GHSA-7VVJ-68JR-4VWQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 09:30 – Updated: 2026-08-06 09:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: intel-hid: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion
Since commit e2ffcda16290 ("ACPI: OSL: Allow Notify () handlers to run on all CPUs") ACPI notify handlers like the intel-hid notify_handler() may run on multiple CPU cores racing with themselves.
On convertibles and detachables (matched by DMI chassis-type 31 and 32 in dmi_auto_add_switch[]) the SW_TABLET_MODE input device is registered lazily from notify_handler() on the first tablet-mode event, via intel_hid_switches_setup(). When two such events race on different CPUs both can pass the !priv->switches check and register the priv->switches input device twice, resulting in a duplicate sysfs entry and a subsequent NULL pointer dereference.
This is the same class of bug fixed by commit e075c3b13a0a ("platform/x86: intel-vbtn: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion") for the sibling intel-vbtn driver.
Protect intel-hid notify_handler() from racing with itself with a mutex to fix this.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64603"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-06T08:16:36Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86: intel-hid: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion\n\nSince commit e2ffcda16290 (\"ACPI: OSL: Allow Notify () handlers to run on\nall CPUs\") ACPI notify handlers like the intel-hid notify_handler() may\nrun on multiple CPU cores racing with themselves.\n\nOn convertibles and detachables (matched by DMI chassis-type 31 and 32 in\ndmi_auto_add_switch[]) the SW_TABLET_MODE input device is registered\nlazily from notify_handler() on the first tablet-mode event, via\nintel_hid_switches_setup(). When two such events race on different CPUs\nboth can pass the !priv-\u003eswitches check and register the priv-\u003eswitches\ninput device twice, resulting in a duplicate sysfs entry and a subsequent\nNULL pointer dereference.\n\nThis is the same class of bug fixed by commit e075c3b13a0a (\"platform/x86:\nintel-vbtn: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion\") for the\nsibling intel-vbtn driver.\n\nProtect intel-hid notify_handler() from racing with itself with a mutex\nto fix this.",
"id": "GHSA-7vvj-68jr-4vwq",
"modified": "2026-08-06T09:30:33Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T09:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86df6499dfd232fbc1c82c0d6eb9322ca67b8cd0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6402808e552e44e9c26a9fe8395ac11703d5800"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c085d82613d5618814b84406c8b2d64f1bc305e7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eace3b3e729d5ba11794d69acfafb58a7950217c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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