GHSA-7PW9-5JF8-R7CW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: size a connection's path set by the transport it ends up with
__rds_conn_create() computes npaths from the caller's transport before it decides whether a connection to one of the host's own addresses is to be handled by the loopback transport instead. That substitution is what an RDS/TCP socket sending to a local address gets, and after it the path init loop still runs for the TCP transport's RDS_MPATH_WORKERS paths and allocates an ordered workqueue for each, while rds_loop_conn_alloc() only ever provides transport data for path 0.
rds_conn_destroy() sizes its teardown from c_trans, by then the loopback transport, so it visits path 0 only - and rds_conn_path_destroy() would skip the other paths anyway, since it returns before destroy_workqueue() for a path without transport data. kfree(c_path) then drops the last pointers to seven workqueues. That repeats for every such connection, on every netns teardown or module unload, and every distinct local destination address is a separate connection.
Recompute npaths once the transport is final, so that creation and destruction agree on the set of paths. The c_path array stays sized for the caller's transport; the unused entries are freed with it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98560"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: size a connection\u0027s path set by the transport it ends up with\n\n__rds_conn_create() computes npaths from the caller\u0027s transport before\nit decides whether a connection to one of the host\u0027s own addresses is\nto be handled by the loopback transport instead. That substitution is\nwhat an RDS/TCP socket sending to a local address gets, and after it\nthe path init loop still runs for the TCP transport\u0027s RDS_MPATH_WORKERS\npaths and allocates an ordered workqueue for each, while\nrds_loop_conn_alloc() only ever provides transport data for path 0.\n\nrds_conn_destroy() sizes its teardown from c_trans, by then the\nloopback transport, so it visits path 0 only - and\nrds_conn_path_destroy() would skip the other paths anyway, since it\nreturns before destroy_workqueue() for a path without transport data.\nkfree(c_path) then drops the last pointers to seven workqueues. That\nrepeats for every such connection, on every netns teardown or module\nunload, and every distinct local destination address is a separate\nconnection.\n\nRecompute npaths once the transport is final, so that creation and\ndestruction agree on the set of paths. The c_path array stays sized\nfor the caller\u0027s transport; the unused entries are freed with it.",
"id": "GHSA-7pw9-5jf8-r7cw",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98560"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/670f303169d2d36f315c40f6d3d18b5ee8498fea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba3d1f480c7a3fba963e7867ad6cc557c197acbc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.