GHSA-7W52-7JVM-M9VW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 19:31 – Updated: 2026-06-04 19:31
VLAI
Summary
Shopware: Timing-attack on admin panel allowing enumeration of administrator usernames
Details

Summary

There is a Proof of Concept which is able to enumerate the usernames of administrator users. This was possible by performing a timing attack.

Details

The faulty code exists in src/Core/Framework/Api/OAuth/UserRepository.php:

public function getUserEntityByUserCredentials(
        string $username,
        #[\SensitiveParameter]
        string $password,
        string $grantType,
        ClientEntityInterface $clientEntity
    ): ?UserEntityInterface {
        if ($this->loginConfigService->getConfig()?->useDefault === false) {
            // never allow login via password if the default login is disabled (e.g. using SSO only)
            return null;
        }

        $builder = $this->connection->createQueryBuilder();
        $user = $builder->select('user.id', 'user.password')
            ->from('user')
            ->where('username = :username')
            ->setParameter('username', $username)
            ->fetchAssociative();

        // PATH 1: EARLY RETURN WHEN USERNAME IS NOT FOUND
        if (!$user) {
            return null;
        }

        // PATH 2: VERIFY PASSWORD IF USER IS FOUND
        if (!password_verify($password, (string) $user['password'])) {
            return null;
        }

        return new User(Uuid::fromBytesToHex($user['id']));
    }

Subroutine getUserEntityByUserCredentials() is called when an auth request is send to api/oauth/token. If the given username is not found an early return is done (PATH 1). Only if the user is found we verify the password using password_verify.

PHP method password_verify by default uses hashing algorithm Argon2id which by design is intentionally 'slow' by introducing a timing cost to an attempt to bruteforce hashes more costly.

Since password_verify has a notable executable time, PATH 2 where an user is found and verified will be slower on average then PATH 1 where we do an early return for non-existing users.

Proposed fix

Before doing the early return, password_verify a dummy hash.

Impact

  1. More targeted dictionary/bruteforce attacks.
  2. Spear phishing / eases social engineering.
  3. Credential stuffing from other data leaks.

Authors

Niel Duysters (@NielDuysters) and Thomas Brankaer (@tbrankaer)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "shopware/platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.7.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "shopware/platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.10.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "shopware/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.7.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "shopware/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.10.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48011"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-04T19:31:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThere is a Proof of Concept which is able to enumerate the usernames of administrator users. This was possible by performing a timing attack.\n\n### Details\nThe faulty code exists in [`src/Core/Framework/Api/OAuth/UserRepository.php`](https://github.com/shopware/shopware/blob/trunk/src/Core/Framework/Api/OAuth/UserRepository.php):\n```\npublic function getUserEntityByUserCredentials(\n        string $username,\n        #[\\SensitiveParameter]\n        string $password,\n        string $grantType,\n        ClientEntityInterface $clientEntity\n    ): ?UserEntityInterface {\n        if ($this-\u003eloginConfigService-\u003egetConfig()?-\u003euseDefault === false) {\n            // never allow login via password if the default login is disabled (e.g. using SSO only)\n            return null;\n        }\n\n        $builder = $this-\u003econnection-\u003ecreateQueryBuilder();\n        $user = $builder-\u003eselect(\u0027user.id\u0027, \u0027user.password\u0027)\n            -\u003efrom(\u0027user\u0027)\n            -\u003ewhere(\u0027username = :username\u0027)\n            -\u003esetParameter(\u0027username\u0027, $username)\n            -\u003efetchAssociative();\n\n        // PATH 1: EARLY RETURN WHEN USERNAME IS NOT FOUND\n        if (!$user) {\n            return null;\n        }\n\n        // PATH 2: VERIFY PASSWORD IF USER IS FOUND\n        if (!password_verify($password, (string) $user[\u0027password\u0027])) {\n            return null;\n        }\n\n        return new User(Uuid::fromBytesToHex($user[\u0027id\u0027]));\n    }\n```\n\nSubroutine `getUserEntityByUserCredentials()` is called when an auth request is send to `api/oauth/token`. If the given username is not found an early return is done (PATH 1). Only if the user is found we verify the password using `password_verify`.\n\nPHP method `password_verify` by default uses hashing algorithm Argon2id which by design is intentionally \u0027slow\u0027 by introducing a timing cost to an attempt to bruteforce hashes more costly.\n\nSince `password_verify` has a notable executable time, PATH 2 where an user is found and verified will be slower on average then PATH 1 where we do an early return for non-existing users.\n\n### Proposed fix\nBefore doing the early return, `password_verify` a dummy hash.\n\n### Impact\n1. More targeted dictionary/bruteforce attacks.\n2. Spear phishing / eases social engineering.\n3. Credential stuffing from other data leaks.\n\n### Authors\nNiel Duysters (@NielDuysters) and Thomas Brankaer (@tbrankaer)",
  "id": "GHSA-7w52-7jvm-m9vw",
  "modified": "2026-06-04T19:31:17Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T19:31:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/security/advisories/GHSA-7w52-7jvm-m9vw"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/releases/tag/v6.6.10.18"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/releases/tag/v6.7.10.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Shopware: Timing-attack on admin panel allowing enumeration of administrator usernames"
}


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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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