GHSA-8234-QCRX-H2V8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Hold map BTF for the memory allocator destructor record
bpf_ma_set_dtor() duplicates map->record so that the bpf_mem_alloc destructor can release the special fields of hash and rhash map elements once the allocator frees them for good. btf_record_dup() only acquires references on kernel and module BTF. Fields whose types live in the map BTF keep pointing into it: a kptr to a local type refers to map->btf, and a list_head or rb_root field carries a value_rec owned by the struct meta table of map->btf.
That borrowed state can outlive the map. When RCU callbacks are still in flight, bpf_mem_alloc_destroy() copies the allocator and defers the final drain, together with the destructor context, to a workqueue. bpf_map_free() then frees map->record and drops the map's BTF reference as soon as map_free() returns. Once the program that loaded the BTF is gone as well, the BTF is freed while the worker still uses the duplicate. The worker dereferences it through btf_is_kernel() and btf_find_struct_meta() in bpf_obj_free_fields() when destroying elements that were freed under RCU, and through btf_is_kernel() in btf_record_free() when releasing the context itself:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btf_is_kernel+0x19/0x30 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88811505dce8 by task kworker/u16:2/50 Workqueue: events_unbound free_mem_alloc_deferred Call Trace: btf_is_kernel+0x19/0x30 btf_record_free+0xc7/0xf0 htab_dtor_ctx_free+0x1a/0x30 free_mem_alloc_no_barrier+0x39/0x230 free_mem_alloc_deferred+0x2a/0x40 process_scheduled_works+0x5ce/0x9d0 worker_thread+0x42a/0x5e0 kthread+0x1f5/0x230 ret_from_fork+0x1dd/0x390 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Allocated by task 358: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x287/0x510 btf_new_fd+0xf7/0x3d0 __sys_bpf+0x487/0x840
Freed by task 0: kfree+0x186/0x560 rcu_core+0x6f6/0xd40
Freeing a map that still holds more elements than the allocator's high watermark is enough to get there, because the bulk free during teardown queues the RCU callback that makes bpf_mem_alloc_destroy() defer. Non-preallocated hash maps and resizable hash maps both register the destructor and are affected alike.
Keep one reference on the map BTF in the destructor context. Every non-kernel pointer in the duplicated record is either map->btf or memory owned by it, so a single reference covers kptrs, list heads, and rb roots, and mirrors what bpf_map_meta_alloc() does for the duplicated record of an inner map. Release it only after the duplicated record has been freed: the worker is preemptible and not in an RCU read-side critical section, so dropping the last reference first would let the BTF be freed while btf_record_free() still reads its fields.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98813"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:35Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Hold map BTF for the memory allocator destructor record\n\nbpf_ma_set_dtor() duplicates map-\u003erecord so that the bpf_mem_alloc\ndestructor can release the special fields of hash and rhash map elements\nonce the allocator frees them for good. btf_record_dup() only acquires\nreferences on kernel and module BTF. Fields whose types live in the map\nBTF keep pointing into it: a kptr to a local type refers to map-\u003ebtf,\nand a list_head or rb_root field carries a value_rec owned by the struct\nmeta table of map-\u003ebtf.\n\nThat borrowed state can outlive the map. When RCU callbacks are still in\nflight, bpf_mem_alloc_destroy() copies the allocator and defers the final\ndrain, together with the destructor context, to a workqueue.\nbpf_map_free() then frees map-\u003erecord and drops the map\u0027s BTF reference\nas soon as map_free() returns. Once the program that loaded the BTF is\ngone as well, the BTF is freed while the worker still uses the\nduplicate. The worker dereferences it through btf_is_kernel() and\nbtf_find_struct_meta() in bpf_obj_free_fields() when destroying elements\nthat were freed under RCU, and through btf_is_kernel() in\nbtf_record_free() when releasing the context itself:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btf_is_kernel+0x19/0x30\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff88811505dce8 by task kworker/u16:2/50\n Workqueue: events_unbound free_mem_alloc_deferred\n Call Trace:\n btf_is_kernel+0x19/0x30\n btf_record_free+0xc7/0xf0\n htab_dtor_ctx_free+0x1a/0x30\n free_mem_alloc_no_barrier+0x39/0x230\n free_mem_alloc_deferred+0x2a/0x40\n process_scheduled_works+0x5ce/0x9d0\n worker_thread+0x42a/0x5e0\n kthread+0x1f5/0x230\n ret_from_fork+0x1dd/0x390\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n\n Allocated by task 358:\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x287/0x510\n btf_new_fd+0xf7/0x3d0\n __sys_bpf+0x487/0x840\n\n Freed by task 0:\n kfree+0x186/0x560\n rcu_core+0x6f6/0xd40\n\nFreeing a map that still holds more elements than the allocator\u0027s high\nwatermark is enough to get there, because the bulk free during teardown\nqueues the RCU callback that makes bpf_mem_alloc_destroy() defer.\nNon-preallocated hash maps and resizable hash maps both register the\ndestructor and are affected alike.\n\nKeep one reference on the map BTF in the destructor context. Every\nnon-kernel pointer in the duplicated record is either map-\u003ebtf or memory\nowned by it, so a single reference covers kptrs, list heads, and rb\nroots, and mirrors what bpf_map_meta_alloc() does for the duplicated\nrecord of an inner map. Release it only after the duplicated record has\nbeen freed: the worker is preemptible and not in an RCU read-side\ncritical section, so dropping the last reference first would let the\nBTF be freed while btf_record_free() still reads its fields.",
"id": "GHSA-8234-qcrx-h2v8",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:04Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98813"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab39974240a0cff765f3bb9cce81d8001ffdb144"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b506f5699e145196ee29d76cf1ca1cbb2202c055"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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