GHSA-83J6-PC2M-JHG5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-04 06:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Check sk_state before sk_protocol in bpf_tcp_*_syncookie
bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie accept a socket pointer 'sk' with argument type ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON. However, they access sk->sk_protocol without validating whether 'sk' represents a full socket.
Fix this issue by checking sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN before inspecting sk->sk_protocol in both bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie. Since mini-sockets are never in the TCP_LISTEN state, the condition short-circuits and prevents dereferencing fullsock-specific fields.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80738"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T13:06:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Check sk_state before sk_protocol in bpf_tcp_*_syncookie\n\nbpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie accept a socket pointer\n\u0027sk\u0027 with argument type ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON. However, they access\nsk-\u003esk_protocol without validating whether \u0027sk\u0027 represents a full socket.\n\nFix this issue by checking sk-\u003esk_state != TCP_LISTEN before inspecting\nsk-\u003esk_protocol in both bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie.\nSince mini-sockets are never in the TCP_LISTEN state, the condition\nshort-circuits and prevents dereferencing fullsock-specific fields.",
"id": "GHSA-83j6-pc2m-jhg5",
"modified": "2026-09-04T06:31:20Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T15:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80738"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23f682083aa3fbc0c49667818efd6979a8bc5ac2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31a420a822ff92e2090bd5d65efe8e34e2d6d9b8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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