GHSA-7VG6-6285-WMRM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate ipc response length before dereferencing its fields
ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size by reading length fields out of the response buffer supplied by the userspace ksmbd daemon (payload_sz, session_key_len, ngroups, ...). Those fields are read before the buffer is verified to be large enough to contain the struct they belong to, so a short response makes the read land past the end of the allocation.
handle_response() sizes entry->response purely from the netlink attribute length (nla_len()) and only guards the leading handle read, so the daemon can install a response as small as the kmalloc-8 object seen below. When ipc_msg_send_request() then calls ipc_validate_msg() for a KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST, the cast to struct ksmbd_rpc_command reads resp->payload_sz at offset 8 of an 8-byte allocation:
[ 3697.841381] ================================================================== [ 3697.844099] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800 [ 3697.846604] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888105f95910 by task kworker/4:3/20682 [ 3697.849061] [ 3697.849801] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 20682 Comm: kworker/4:3 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc3-next-20260717-virtme #117 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 3697.850077] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 3697.850303] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ 3697.850592] Call Trace: [ 3697.850794] [ 3697.850952] __dump_stack+0x21/0x60 [ 3697.851239] dump_stack_lvl+0xc2/0x100 [ 3697.851528] print_address_description+0x77/0x200 [ 3697.851816] ? ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800 [ 3697.852024] print_report+0x58/0x70 [ 3697.852316] kasan_report+0x117/0x150 [ 3697.852585] ? down_write+0x146/0x1f0 [ 3697.852809] ? ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800 [ 3697.853082] ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800 [ 3697.853385] ? __pfx_ipc_msg_send_request+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.853604] ? kasan_unpoison+0x48/0x70 [ 3697.853936] ? __pfxupread+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.854221] ksmbd_rpc_ioctl+0x380/0x520 [ 3697.854542] ? pfx_ksmbd_rpc_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.854757] ? kasan_unpoison+0x48/0x70 [ 3697.854962] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x32c/0x4e0 [ 3697.855166] ? kasan_unpoison+0x48/0x70 [ 3697.855416] fsctl_pipe_transceive+0x139/0x7a0 [ 3697.855705] ? __pfx_copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.855937] ? __pfx_fsctl_pipe_transceive+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.856388] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140 [ 3697.856620] smb2_ioctl+0x1141/0x3420 [ 3697.856994] ? __pfx_smb2_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.857182] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0 [ 3697.857655] handle_ksmbd_work+0x9ad/0x15e0 [ 3697.858034] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.858251] ? lock_release+0xf7/0x360 [ 3697.858466] ? process_scheduled_works+0x954/0x1600 [ 3697.858698] ? process_scheduled_works+0x954/0x1600 [ 3697.858905] process_scheduled_works+0xc22/0x1600 [ 3697.859368] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.859637] ? __pfx_assign_work+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.859896] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110 [ 3697.860146] worker_thread+0x975/0xee0 [ 3697.860524] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.860830] ? __kthread_parkme+0x21e/0x260 [ 3697.861105] kthread+0x3a6/0x490 [ 3697.861423] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.861643] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.861878] ret_from_fork+0x55a/0xa20 [ 3697.862194] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.862480] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 3697.862714] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 3697.862965] [ 3697.863039] [ 3697.938882] Allocated by task 20761: [ 3697.940257] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 3697.941782] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 [ 3697.943228] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3e9/0x6a0 [ 3697.944948] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750 [ 3697.946592] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x3d6/0x560 [ 3697.946977] genl_rcv_msg+0x67c/0x900 [ 3697.947224] netlink_rcv_skb+0x286/0x580 [ 3697.947488] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x80 [ 3 ---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90170"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:10Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: validate ipc response length before dereferencing its fields\n\nipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size by reading length\nfields out of the response buffer supplied by the userspace ksmbd daemon\n(payload_sz, session_key_len, ngroups, ...). Those fields are read before\nthe buffer is verified to be large enough to contain the struct they belong\nto, so a short response makes the read land past the end of the allocation.