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GHSA-7R96-J35V-9X4X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 15:31

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nstree: check listing permission before taking a namespace reference

legitimize_ns() takes a reference on the candidate namespace before may_list_ns() has decided whether the caller may see it. The __free(ns_put) cleanup on the denied path can drop the last reference to a mount namespace while we still hold the rcu read lock, and put_mnt_ns() may sleep there. This is the same problem commit 2ec2aff3c8e2 ("ns: make sure reference are dropped outside of rcu lock") fixed for the put_user() path. Neither ns_requested() nor may_list_ns() needs a reference, both only look at the namespace type and at the caller's own namespaces, so do the checks first and take the reference last.

Splat:

Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section! WARNING: kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:332 at rcu_note_context_switch+0x238/0x2a0, CPU#5: a/3442 CPU: 5 UID: 1000 PID: 3442 Comm: a Not tainted 7.0.0-30-generic #30-Ubuntu PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x238/0x2a0 Call Trace: __schedule+0xcf/0x650 schedule+0x27/0x90 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x550/0xaf0 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20 mutex_lock+0x3b/0x50 exp_funnel_lock+0xb2/0x260 synchronize_rcu_expedited+0xe7/0x220 namespace_unlock+0x26a/0x320 put_mnt_ns+0xd3/0x120 mntns_put+0xe/0x20 do_listns+0x13e/0x560 __do_sys_listns+0x126/0x2d0 __x64_sys_listns+0x20/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2366/0x2390 do_syscall_64+0x105/0x5a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-97971"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnstree: check listing permission before taking a namespace reference\n\nlegitimize_ns() takes a reference on the candidate namespace before\nmay_list_ns() has decided whether the caller may see it. The\n__free(ns_put) cleanup on the denied path can drop the last reference to a\nmount namespace while we still hold the rcu read lock, and put_mnt_ns()\nmay sleep there. This is the same problem commit 2ec2aff3c8e2 (\"ns: make\nsure reference are dropped outside of rcu lock\") fixed for the put_user()\npath. Neither ns_requested() nor may_list_ns() needs a reference, both\nonly look at the namespace type and at the caller\u0027s own namespaces, so do\nthe checks first and take the reference last.\n\nSplat:\n\n  Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!\n  WARNING: kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:332 at rcu_note_context_switch+0x238/0x2a0, CPU#5: a/3442\n  CPU: 5 UID: 1000 PID: 3442 Comm: a Not tainted 7.0.0-30-generic #30-Ubuntu PREEMPT(lazy)\n  RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x238/0x2a0\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   __schedule+0xcf/0x650\n   schedule+0x27/0x90\n   schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30\n   __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x550/0xaf0\n   __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20\n   mutex_lock+0x3b/0x50\n   exp_funnel_lock+0xb2/0x260\n   synchronize_rcu_expedited+0xe7/0x220\n   namespace_unlock+0x26a/0x320\n   put_mnt_ns+0xd3/0x120\n   mntns_put+0xe/0x20\n   do_listns+0x13e/0x560\n   __do_sys_listns+0x126/0x2d0\n   __x64_sys_listns+0x20/0x30\n   x64_sys_call+0x2366/0x2390\n   do_syscall_64+0x105/0x5a0\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-7r96-j35v-9x4x",
  "modified": "2026-09-25T15:31:44Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T12:31:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97971"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56ea4e86832d8abe8930394473566c194d189f85"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e673bf5d88aa898e52cef5c87058c3fa845bc71"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-97971 (GCVE-0-2026-97971)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-25 10:23 – Updated: 2026-10-19 09:11

Title

nstree: check listing permission before taking a namespace reference

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nstree: check listing permission before taking a namespace reference legitimize_ns() takes a reference on the candidate namespace before may_list_ns() has decided whether the caller may see it. The __free(ns_put) cleanup on the denied path can drop the last reference to a mount namespace while we still hold the rcu read lock, and put_mnt_ns() may sleep there. This is the same problem commit 2ec2aff3c8e2 ("ns: make sure reference are dropped outside of rcu lock") fixed for the put_user() path. Neither ns_requested() nor may_list_ns() needs a reference, both only look at the namespace type and at the caller's own namespaces, so do the checks first and take the reference last. Splat: Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section! WARNING: kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:332 at rcu_note_context_switch+0x238/0x2a0, CPU#5: a/3442 CPU: 5 UID: 1000 PID: 3442 Comm: a Not tainted 7.0.0-30-generic #30-Ubuntu PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x238/0x2a0 Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0xcf/0x650 schedule+0x27/0x90 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x550/0xaf0 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20 mutex_lock+0x3b/0x50 exp_funnel_lock+0xb2/0x260 synchronize_rcu_expedited+0xe7/0x220 namespace_unlock+0x26a/0x320 put_mnt_ns+0xd3/0x120 mntns_put+0xe/0x20 do_listns+0x13e/0x560 __do_sys_listns+0x126/0x2d0 __x64_sys_listns+0x20/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2366/0x2390 do_syscall_64+0x105/0x5a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK>

