GHSA-7Q96-F8XW-JV5J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:39 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:39Summary
A SQL injection vulnerability in Fleet's Okta conditional access integration could allow an attacker who controls a single enrolled host to read or modify arbitrary data in the Fleet database, including stored session tokens. Disclosed session tokens may be replayed to act as a global administrator, which on a managed fleet leads to remote code execution on enrolled hosts.
Impact
When Fleet Premium with Okta conditional access is configured, an unauthenticated request path that supports the conditional access integration uses a host-supplied value in a database query without proper parameterization. Because the value is reported by the host's own agent and stored verbatim, any party that controls one enrolled host (the lowest-privilege role in the product) can influence the query.
Successful exploitation could allow:
- Disclosure of arbitrary database contents, including credentials and session tokens.
- Replay of disclosed session tokens to gain global administrator access.
- Subsequent actions available to a global administrator, including running scripts on enrolled hosts.
This issue requires Fleet Premium with the Okta conditional access integration enabled. It does not affect instances where Okta conditional access is not configured.
Workarounds
If an immediate upgrade is not possible, disable the Okta conditional access integration until the patched version is deployed.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Email us at security@fleetdm.com
Join #fleet in osquery Slack
Credits
We thank @fuzzztf for responsibly disclosing this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.86.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54245"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:39:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA SQL injection vulnerability in Fleet\u0027s Okta conditional access integration could allow an attacker who controls a single enrolled host to read or modify arbitrary data in the Fleet database, including stored session tokens. Disclosed session tokens may be replayed to act as a global administrator, which on a managed fleet leads to remote code execution on enrolled hosts.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen Fleet Premium with Okta conditional access is configured, an unauthenticated request path that supports the conditional access integration uses a host-supplied value in a database query without proper parameterization. Because the value is reported by the host\u0027s own agent and stored verbatim, any party that controls one enrolled host (the lowest-privilege role in the product) can influence the query.\n\nSuccessful exploitation could allow:\n\n- Disclosure of arbitrary database contents, including credentials and session tokens.\n- Replay of disclosed session tokens to gain global administrator access.\n- Subsequent actions available to a global administrator, including running scripts on enrolled hosts.\n\nThis issue requires Fleet Premium with the Okta conditional access integration enabled. It does not affect instances where Okta conditional access is not configured.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf an immediate upgrade is not possible, disable the Okta conditional access integration until the patched version is deployed.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\nEmail us at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)\n\nJoin #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)\n\n### Credits\n\nWe thank @fuzzztf for responsibly disclosing this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-7q96-f8xw-jv5j",
"modified": "2026-08-20T18:39:42Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T18:39:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-7q96-f8xw-jv5j"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/releases/tag/fleet-v4.86.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Fleet: SQL injection in Okta conditional access endpoint allows host-controlled compromise of the Fleet database"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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