GHSA-7VGH-484P-PV5R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-02 21:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

firmware: stratix10-rsu: Fix NULL deref on rsu_send_msg() timeout in probe

rsu_send_msg() can return -ETIMEDOUT when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() fires while the SMC call is still pending. In stratix10_rsu_probe(), the error paths for COMMAND_RSU_DCMF_VERSION, COMMAND_RSU_DCMF_STATUS, COMMAND_RSU_MAX_RETRY and COMMAND_RSU_GET_SPT_TABLE call stratix10_svc_free_channel() - which sets chan->scl to NULL - but then fall through and queue the next request on the same channel. The next svc kthread that runs will dereference pdata->chan->scl in its receive callback path, triggering a NULL pointer dereference identical to the one fixed by commit c45f7263100c ("firmware: stratix10-rsu: Fix NULL pointer dereference when RSU is disabled") for the COMMAND_RSU_STATUS path.

Apply the same cleanup pattern to the remaining failure paths: remove the async client, free the channel, and return early so no further messages are queued on a channel whose scl has been cleared.

While at it, clean up stratix10_rsu_probe() in two ways without changing behavior:

  • Drop redundant zero-initialization of fields already cleared by devm_kzalloc(): client.receive_cb, status.* and spt0/1_address (INVALID_SPT_ADDRESS is 0x0).

  • Replace five identical 3-line error-cleanup blocks (stratix10_svc_remove_async_client() + stratix10_svc_free_channel() + return ret) with goto labels (remove_async_client, free_channel), matching the standard kernel resource-unwinding pattern and making it easier to extend the probe sequence without forgetting matching cleanup.

Also move init_completion() next to mutex_init() so sync-primitive initialization is grouped before anything that could trigger a callback.


v2: Add a minor clean-up of the function stratix10_rsu_probe() to have a centralize exit for all the rsu_send_async_msg() and rsu_send_msg().

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53204"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfirmware: stratix10-rsu: Fix NULL deref on rsu_send_msg() timeout in probe\n\nrsu_send_msg() can return -ETIMEDOUT when\nwait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() fires while the SMC call is still\npending. In stratix10_rsu_probe(), the error paths for COMMAND_RSU_DCMF_VERSION,\nCOMMAND_RSU_DCMF_STATUS, COMMAND_RSU_MAX_RETRY and COMMAND_RSU_GET_SPT_TABLE\ncall stratix10_svc_free_channel() - which sets chan-\u003escl to NULL - but then\nfall through and queue the next request on the same channel. The next svc\nkthread that runs will dereference pdata-\u003echan-\u003escl in its receive callback\npath, triggering a NULL pointer dereference identical to the one fixed by\ncommit c45f7263100c (\"firmware: stratix10-rsu: Fix NULL pointer dereference\nwhen RSU is disabled\") for the COMMAND_RSU_STATUS path.\n\nApply the same cleanup pattern to the remaining failure paths: remove the\nasync client, free the channel, and return early so no further messages are\nqueued on a channel whose scl has been cleared.\n\nWhile at it, clean up stratix10_rsu_probe() in two ways without changing\nbehavior:\n\n- Drop redundant zero-initialization of fields already cleared by\n  devm_kzalloc(): client.receive_cb, status.* and spt0/1_address\n  (INVALID_SPT_ADDRESS is 0x0).\n\n- Replace five identical 3-line error-cleanup blocks\n  (stratix10_svc_remove_async_client() + stratix10_svc_free_channel() +\n  return ret) with goto labels (remove_async_client, free_channel),\n  matching the standard kernel resource-unwinding pattern and making it\n  easier to extend the probe sequence without forgetting matching\n  cleanup.\n\nAlso move init_completion() next to mutex_init() so sync-primitive\ninitialization is grouped before anything that could trigger a\ncallback.\n\n---\nv2: Add a minor clean-up of the function stratix10_rsu_probe() to have a\n    centralize exit for all the rsu_send_async_msg() and rsu_send_msg().",
  "id": "GHSA-7vgh-484p-pv5r",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T21:32:04Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T09:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53204"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bc249d324241c64118a3018124798c28e2950f7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfd2eb9bba548a8f63c3339bb1fb9a2031a42d86"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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