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard D 53/100 over 6641 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e673bf5d88aa898e…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56ea4e86832d8abe8…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: 76b6f5dfb3fda76fce1f9990d6fa58adc711122b , < 9e673bf5d88aa898e52cef5c87058c3fa845bc71 (git) Affected: 76b6f5dfb3fda76fce1f9990d6fa58adc711122b , < 56ea4e86832d8abe8930394473566c194d189f85 (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.19 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.19 (semver) Unaffected: 7.2.7 , ≤ 7.2.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.3 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

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JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/nstree.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "9e673bf5d88aa898e52cef5c87058c3fa845bc71",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "76b6f5dfb3fda76fce1f9990d6fa58adc711122b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "56ea4e86832d8abe8930394473566c194d189f85",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "76b6f5dfb3fda76fce1f9990d6fa58adc711122b",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/nstree.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.19"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.19",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.7",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.7",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.3",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnstree: check listing permission before taking a namespace reference\n\nlegitimize_ns() takes a reference on the candidate namespace before\nmay_list_ns() has decided whether the caller may see it. The\n__free(ns_put) cleanup on the denied path can drop the last reference to a\nmount namespace while we still hold the rcu read lock, and put_mnt_ns()\nmay sleep there. This is the same problem commit 2ec2aff3c8e2 (\"ns: make\nsure reference are dropped outside of rcu lock\") fixed for the put_user()\npath. Neither ns_requested() nor may_list_ns() needs a reference, both\nonly look at the namespace type and at the caller\u0027s own namespaces, so do\nthe checks first and take the reference last.\n\nSplat:\n\n  Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!\n  WARNING: kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:332 at rcu_note_context_switch+0x238/0x2a0, CPU#5: a/3442\n  CPU: 5 UID: 1000 PID: 3442 Comm: a Not tainted 7.0.0-30-generic #30-Ubuntu PREEMPT(lazy)\n  RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x238/0x2a0\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   __schedule+0xcf/0x650\n   schedule+0x27/0x90\n   schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30\n   __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x550/0xaf0\n   __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20\n   mutex_lock+0x3b/0x50\n   exp_funnel_lock+0xb2/0x260\n   synchronize_rcu_expedited+0xe7/0x220\n   namespace_unlock+0x26a/0x320\n   put_mnt_ns+0xd3/0x120\n   mntns_put+0xe/0x20\n   do_listns+0x13e/0x560\n   __do_sys_listns+0x126/0x2d0\n   __x64_sys_listns+0x20/0x30\n   x64_sys_call+0x2366/0x2390\n   do_syscall_64+0x105/0x5a0\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e"
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The bug is reached only through the local listns() syscall (SYSCALL_DEFINE4(listns) -\u003e do_listns()/do_listns_userns() -\u003e legitimize_ns()). No remote protocol supplies any input.\nAC:L - The attacker controls both sides of the race. One process loops listns() while another creates and tears down its own mount namespaces with unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS), so legitimize_ns() ends up holding the last reference on the may_list_ns() denied path.\nPR:L - listns() has no capability gate, and may_list_ns() only filters what is returned after the reference is taken. The commit\u0027s splat shows the trigger from UID 1000, and the victim mount namespaces can be created without privilege through user namespaces.\nUI:N - The attacker\u0027s own syscalls produce both the listing and the namespace teardown. No other user takes part.\nS:U - This is corruption and a hang inside the kernel\u0027s own namespace and RCU handling. No hypervisor, IOMMU or other separately governed boundary is crossed.\nC:H - put_mnt_ns() queues call_rcu(mnt_ns_release_rcu) and then sleeps in synchronize_rcu_expedited() inside do_listns()\u0027s rcu_read_lock. On non-preemptible-RCU kernels that lets the mnt_namespace be kfree\u0027d, and next_ns_common(ns) then walks list pointers read from freed memory.\nI:H - After the use-after-free, the iterator hands a freed, reallocatable object to legitimize_ns(), which increments its refcount through ns_get_unless_inactive() and calls ns-\u003eops-\u003eput(). That gives a write primitive and an indirect call through attacker-sprayable memory.\nA:H - On PREEMPT_RCU kernels, synchronize_rcu_expedited() called from within the caller\u0027s own RCU read-side section waits on itself and hangs the task. Elsewhere the result is a sleeping-in-atomic BUG or a use-after-free crash, and an unprivileged user can repeat it at will."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:11:37.164Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
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      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e673bf5d88aa898e52cef5c87058c3fa845bc71"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56ea4e86832d8abe8930394473566c194d189f85"
        }
      ],
      "title": "nstree: check listing permission before taking a namespace reference",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
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  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-97971",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-25T10:23:11.539Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:18:58.207Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-19T09:11:37.164Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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