GHSA-7PHJ-5CJ2-3CG5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31MISP contains an authorization flaw in the handling of remote pull and feed operations. When a non-internal pull or a feed processes incoming data and encounters an existing sharing group, the application did not verify that the remote server's organization was actually a member of that sharing group before allowing the group's metadata to be updated. The captureRemote mechanism previously stored only a boolean flag indicating whether the link was internal, and the authorization check in captureSGExisting relied solely on that flag. For non-internal pulls and feeds, the check was insufficient: a remote server whose organization was not a member of the target sharing group could still cause the group record to be modified (for example, altering the local flag, the modified timestamp, or other group properties). A feed, which has no associated server organization at all, could likewise trigger an update to an existing sharing group's metadata. The security impact is an integrity violation: an authenticated remote entity with sync or feed privileges can alter sharing group attributes that govern how data is distributed among organizations, potentially changing the local flag or other access-relevant properties of groups it does not belong to. The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with the ability to initiate a pull or feed (a sync user or feed administrator) and a target sharing group that exists on the local instance. No unauthenticated access or user interaction is required.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-133183"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "MISP contains an authorization flaw in the handling of remote pull and feed operations. When a non-internal pull or a feed processes incoming data and encounters an existing sharing group, the application did not verify that the remote server\u0027s organization was actually a member of that sharing group before allowing the group\u0027s metadata to be updated. The captureRemote mechanism previously stored only a boolean flag indicating whether the link was internal, and the authorization check in captureSGExisting relied solely on that flag. For non-internal pulls and feeds, the check was insufficient: a remote server whose organization was not a member of the target sharing group could still cause the group record to be modified (for example, altering the local flag, the modified timestamp, or other group properties). A feed, which has no associated server organization at all, could likewise trigger an update to an existing sharing group\u0027s metadata. The security impact is an integrity violation: an authenticated remote entity with sync or feed privileges can alter sharing group attributes that govern how data is distributed among organizations, potentially changing the local flag or other access-relevant properties of groups it does not belong to. The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with the ability to initiate a pull or feed (a sync user or feed administrator) and a target sharing group that exists on the local instance. No unauthenticated access or user interaction is required.",
"id": "GHSA-7phj-5cj2-3cg5",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:18Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133183"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/389ce674c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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