GHSA-7WQV-XJF3-X35V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 19:35 – Updated: 2026-06-19 19:35
VLAI
Summary
parse-server: Stored XSS via trailing-dot filename bypassing file upload extension blocklist
Details

Impact

The default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. poc.svg.). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as image/svg+xml, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff on responses.

Patches

A filename ending in a dot is now treated as extensionless. When the parser produces an empty extension, the request handler falls back to validating the Content-Type subtype against the configured extension blocklist, matching the path that already catches truly extensionless uploads with a dangerous Content-Type. This is a follow-up to the previous fix GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc.

Workarounds

Configure the storage adapter or CDN to derive Content-Type from the filename extension instead of using the stored Content-Type, or replace the default blocklist with an explicit allowlist of needed file extensions.

Severity
2.1 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.9.1-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.6.78"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "parse-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.6.79"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53724"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-434",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T19:35:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T19:16:30Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe default file upload extension blocklist can be bypassed by appending a trailing dot to a filename whose extension would otherwise be blocked (e.g. `poc.svg.`). The trailing dot causes the extension parser to extract an empty string, which short-circuits the blocklist check, and the attacker-controlled Content-Type is forwarded to the storage adapter unchanged. Storage adapters that persist and serve the provided Content-Type (such as S3 or GCS) then serve the file with an active type such as `image/svg+xml`, enabling stored XSS when a victim opens the file URL. The default GridFS adapter is not affected because it sets `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` on responses.\n\n### Patches\n\nA filename ending in a dot is now treated as extensionless. When the parser produces an empty extension, the request handler falls back to validating the Content-Type subtype against the configured extension blocklist, matching the path that already catches truly extensionless uploads with a dangerous Content-Type. This is a follow-up to the previous fix [GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc](https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vr5f-2r24-w5hc).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nConfigure the storage adapter or CDN to derive Content-Type from the filename extension instead of using the stored Content-Type, or replace the default blocklist with an explicit allowlist of needed file extensions.",
  "id": "GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T19:35:11Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T19:35:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-7wqv-xjf3-x35v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53724"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10489"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10490"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "parse-server: Stored XSS via trailing-dot filename bypassing file upload extension blocklist"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.