GHSA-826X-QG76-XQJX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:32
VLAI
Details

Issue summary: OpenSSL CMP response validation passed an unexpected response sender distinguished name directly as the format string to ERR_raise_data().

Impact summary: A malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint can crash a CMP client that enforces an expected sender or uses a pinned server certificate whose subject becomes the default expected sender.

CWE: CWE-134 (Use of Externally-Controlled Format String)

Description: When validating a received CMP message, ossl_cmp_msg_check_update() converts the peer-supplied sender distinguished name with X509_NAME_oneline() and passes it directly as the format argument to ERR_raise_data(). Percent characters survive the conversion, so a sender DN such as "CN=%s%n" reaches BIO_vsnprintf() as an attacker-controlled format string with no matching variadic arguments. This path is only reached when the caller configures an expected sender or pins a server certificate, which is the normal configuration for a CMP client validating server responses.

Since the attacker controls the format string but none of the variadic arguments, such specifiers as %s and %n dereference or write through unrelated stack contents and crash the client. The reliable consequence is a denial of service, when the response comes from a malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint. There is no controlled memory write, arbitrary-address read, or reliable path to remote code execution.

FIPS impact: no

No FIPS modules are affected by this issue, as the CMP protocol implementation is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63073"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-134"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T13:19:26Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Issue summary: OpenSSL CMP response validation passed an unexpected response\nsender distinguished name directly as the format string to `ERR_raise_data()`.\n\nImpact summary: A malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint can crash a CMP client\nthat enforces an expected sender or uses a pinned server certificate whose\nsubject becomes the default expected sender.\n\nCWE: CWE-134 (Use of Externally-Controlled Format String)\n\nDescription: When validating a received CMP message, ossl_cmp_msg_check_update()\nconverts the peer-supplied sender distinguished name with X509_NAME_oneline()\nand passes it directly as the format argument to ERR_raise_data(). Percent\ncharacters survive the conversion, so a sender DN such as \"CN=%s%n\" reaches\nBIO_vsnprintf() as an attacker-controlled format string with no matching variadic\narguments. This path is only reached when the caller configures an expected\nsender or pins a server certificate, which is the normal configuration for a\nCMP client validating server responses.\n\nSince the attacker controls the format string but none of the variadic\narguments, such specifiers as %s and %n dereference or write through unrelated\nstack contents and crash the client. The reliable consequence is a denial of\nservice, when the response comes from a malicious or intercepted CMP endpoint.\nThere is no controlled memory write, arbitrary-address read, or reliable path\nto remote code execution.\n\nFIPS impact: no\n\nNo FIPS modules are affected by this issue, as the CMP protocol\nimplementation is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.",
  "id": "GHSA-826x-qg76-xqjx",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T15:32:59Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T15:32:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63073"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0cc20b322639919aa423e90799d9a57c3b4b76ca"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/6a0acc072b4d37a7cac1252a29c1ce1f00c5ec29"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7eb2e3ec9d1d4f35c8022fccd4b03398b3f33e21"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a7e5a6eea8fd3ccca6b6fbba031a5fbf8a3d93b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260825.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…