GHSA-7G63-2RPP-XVQC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-11 15:30 – Updated: 2025-09-23 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix overflow in __rb_map_vma
An overflow occurred when performing the following calculation:
nr_pages = ((nr_subbufs + 1) << subbuf_order) - pgoff;
Add a check before the calculation to avoid this problem.
syzbot reported this as a slab-out-of-bounds in __rb_map_vma:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __rb_map_vma+0x9ab/0xae0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7058 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880767dd2b8 by task syz-executor187/5836
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5836 Comm: syz-executor187 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-syzkaller-00159-gf932fb9b4074 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/25/2024 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:602 __rb_map_vma+0x9ab/0xae0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7058 ring_buffer_map+0x56e/0x9b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7138 tracing_buffers_mmap+0xa6/0x120 kernel/trace/trace.c:8482 call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:2183 [inline] mmap_file mm/internal.h:124 [inline] __mmap_new_file_vma mm/vma.c:2291 [inline] __mmap_new_vma mm/vma.c:2355 [inline] __mmap_region+0x1786/0x2670 mm/vma.c:2456 mmap_region+0x127/0x320 mm/mmap.c:1348 do_mmap+0xc00/0xfc0 mm/mmap.c:496 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1ba/0x360 mm/util.c:580 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x32c/0x5c0 mm/mmap.c:542 __do_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:89 [inline] __se_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:82 [inline] __x64_sys_mmap+0x125/0x190 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:82 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The reproducer for this bug is:
------------------------8<------------------------- #include #include #include #include #include
int main(int argc, char **argv) { int page_size = getpagesize(); int fd; void *meta;
system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_size_kb");
fd = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY);
meta = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, page_size * 5);
} ------------------------>8-------------------------
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-11T13:15:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nring-buffer: Fix overflow in __rb_map_vma\n\nAn overflow occurred when performing the following calculation:\n\n nr_pages = ((nr_subbufs + 1) \u003c\u003c subbuf_order) - pgoff;\n\nAdd a check before the calculation to avoid this problem.\n\nsyzbot reported this as a slab-out-of-bounds in __rb_map_vma:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __rb_map_vma+0x9ab/0xae0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7058\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff8880767dd2b8 by task syz-executor187/5836\n\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5836 Comm: syz-executor187 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-syzkaller-00159-gf932fb9b4074 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/25/2024\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]\n dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]\n print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:489\n kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:602\n __rb_map_vma+0x9ab/0xae0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7058\n ring_buffer_map+0x56e/0x9b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7138\n tracing_buffers_mmap+0xa6/0x120 kernel/trace/trace.c:8482\n call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:2183 [inline]\n mmap_file mm/internal.h:124 [inline]\n __mmap_new_file_vma mm/vma.c:2291 [inline]\n __mmap_new_vma mm/vma.c:2355 [inline]\n __mmap_region+0x1786/0x2670 mm/vma.c:2456\n mmap_region+0x127/0x320 mm/mmap.c:1348\n do_mmap+0xc00/0xfc0 mm/mmap.c:496\n vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1ba/0x360 mm/util.c:580\n ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x32c/0x5c0 mm/mmap.c:542\n __do_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:89 [inline]\n __se_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:82 [inline]\n __x64_sys_mmap+0x125/0x190 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:82\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nThe reproducer for this bug is:\n\n------------------------8\u003c-------------------------\n #include \u003cfcntl.h\u003e\n #include \u003cstdlib.h\u003e\n #include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n #include \u003casm/types.h\u003e\n #include \u003csys/mman.h\u003e\n\n int main(int argc, char **argv)\n {\n\tint page_size = getpagesize();\n\tint fd;\n\tvoid *meta;\n\n\tsystem(\"echo 1 \u003e /sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_size_kb\");\n\tfd = open(\"/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw\", O_RDONLY);\n\n\tmeta = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, page_size * 5);\n }\n------------------------\u003e8-------------------------",
"id": "GHSA-7g63-2rpp-xvqc",
"modified": "2025-09-23T15:31:07Z",
"published": "2025-01-11T15:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c58a812c8e49ad688f94f4b050ad5c5b388fc5d2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec12f30fe54234dd40ffee50dda8d2df10bd0871"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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