GHSA-8398-GMMX-564H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 19:42 – Updated: 2026-03-25 03:12Impact
A vulnerability in the Python Code node allows authenticated users to break out of the Python sandbox environment and execute code outside the intended security boundary.
Only authenticated users are able to execute code through Task Runners.
This issue affected any deployment in which the following conditions were met:
- Task Runners were enabled using
N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED=true(default: false) - Python was enabled
N8N_PYTHON_ENABLED=true - Code Node was enabled (default: true)
In case the N8N_RUNNERS_MODE is set to external (default: internal) the sandbox escape is limited to the sidecar container with lower risk for lateral movement. In that case a lower high severity is more appropriate.
Patches
This vulnerability is fixed in version 2.4.8 and later.
Workarounds
If an immediate upgrade cannot be applied, the following hardening steps are recommended:
- Disable the Code Node by adding
n8n-nodes-base.codeto theNODES_EXCLUDEenvironment variable - Prefer external mode for isolation: run Task Runners in external mode so that untrusted task code executes in a separate sidecar container rather than within the main n8n process. This configuration significantly reduces the risk of in-process memory disclosure caused by unsafe buffer allocations.In external mode, a launcher manages Task Runner processes in a dedicated sidecar environment, separate from the primary n8n instance. See the [n8n documentation](https://docs.n8n.io/hosting/configuration/task-runners/) for configuration details and required environment variables.
Resources
- n8n Documentation — Task Runners — external mode, setup guide, and environment configuration details
- n8n Documentation — Blocking nodes — how to globally disable specific nodes
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25115"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-04T19:42:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T17:16:23Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nA vulnerability in the Python Code node allows authenticated users to break out of the Python sandbox environment and execute code outside the intended security boundary. \n\nOnly authenticated users are able to execute code through Task Runners.\n\nThis issue affected any deployment in which the following conditions were met:\n\n- Task Runners were enabled using\u00a0`N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED=true`\u00a0(default: false)\n- Python was enabled `N8N_PYTHON_ENABLED=true`\n- Code Node was enabled (default: true)\n\nIn case the `N8N_RUNNERS_MODE` is set to `external` (default: `internal`) the sandbox escape is limited to the sidecar container with lower risk for lateral movement. In that case a lower high severity is more appropriate.\n\n## Patches\n\nThis vulnerability is fixed in version 2.4.8 and later. \n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf an immediate upgrade cannot be applied, the following hardening steps are recommended:\n\n- Disable the Code Node by adding\u00a0`n8n-nodes-base.code`\u00a0to the\u00a0`NODES_EXCLUDE`\u00a0environment variable\n- Prefer external mode for isolation: run Task Runners in external mode so that untrusted task code executes in a separate sidecar container rather than within the main n8n process. This configuration significantly reduces the risk of in-process memory disclosure caused by unsafe buffer [allocations.In](http://allocations.in/) external mode, a launcher manages Task Runner processes in a dedicated sidecar environment, separate from the primary n8n instance. See the\u00a0[[n8n documentation](https://docs.n8n.io/hosting/configuration/task-runners/)](https://docs.n8n.io/hosting/configuration/task-runners/)\u00a0for configuration details and required environment variables.\n\n## Resources\n\n- [n8n Documentation \u2014 Task Runners](https://docs.n8n.io/hosting/configuration/task-runners/) \u2014 external mode, setup guide, and environment configuration details\n- [n8n Documentation \u2014 Blocking nodes](https://docs.n8n.io/hosting/securing/blocking-nodes/)\u00a0\u2014 how to globally disable specific nodes",
"id": "GHSA-8398-gmmx-564h",
"modified": "2026-03-25T03:12:11Z",
"published": "2026-02-04T19:42:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-8398-gmmx-564h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/8607d372f78c388bb3691d9d5b52af7259ec7b1f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "n8n has a Python sandbox escape"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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