the endpoint was looked up or run, without checking that the caller's authenticated scope covered them. Because a custom API handler runs with permissions disabled (definer's rights), the endpoint's own PERMISSIONS clause was the only gate — open to everyone for a PERMISSIONS FULL endpoint. The api::invoke() function was affected the same way, resolving against the session's selected namespace/database (settable via the surreal-ns / surreal-db headers or USE).
Impact
What an attacker can do:
- With valid credentials for any one namespace/database (a
VIEWERis enough), invoke a custom API in another namespace/database by naming the victim scope in the URL. - Read data that endpoint returns — including from
PERMISSIONS NONEtables, since the handler runs with permissions disabled — or trigger any writes and side effects it performs.
What it can't do:
- Reach a scope without valid credentials for some namespace/database on the instance; this is not an unauthenticated bypass.
- Affect single-tenant deployments, or any deployment where callers already hold instance-wide (root) scope.
Patches
The namespace/database is now validated against the caller's authenticated level — which the request cannot change — before the endpoint is resolved or run. A target scope outside that level is rejected with 403 Forbidden, both at the HTTP entry point and at the dispatch step shared with api::invoke(). Root reaches any scope; namespace principals their namespace; database and record principals their exact namespace/database; anonymous callers remain governed by the endpoint's PERMISSIONS.
- Versions 3.2.0 and later are not affected by this issue.
Workarounds
Users unable to patch should consider the following workarounds:
- Disable the custom API HTTP route via capabilities where it is not required.
- Treat separate deployments, not namespace/database boundaries, as the tenant isolation boundary on shared instances.
- Prefer a
PERMISSIONS WHEREclause that checks the authenticated identity overPERMISSIONS FULL(reduces exposure but does not restore the boundary).
Resources
- SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE API
- SurrealDB Documentation — Capabilities
fix(core/api): reject cross-tenant custom API access(included in SurrealDB 3.2.0)
Acknowledgements
SurrealDB thanks sondt99 for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "surrealdb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63735"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T20:07:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An authenticated user scoped to one namespace/database could invoke a custom API (`DEFINE API`) belonging to a different namespace/database, reaching another tenant\u0027s endpoint.\n\nThe route `/api/{namespace}/{database}/{endpoint}` took the namespace and database from the URL and applied them to the caller\u0027s session before the endpoint was looked up or run, without checking that the caller\u0027s authenticated scope covered them. Because a custom API handler runs with permissions disabled (definer\u0027s rights), the endpoint\u0027s own `PERMISSIONS` clause was the only gate \u2014 open to everyone for a `PERMISSIONS FULL` endpoint. The `api::invoke()` function was affected the same way, resolving against the session\u0027s selected namespace/database (settable via the `surreal-ns` / `surreal-db` headers or `USE`).\n\n### Impact\n\nWhat an attacker **can** do:\n\n- With valid credentials for any one namespace/database (a `VIEWER` is enough), invoke a custom API in another namespace/database by naming the victim scope in the URL.\n- Read data that endpoint returns \u2014 including from `PERMISSIONS NONE` tables, since the handler runs with permissions disabled \u2014 or trigger any writes and side effects it performs.\n\nWhat it **can\u0027t** do:\n\n- Reach a scope without valid credentials for some namespace/database on the instance; this is not an unauthenticated bypass.\n- Affect single-tenant deployments, or any deployment where callers already hold instance-wide (root) scope.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe namespace/database is now validated against the caller\u0027s authenticated level \u2014 which the request cannot change \u2014 before the endpoint is resolved or run. A target scope outside that level is rejected with `403 Forbidden`, both at the HTTP entry point and at the dispatch step shared with `api::invoke()`. Root reaches any scope; namespace principals their namespace; database and record principals their exact namespace/database; anonymous callers remain governed by the endpoint\u0027s `PERMISSIONS`.\n\n- Versions 3.2.0 and later are not affected by this issue.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers unable to patch should consider the following workarounds:\n\n- Disable the custom API HTTP route via capabilities where it is not required.\n- Treat separate deployments, not namespace/database boundaries, as the tenant isolation boundary on shared instances.\n- Prefer a `PERMISSIONS WHERE` clause that checks the authenticated identity over `PERMISSIONS FULL` (reduces exposure but does not restore the boundary).\n\n### Resources\n\n- [SurrealQL Documentation \u2014 DEFINE API](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/api)\n- [SurrealDB Documentation \u2014 Capabilities](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/security/capabilities)\n- `fix(core/api): reject cross-tenant custom API access` (included in SurrealDB 3.2.0)\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nSurrealDB thanks [sondt99](https://github.com/sondt99) for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-848m-r628-vrxw",
"modified": "2026-09-04T20:07:07Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T20:07:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-848m-r628-vrxw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63735"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/0938f88d196dc4eb11a82af343df3fffe9c195e2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/75b7154f84904d047619b5a47b08d256254dceca"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/surrealdb-before-authentication-bypass-via-custom-api"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SurrealDB: Custom API route lets authenticated callers override namespace/database scope via URL path"
}
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Nomenclature
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