GHSA-7P8R-JG48-9546
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Fix demo-mode dynamic ACL dev-entry UAF vs LUN teardown
A demo-mode (generate_node_acls=1) login that allocates a dynamic NodeACL populates that ACL's per-LUN dev entries in core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() before the ACL is linked onto tpg->acl_node_list by target_add_node_acl():
core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl():
...
core_tpg_add_node_to_devs(acl, tpg, NULL); /* builds deves */
target_add_node_acl(acl); /* only now listed */
The LUN teardown sweep, core_clear_lun_from_tpg(), enumerates only tpg->acl_node_list, so a dev entry whose ACL is still in the window above is invisible to the sweep and is never disabled. It is left on the se_lun->lun_deve_list after core_tpg_remove_lun() frees the se_lun; when the same unpacked_lun is later re-added and the se_lun is reallocated at the same address, the stale dev entry is rediscovered by target_nacl_find_deve() and core_enable_device_list_for_node() corrupts lun_deve_list:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free ... core_enable_device_list_for_node+0x5ce/0x880 core_tpg_add_node_to_devs+0x169/0x190 core_dev_add_lun+0x146/0x190 target_fabric_port_link+0xe9/0x1b0 configfs_symlink+0x381/0xae0 __x64_sys_symlink+0x55/0x80
The demo-mode login path that drives the ACL/dev-entry creation is reachable by an unauthenticated initiator; the colliding LUN add/remove is a local configfs operation.
Commit 49cb77e297dc ("target: Avoid mappedlun symlink creation during lun shutdown") introduced se_lun->lun_shutdown and guarded the explicit ACL MappedLUN path (target_fabric_mappedlun_link()), but the demo-mode automatic path, core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() -> core_enable_device_list_for_node(), was never given the equivalent guard, and the publish-after-populate ordering in core_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl() was left unchanged.
Fix it in three cooperating parts:
1) Publish the dynamic NodeACL onto acl_node_list before creating its dev entries, so the teardown sweep can observe them.
2) Refuse to attach a dev entry to an se_lun that is shutting down, checked under nacl->lun_entry_mutex -- the same lock the sweep takes -- so once the sweep has passed an ACL any later enable for that LUN observes lun_shutdown and skips it.
3) In core_enable_device_list_for_node(), insert the new dev entry onto lun->lun_deve_list while still holding nacl->lun_entry_mutex, in both the replace and the new-entry branch. Previously the entry was added to nacl->lun_entry_hlist under the mutex but to lun->lun_deve_list only after dropping it; with the ACL now published early, the sweep could take the mutex in that gap, find the entry on the hlist, core_disable_device_list_for_node() it (list_del() on the not-yet- linked lun_link succeeds and the entry is freed), and then the enable would list_add_tail() the freed entry back onto lun_deve_list. Linking both lists under the mutex makes enable and the sweep mutually exclusive, closing that window.
core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() already ignores the return value of core_enable_device_list_for_node(), so a shutting-down LUN is simply skipped.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99765"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:15Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: target: Fix demo-mode dynamic ACL dev-entry UAF vs LUN teardown\n\nA demo-mode (generate_node_acls=1) login that allocates a dynamic NodeACL\npopulates that ACL\u0027s per-LUN dev entries in core_tpg_add_node_to_devs()\n*before* the ACL is linked onto tpg-\u003eacl_node_list by\ntarget_add_node_acl():\n\n\tcore_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl():\n\t\t...\n\t\tcore_tpg_add_node_to_devs(acl, tpg, NULL); /* builds deves */\n\t\ttarget_add_node_acl(acl); /* only now listed */\n\nThe LUN teardown sweep, core_clear_lun_from_tpg(), enumerates only\ntpg-\u003eacl_node_list, so a dev entry whose ACL is still in the window above\nis invisible to the sweep and is never disabled. It is left on the\nse_lun-\u003elun_deve_list after core_tpg_remove_lun() frees the se_lun; when\nthe same unpacked_lun is later re-added and the se_lun is reallocated at\nthe same address, the stale dev entry is rediscovered by\ntarget_nacl_find_deve() and core_enable_device_list_for_node() corrupts\nlun_deve_list:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free ...\n core_enable_device_list_for_node+0x5ce/0x880\n core_tpg_add_node_to_devs+0x169/0x190\n core_dev_add_lun+0x146/0x190\n target_fabric_port_link+0xe9/0x1b0\n configfs_symlink+0x381/0xae0\n __x64_sys_symlink+0x55/0x80\n\nThe demo-mode login path that drives the ACL/dev-entry creation is\nreachable by an unauthenticated initiator; the colliding LUN add/remove is\na local configfs operation.\n\nCommit 49cb77e297dc (\"target: Avoid mappedlun symlink creation during lun\nshutdown\") introduced se_lun-\u003elun_shutdown and guarded the *explicit* ACL\nMappedLUN path (target_fabric_mappedlun_link()), but the demo-mode\nautomatic path, core_tpg_add_node_to_devs() -\u003e\ncore_enable_device_list_for_node(), was never given the equivalent guard,\nand the publish-after-populate ordering in\ncore_tpg_check_initiator_node_acl() was left unchanged.\n\nFix it in three cooperating parts:\n\n 1) Publish the dynamic NodeACL onto acl_node_list *before* creating its\n dev entries, so the teardown sweep can observe them.\n\n 2) Refuse to attach a dev entry to an se_lun that is shutting down,\n checked under nacl-\u003elun_entry_mutex -- the same lock the sweep takes --\n so once the sweep has passed an ACL any later enable for that LUN\n observes lun_shutdown and skips it.\n\n 3) In core_enable_device_list_for_node(), insert the new dev entry onto\n lun-\u003elun_deve_list while still holding nacl-\u003elun_entry_mutex, in both\n the replace and the new-entry branch. Previously the entry was added\n to nacl-\u003elun_entry_hlist under the mutex but to lun-\u003elun_deve_list only\n after dropping it; with the ACL now published early, the sweep could\n take the mutex in that gap, find the entry on the hlist,\n core_disable_device_list_for_node() it (list_del() on the not-yet-\n linked lun_link succeeds and the entry is freed), and then the enable\n would list_add_tail() the freed entry back onto lun_deve_list. Linking\n both lists under the mutex makes enable and the sweep mutually\n exclusive, closing that window.\n\ncore_tpg_add_node_to_devs() already ignores the return value of\ncore_enable_device_list_for_node(), so a shutting-down LUN is simply\nskipped.",
"id": "GHSA-7p8r-jg48-9546",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99765"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a6e7d7230cd4e0a6c003bae5b85bf37a1e77b94"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78ad4413fab0cbd42c7280b5069ed2dd3f039162"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8b6eec86742f736a913aba7d7c1d0cedb1d7751"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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