\n\nhandle_response() sizes entry-\u003eresponse purely from the netlink attribute\nlength (nla_len()) and only guards the leading handle read, so the daemon\ncan install a response as small as the kmalloc-8 object seen below. When\nipc_msg_send_request() then calls ipc_validate_msg() for a\nKSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST, the cast to struct ksmbd_rpc_command reads\nresp-\u003epayload_sz at offset 8 of an 8-byte allocation:\n\n[ 3697.841381] ==================================================================\n[ 3697.844099] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800\n[ 3697.846604] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888105f95910 by task kworker/4:3/20682\n[ 3697.849061]\n[ 3697.849801] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 20682 Comm: kworker/4:3 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc3-next-20260717-virtme #117 PREEMPT(lazy)\n[ 3697.850077] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014\n[ 3697.850303] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work\n[ 3697.850592] Call Trace:\n[ 3697.850794] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 3697.850952] __dump_stack+0x21/0x60\n[ 3697.851239] dump_stack_lvl+0xc2/0x100\n[ 3697.851528] print_address_description+0x77/0x200\n[ 3697.851816] ? ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800\n[ 3697.852024] print_report+0x58/0x70\n[ 3697.852316] kasan_report+0x117/0x150\n[ 3697.852585] ? down_write+0x146/0x1f0\n[ 3697.852809] ? ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800\n[ 3697.853082] ipc_msg_send_request+0x763/0x800\n[ 3697.853385] ? __pfx_ipc_msg_send_request+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.853604] ? kasan_unpoison+0x48/0x70\n[ 3697.853936] ? __pfx___up_read+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.854221] ksmbd_rpc_ioctl+0x380/0x520\n[ 3697.854542] ? __pfx_ksmbd_rpc_ioctl+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.854757] ? kasan_unpoison+0x48/0x70\n[ 3697.854962] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x32c/0x4e0\n[ 3697.855166] ? kasan_unpoison+0x48/0x70\n[ 3697.855416] fsctl_pipe_transceive+0x139/0x7a0\n[ 3697.855705] ? __pfx_copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.855937] ? __pfx_fsctl_pipe_transceive+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.856388] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140\n[ 3697.856620] smb2_ioctl+0x1141/0x3420\n[ 3697.856994] ? __pfx_smb2_ioctl+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.857182] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0\n[ 3697.857655] handle_ksmbd_work+0x9ad/0x15e0\n[ 3697.858034] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.858251] ? lock_release+0xf7/0x360\n[ 3697.858466] ? process_scheduled_works+0x954/0x1600\n[ 3697.858698] ? process_scheduled_works+0x954/0x1600\n[ 3697.858905] process_scheduled_works+0xc22/0x1600\n[ 3697.859368] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.859637] ? __pfx_assign_work+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.859896] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110\n[ 3697.860146] worker_thread+0x975/0xee0\n[ 3697.860524] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.860830] ? __kthread_parkme+0x21e/0x260\n[ 3697.861105] kthread+0x3a6/0x490\n[ 3697.861423] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.861643] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.861878] ret_from_fork+0x55a/0xa20\n[ 3697.862194] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.862480] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[ 3697.862714] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n[ 3697.862965] \u003c/TASK\u003e\n[ 3697.863039]\n[ 3697.938882] Allocated by task 20761:\n[ 3697.940257] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80\n[ 3697.941782] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90\n[ 3697.943228] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3e9/0x6a0\n[ 3697.944948] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750\n[ 3697.946592] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x3d6/0x560\n[ 3697.946977] genl_rcv_msg+0x67c/0x900\n[ 3697.947224] netlink_rcv_skb+0x286/0x580\n[ 3697.947488] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x80\n[ 3\n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-7vg6-6285-wmrm",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0aa8f94bfd4d818284c8a7ce0040d40ca1ec3595"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17b7d1a2b4d5473df5dca8c9a07d65021806c23a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/398cba4b646a6c08ff3d79e6b1e70e5ddae8a065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c494fcf8e89e3c970e13d78ebe62bf5d8f2b1c52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9b33376bd07bca4175f7bcc2d6034ef250f8181"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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