GHSA-7R8J-XCF8-CXQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: guard dc_sink dereferences in MST mode validation
dm_dp_mst_is_port_support_mode() reads aconnector->dc_sink->dsc_caps... for the DSC branch-throughput check, and get_conv_frl_bw()'s HDMI-PCON FRL-bandwidth path reads aconnector->dc_sink->edid_caps.max_frl_rate, both without a NULL check. dc_sink is cleared asynchronously on MST unplug, and both functions run from paths that the driver's own comments document as racing that teardown: the connector probe worker's ->mode_valid callback and a compositor's atomic check, neither of which holds the MST manager lock that the teardown path uses. The former does have an existing dsc_aux NULL check, but dsc_aux isn't reliably cleared in every path that clears dc_sink, so it doesn't cover this.
Fail the port-support check and skip the FRL conversion path when the sink is already gone.
(cherry picked from commit 7c3db8da4e039698ae198c870712428644e965c7)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98786"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:32Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amd/display: guard dc_sink dereferences in MST mode validation\n\ndm_dp_mst_is_port_support_mode() reads\naconnector-\u003edc_sink-\u003edsc_caps... for the DSC branch-throughput check,\nand get_conv_frl_bw()\u0027s HDMI-PCON FRL-bandwidth path reads\naconnector-\u003edc_sink-\u003eedid_caps.max_frl_rate, both without a NULL\ncheck. dc_sink is cleared asynchronously on MST unplug, and both\nfunctions run from paths that the driver\u0027s own comments document as\nracing that teardown: the connector probe worker\u0027s -\u003emode_valid\ncallback and a compositor\u0027s atomic check, neither of which holds the\nMST manager lock that the teardown path uses. The former does have an\nexisting dsc_aux NULL check, but dsc_aux isn\u0027t reliably cleared in\nevery path that clears dc_sink, so it doesn\u0027t cover this.\n\nFail the port-support check and skip the FRL conversion path when the\nsink is already gone.\n\n(cherry picked from commit 7c3db8da4e039698ae198c870712428644e965c7)",
"id": "GHSA-7r8j-xcf8-cxq6",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:03Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98786"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/217f64f348c90cba62164e7ff38e0ccf78a5ca09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/daa0437fe5e451856aaf8fda602a9fc2105bbd54"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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