GHSA-7VGM-4F6W-WJ5F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-06 18:31 – Updated: 2025-01-08 00:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/MSI: Handle lack of irqdomain gracefully
Alexandre observed a warning emitted from pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() on a RISCV platform which does not provide PCI/MSI support:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/msi/msi.h:121 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32 __pci_enable_msix_range+0x30c/0x596 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xb8/0xe2
RISCV uses hierarchical interrupt domains and correctly does not implement the legacy fallback. The warning triggers from the legacy fallback stub.
That warning is bogus as the PCI/MSI layer knows whether a PCI/MSI parent domain is associated with the device or not. There is a check for MSI-X, which has a legacy assumption. But that legacy fallback assumption is only valid when legacy support is enabled, but otherwise the check should simply return -ENOTSUPP.
Loongarch tripped over the same problem and blindly enabled legacy support without implementing the legacy fallbacks. There are weak implementations which return an error, so the problem was papered over.
Correct pci_msi_domain_supports() to evaluate the legacy mode and add the missing supported check into the MSI enable path to complete it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56760"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-06T17:15:41Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI/MSI: Handle lack of irqdomain gracefully\n\nAlexandre observed a warning emitted from pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() on a\nRISCV platform which does not provide PCI/MSI support:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/msi/msi.h:121 pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32\n __pci_enable_msix_range+0x30c/0x596\n pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x2c/0x32\n pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xb8/0xe2\n\nRISCV uses hierarchical interrupt domains and correctly does not implement\nthe legacy fallback. The warning triggers from the legacy fallback stub.\n\nThat warning is bogus as the PCI/MSI layer knows whether a PCI/MSI parent\ndomain is associated with the device or not. There is a check for MSI-X,\nwhich has a legacy assumption. But that legacy fallback assumption is only\nvalid when legacy support is enabled, but otherwise the check should simply\nreturn -ENOTSUPP.\n\nLoongarch tripped over the same problem and blindly enabled legacy support\nwithout implementing the legacy fallbacks. There are weak implementations\nwhich return an error, so the problem was papered over.\n\nCorrect pci_msi_domain_supports() to evaluate the legacy mode and add\nthe missing supported check into the MSI enable path to complete it.",
"id": "GHSA-7vgm-4f6w-wj5f",
"modified": "2025-01-08T00:30:49Z",
"published": "2025-01-06T18:31:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56760"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a60b990798eb17433d0283788280422b1bd94b18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aed157301c659a48f5564cc4568cf0e5c8831af0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1f7476e07b93d65a1a3643dcb4a7bed80d4328d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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