GHSA-7GWC-V56P-6JCP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/q54sj108a2) Add missing NULL pointer check
When CONFIG_DEBUG_FS is enabled and per-client PMBus debugfs directory creation fails during pmbus_do_probe(), q54sj108a2_probe() passes the NULL pointer returned by pmbus_get_debugfs_dir() to debugfs_create_dir() without validation, creating its debugfs directory at the debugfs root instead of under the client directory.
If pmbus_init_debugfs() fails to create the client directory, data->debugfs is left as NULL or an ERR_PTR, which pmbus_get_debugfs_dir() converts to NULL. Passing a NULL parent to debugfs_create_dir() places q54sj108a2_dir in the root of the debugfs filesystem and populates it with attribute files whose private data pointers reference psu->debugfs_entries. Because this root-level directory is outside the client debugfs hierarchy, PMBus core cleanup does not remove it on device unbind, leaking the debugfs entries and causing a use-after-free of the devm-allocated struct q54sj108a2_data if the orphaned files are accessed via q54sj108a2_debugfs_read() or q54sj108a2_debugfs_write() after device removal.
Fix the problem by adding the missing NULL pointer check.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99717"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (pmbus/q54sj108a2) Add missing NULL pointer check\n\nWhen CONFIG_DEBUG_FS is enabled and per-client PMBus debugfs directory\ncreation fails during pmbus_do_probe(), q54sj108a2_probe() passes the NULL\npointer returned by pmbus_get_debugfs_dir() to debugfs_create_dir()\nwithout validation, creating its debugfs directory at the debugfs root\ninstead of under the client directory.\n\nIf pmbus_init_debugfs() fails to create the client directory, data-\u003edebugfs\nis left as NULL or an ERR_PTR, which pmbus_get_debugfs_dir() converts to\nNULL. Passing a NULL parent to debugfs_create_dir() places q54sj108a2_dir\nin the root of the debugfs filesystem and populates it with attribute files\nwhose private data pointers reference psu-\u003edebugfs_entries. Because this\nroot-level directory is outside the client debugfs hierarchy, PMBus core\ncleanup does not remove it on device unbind, leaking the debugfs entries\nand causing a use-after-free of the devm-allocated struct q54sj108a2_data\nif the orphaned files are accessed via q54sj108a2_debugfs_read() or\nq54sj108a2_debugfs_write() after device removal.\n\nFix the problem by adding the missing NULL pointer check.",
"id": "GHSA-7gwc-v56p-6jcp",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99717"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73b425e6df23db056873eecce70c3f06db06ca16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5802c587da97a4ff85c04aad6043fa26640fc9b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d221b9a6e2328f52c8a3136276efbb1df9272650"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e051c87d9333b10a93fb50d6a46ab63ec64e4c98"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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