GHSA-7PR9-P5W4-7QF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 06:31 – Updated: 2026-08-27 06:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix off-by-one in rtrefcount btree root level validation
xfs_rtrefcountbt_compute_maxlevels() sets
mp->m_rtrefc_maxlevels = min(d_maxlevels, r_maxlevels) + 1;
where the trailing "+ 1" already accounts for the inode-root level, so the deepest valid on-disk root level is m_rtrefc_maxlevels - 1 and a cursor must satisfy bc_nlevels <= bc_maxlevels (= m_rtrefc_maxlevels).
The two on-disk validation paths, xfs_rtrefcountbt_verify() and xfs_iformat_rtrefcount(), check the root level with ">" instead of ">=", so a crafted rtreflink (metadir + realtime + reflink) image whose /rtgroups/N.refcount inode has bb_level == m_rtrefc_maxlevels is accepted on mount. xfs_rtrefcountbt_init_cursor() then sets bc_nlevels = bb_level + 1, exceeding bc_maxlevels by one. Since the xfs_rtrefcountbt_cur slab object is sized for exactly bc_maxlevels entries, the first btree op on such a cursor indexes bc_levels[m_rtrefc_maxlevels] past the end of the object. This is reached by the first rtrefcount cursor built after mount, via log/CoW recovery (xfs_reflink_recover_cow() during xfs_mountfs()) or an FS_IOC_GETFSMAP over the realtime device.
Reject a root level equal to m_rtrefc_maxlevels, matching the ">=" form already used by the sibling data-device refcount/rmap verifiers and the in-memory rtrmap verifier.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfs_btree_lookup (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:2101) Write of size 2 at addr ffff888018391658 by task exploit/144 xfs_btree_lookup (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:2101) xfs_btree_query_range (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:5308) xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_refcount.c:2113) xfs_reflink_recover_cow (fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c:1085) xlog_recover_finish (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3551) xfs_mountfs (fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:1158) xfs_fs_fill_super (fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1940) get_tree_bdev_flags (fs/super.c:1634) vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1694) path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4161) __x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4367) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) The buggy address belongs to the cache xfs_rtrefcountbt_cur of size 216 The buggy address is located 8 bytes to the right of allocated 216-byte region [ffff888018391578, ffff888018391650) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80537"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T15:17:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nxfs: fix off-by-one in rtrefcount btree root level validation\n\nxfs_rtrefcountbt_compute_maxlevels() sets\n\n\tmp-\u003em_rtrefc_maxlevels = min(d_maxlevels, r_maxlevels) + 1;\n\nwhere the trailing \"+ 1\" already accounts for the inode-root level, so the\ndeepest valid on-disk root level is m_rtrefc_maxlevels - 1 and a cursor must\nsatisfy bc_nlevels \u003c= bc_maxlevels (= m_rtrefc_maxlevels).\n\nThe two on-disk validation paths, xfs_rtrefcountbt_verify() and\nxfs_iformat_rtrefcount(), check the root level with \"\u003e\" instead of \"\u003e=\", so a\ncrafted rtreflink (metadir + realtime + reflink) image whose\n/rtgroups/N.refcount inode has bb_level == m_rtrefc_maxlevels is accepted on\nmount. xfs_rtrefcountbt_init_cursor() then sets bc_nlevels = bb_level + 1,\nexceeding bc_maxlevels by one. Since the xfs_rtrefcountbt_cur slab object is\nsized for exactly bc_maxlevels entries, the first btree op on such a cursor\nindexes bc_levels[m_rtrefc_maxlevels] past the end of the object. This is\nreached by the first rtrefcount cursor built after mount, via log/CoW\nrecovery (xfs_reflink_recover_cow() during xfs_mountfs()) or an\nFS_IOC_GETFSMAP over the realtime device.\n\nReject a root level equal to m_rtrefc_maxlevels, matching the \"\u003e=\" form\nalready used by the sibling data-device refcount/rmap verifiers and the\nin-memory rtrmap verifier.\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfs_btree_lookup (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:2101)\n Write of size 2 at addr ffff888018391658 by task exploit/144\n xfs_btree_lookup (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:2101)\n xfs_btree_query_range (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:5308)\n xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_refcount.c:2113)\n xfs_reflink_recover_cow (fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c:1085)\n xlog_recover_finish (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3551)\n xfs_mountfs (fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:1158)\n xfs_fs_fill_super (fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1940)\n get_tree_bdev_flags (fs/super.c:1634)\n vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1694)\n path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4161)\n __x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4367)\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)\n The buggy address belongs to the cache xfs_rtrefcountbt_cur of size 216\n The buggy address is located 8 bytes to the right of\n allocated 216-byte region [ffff888018391578, ffff888018391650)\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception",
"id": "GHSA-7pr9-p5w4-7qf6",
"modified": "2026-08-27T06:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T06:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80537"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a0ecae2ecda9f9a83a496ed05c42c4b1f5c3f2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc3144da377de5fb422d44a2311f978623f7c900"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ccebfc309441e0b37b2e6ece90f18810a489d326"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
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