GHSA-7FRW-FR37-XC5H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hwmon: (lm87) Fix drvdata type confusion in vrm_show() and vrm_store()

When an LM87 or ADM1024 device is probed with VID support enabled, reading from or writing to the vrm sysfs attribute triggers a driver data type confusion in vrm_show() and vrm_store() in drivers/hwmon/lm87.c.

In lm87_probe(), the driver stores the struct lm87_data pointer on the I2C client via i2c_set_clientdata() and passes the struct i2c_client pointer as the drvdata argument to devm_hwmon_device_register_with_groups(), which attaches the attribute groups to the registered hwmon device with client as its driver_data. Unlike the other sysfs callbacks that retrieve client via dev_get_drvdata() and then obtain data via i2c_get_clientdata(), vrm_show() and vrm_store() assign dev_get_drvdata(dev) directly to struct lm87_data *. Dereferencing data->vrm therefore accesses the struct i2c_client instance at offsetof(struct lm87_data, vrm), causing vrm_show() to leak an unrelated byte from struct i2c_client to userspace and vrm_store() to corrupt a byte within struct i2c_client while failing to update the actual VRM value.

Fix the problem by assigning the return value from dev_get_drvdata(dev) to struct i2c_client *client and using i2c_get_clientdata() to get the actual client data.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99719"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:08Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (lm87) Fix drvdata type confusion in vrm_show() and vrm_store()\n\nWhen an LM87 or ADM1024 device is probed with VID support enabled, reading\nfrom or writing to the vrm sysfs attribute triggers a driver data type\nconfusion in vrm_show() and vrm_store() in drivers/hwmon/lm87.c.\n\nIn lm87_probe(), the driver stores the struct lm87_data pointer on the I2C\nclient via i2c_set_clientdata() and passes the struct i2c_client pointer as\nthe drvdata argument to devm_hwmon_device_register_with_groups(), which\nattaches the attribute groups to the registered hwmon device with client as\nits driver_data. Unlike the other sysfs callbacks that retrieve client via\ndev_get_drvdata() and then obtain data via i2c_get_clientdata(), vrm_show()\nand vrm_store() assign dev_get_drvdata(dev) directly to struct lm87_data *.\nDereferencing data-\u003evrm therefore accesses the struct i2c_client instance\nat offsetof(struct lm87_data, vrm), causing vrm_show() to leak an unrelated\nbyte from struct i2c_client to userspace and vrm_store() to corrupt a byte\nwithin struct i2c_client while failing to update the actual VRM value.\n\nFix the problem by assigning the return value from dev_get_drvdata(dev) to\nstruct i2c_client *client and using i2c_get_clientdata() to get the actual\nclient data.",
  "id": "GHSA-7frw-fr37-xc5h",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:09Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25ff5f904e1cb55ac700ce88db3a5a6b735b12bc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b51ff0887b9f88d042b92dd07fcdda4132f0ebc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f5888c37a1a8f5462fdf72fb07d55f23fee5005"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3b6489a11966c2e3a50574b0f08ada55530c10d"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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