GHSA-7PJR-QPVH-M339
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 20:17 – Updated: 2026-05-21 20:17Summary
Before the round-1 security sweep, pkg/builder/builder.go passed Environment.spec.builder.command directly into exec.Command(...) after a strings.Fields split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update Environment CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. /bin/sh -c '...') and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context.
Affected component
pkg/builder/builder.go:254— call site (exec.Command(buildCmd, buildArgs...)).pkg/builder/builder.go:106— input source:buildCmd, buildArgs = strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[0], strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[1:].
Impact
A subject with create / update privilege on Environment objects could:
- Cause the builder pod for any package using that environment to execute arbitrary code.
- Read whatever files the builder pod has access to inside its
/packagesshared volume (deployment archive payloads for that package). - Write arbitrary content into the
/packagesshared volume, which the fetcher subsequently uploads as the package deployment archive.
The builder pod runs in the user's namespace with the fission-builder SA (not the more-privileged executor SA), so the impact is bounded to that namespace's package contents and the builder pod's own filesystem. PR:H reflects that creating / modifying Environment CRDs is typically restricted to cluster admins or platform operators.
Root cause
pkg/builder/builder.go's build-command parser did not validate the resulting executable path. Although exec.Command does not invoke a shell, it does locate the executable via $PATH, and strings.Fields splitting allowed multiple flags / sub-arguments to be passed.
Fix
Released in v1.23.0:
- PR #3364 (commit
0f45c911) introducesBuilder.resolveBuildCommandinpkg/builder/builder.go, which: - Accepts an empty string (treated as the default
/build). - Accepts the literal
/build. - Accepts any absolute path that survives
filepath.Cleanand contains no..segments. - Rejects anything containing whitespace metacharacters or relative paths.
exec.Commandstill receives only the validated absolute path; sub-arguments continue to come fromstrings.Fieldsof the original string but are now passed positionally with no shell expansion.
Mitigation (until upgrade)
- Restrict who can create / update
EnvironmentCRDs to trusted operators only. - Audit
Environment.spec.builder.commandvalues for any non-/buildpaths. - Run the buildermgr with a tightened ServiceAccount that has no secret access in the builder namespace.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.22.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fission/fission"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.23.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46618"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250",
"CWE-269",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T20:17:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nBefore the round-1 security sweep, `pkg/builder/builder.go` passed `Environment.spec.builder.command` directly into `exec.Command(...)` after a `strings.Fields` split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update `Environment` CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. `/bin/sh -c \u0027...\u0027`) and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context.\n\n### Affected component\n\n- `pkg/builder/builder.go:254` \u2014 call site (`exec.Command(buildCmd, buildArgs...)`).\n- `pkg/builder/builder.go:106` \u2014 input source: `buildCmd, buildArgs = strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[0], strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[1:]`.\n\n### Impact\n\nA subject with `create` / `update` privilege on `Environment` objects could:\n\n1. Cause the builder pod for any package using that environment to execute arbitrary code.\n2. Read whatever files the builder pod has access to inside its `/packages` shared volume (deployment archive payloads for that package).\n3. Write arbitrary content into the `/packages` shared volume, which the fetcher subsequently uploads as the package deployment archive.\n\nThe builder pod runs in the user\u0027s namespace with the `fission-builder` SA (not the more-privileged executor SA), so the impact is bounded to that namespace\u0027s package contents and the builder pod\u0027s own filesystem. `PR:H` reflects that creating / modifying `Environment` CRDs is typically restricted to cluster admins or platform operators.\n\n### Root cause\n\n`pkg/builder/builder.go`\u0027s build-command parser did not validate the resulting executable path. Although `exec.Command` does not invoke a shell, it does locate the executable via `$PATH`, and `strings.Fields` splitting allowed multiple flags / sub-arguments to be passed.\n\n### Fix\n\nReleased in [v1.23.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.23.0):\n\n- **PR #3364** (commit `0f45c911`) introduces `Builder.resolveBuildCommand` in `pkg/builder/builder.go`, which:\n 1. Accepts an empty string (treated as the default `/build`).\n 2. Accepts the literal `/build`.\n 3. Accepts any absolute path that survives `filepath.Clean` and contains no `..` segments.\n 4. Rejects anything containing whitespace metacharacters or relative paths.\n- `exec.Command` still receives only the validated absolute path; sub-arguments continue to come from `strings.Fields` of the original string but are now passed positionally with no shell expansion.\n\n### Mitigation (until upgrade)\n\n1. Restrict who can create / update `Environment` CRDs to trusted operators only.\n2. Audit `Environment.spec.builder.command` values for any non-`/build` paths.\n3. Run the buildermgr with a tightened ServiceAccount that has no secret access in the builder namespace.",
"id": "GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339",
"modified": "2026-05-21T20:17:24Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T20:17:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3364"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.23.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Fission builder accepts arbitrary buildcmd strings from Environment.spec.builder.command, allowing the builder pod to invoke arbitrary executables"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.