GHSA-7M99-CFRM-M9CQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 06:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: NFIT: core: Fix acpi_nfit_init() error cleanup
If acpi_nfit_init() fails after adding the acpi_desc object to the acpi_descs list, that object is never removed from that list because the acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device in that case. Next, the acpi_nfit_init() failure causes acpi_nfit_probe() to fail, the acpi_desc object is freed, and a dangling pointer is left behind in the acpi_descs. Any subsequent ACPI Machine Check Exception will trigger nfit_handle_mce() which iterates over acpi_descs and so a use-after-free will occur.
Moreover, if acpi_nfit_probe() returns 0 after installing a notify handler for the NFIT device and without allocating the acpi_desc object and setting the NFIT device's driver data pointer, the acpi_desc object will be allocated by acpi_nfit_update_notify() and acpi_nfit_init() will be called to initialize it. Regardless of whether or not acpi_nfit_init() fails in that case, the acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device and acpi_desc is never removed from the acpi_descs list. If the acpi_desc object is freed subsequently on driver removal, any subsequent ACPI MCE will lead to a use-after-free like in the previous case.
To address the first issue mentioned above, make acpi_nfit_probe() call acpi_nfit_shutdown() directly on acpi_nfit_init() failures and to address the other one, add a remove callback to the driver and make it call acpi_nfit_shutdown(). Also, since it is now possible to pass NULL to acpi_nfit_shutdown() or the acpi_desc object passed to it may not have been initialized, add checks against NULL for acpi_desc and its nvdimm_bus field to that function and make acpi_nfit_unregister() clear the latter after unregistering the NVDIMM bus.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64510"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPI: NFIT: core: Fix acpi_nfit_init() error cleanup\n\nIf acpi_nfit_init() fails after adding the acpi_desc object to the\nacpi_descs list, that object is never removed from that list because\nthe acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device\nin that case. Next, the acpi_nfit_init() failure causes\nacpi_nfit_probe() to fail, the acpi_desc object is freed, and a\ndangling pointer is left behind in the acpi_descs. Any subsequent\nACPI Machine Check Exception will trigger nfit_handle_mce() which\niterates over acpi_descs and so a use-after-free will occur.\n\nMoreover, if acpi_nfit_probe() returns 0 after installing a notify\nhandler for the NFIT device and without allocating the acpi_desc\nobject and setting the NFIT device\u0027s driver data pointer, the\nacpi_desc object will be allocated by acpi_nfit_update_notify()\nand acpi_nfit_init() will be called to initialize it. Regardless\nof whether or not acpi_nfit_init() fails in that case, the\nacpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device\nand acpi_desc is never removed from the acpi_descs list. If the\nacpi_desc object is freed subsequently on driver removal, any\nsubsequent ACPI MCE will lead to a use-after-free like in the\nprevious case.\n\nTo address the first issue mentioned above, make acpi_nfit_probe()\ncall acpi_nfit_shutdown() directly on acpi_nfit_init() failures and\nto address the other one, add a remove callback to the driver and\nmake it call acpi_nfit_shutdown(). Also, since it is now possible to\npass NULL to acpi_nfit_shutdown() or the acpi_desc object passed to it\nmay not have been initialized, add checks against NULL for acpi_desc and\nits nvdimm_bus field to that function and make acpi_nfit_unregister()\nclear the latter after unregistering the NVDIMM bus.",
"id": "GHSA-7m99-cfrm-m9cq",
"modified": "2026-07-27T06:30:40Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38bf27511ef41bffebd157ec3eba41fc89ba59cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b2628f7682aea8d9ce09ad4b9a3bd144b451eaa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6ff054cc02a763914773b026cacb429e5fbf64fa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d69235bdc581a4346e9bcd6a8bea37d3e1abd25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b07d22a2d17ad6465c87bd5752bc70e4c16e0ee4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c127dbd832bd4b9aef8a749d9f491b74042f9b47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df7c92216a1583a76cb0cbf2f21cd68870609b05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee82078e776ae31266cc70fdf62ac17c3c6f100a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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