GHSA-844X-J3WF-R5RF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-12 21:31 – Updated: 2025-02-12 21:31
VLAI
Details

CrowdStrike uses industry-standard TLS (transport layer security) to secure communications from the Falcon sensor to the CrowdStrike cloud. CrowdStrike has identified a validation logic error in the Falcon sensor for Linux, Falcon Kubernetes Admission Controller, and Falcon Container Sensor where our TLS connection routine to the CrowdStrike cloud can incorrectly process server certificate validation. This could allow an attacker with the ability to control network traffic to potentially conduct a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack. CrowdStrike identified this issue internally and released a security fix in all Falcon sensor for Linux, Falcon Kubernetes Admission Controller, and Falcon Container Sensor versions 7.06 and above.

CrowdStrike identified this issue through our longstanding, rigorous security review process, which has been continually strengthened with deeper source code analysis and ongoing program enhancements as part of our commitment to security resilience. CrowdStrike has no indication of any exploitation of this issue in the wild. CrowdStrike has leveraged its world class threat hunting and intelligence capabilities to actively monitor for signs of abuse or usage of this flaw and will continue to do so.

Windows and Mac sensors are not affected by this.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-1146"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-296"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-12T19:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "CrowdStrike uses industry-standard TLS (transport layer security) to secure communications from the Falcon sensor to the CrowdStrike cloud. CrowdStrike has identified a validation logic error in the Falcon sensor for Linux, Falcon Kubernetes Admission Controller, and Falcon Container Sensor where our TLS connection routine to the CrowdStrike cloud can incorrectly process server certificate validation. This could allow an attacker with the ability to control network traffic to potentially conduct a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack. CrowdStrike identified this issue internally and released a security fix in all Falcon sensor for Linux, Falcon Kubernetes Admission Controller, and Falcon Container Sensor versions 7.06 and above.\n\n \nCrowdStrike identified this issue through our longstanding, rigorous security review process, which has been continually strengthened with deeper source code analysis and ongoing program enhancements as part of our commitment to security resilience. CrowdStrike has no indication of any exploitation of this issue in the wild. CrowdStrike has leveraged its world class threat hunting and intelligence capabilities to actively monitor for signs of abuse or usage of this flaw and will continue to do so. \n\n\nWindows and Mac sensors are not affected by this.",
  "id": "GHSA-844x-j3wf-r5rf",
  "modified": "2025-02-12T21:31:53Z",
  "published": "2025-02-12T21:31:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1146"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/security-advisories/cve-2025-1146"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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