GHSA-7F94-Q32G-R8M7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-17 15:31 – Updated: 2025-09-26 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: compress: fix reserve_cblocks counting error when out of space
When a file only needs one direct_node, performing the following operations will cause the file to be unrepairable:
unisoc # ./f2fs_io compress test.apk unisoc #df -h | grep dm-48 /dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 1.2M 100% /data
unisoc # ./f2fs_io release_cblocks test.apk 924 unisoc # df -h | grep dm-48 /dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 4.8M 100% /data
unisoc # dd if=/dev/random of=file4 bs=1M count=3 3145728 bytes (3.0 M) copied, 0.025 s, 120 M/s unisoc # df -h | grep dm-48 /dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 1.8M 100% /data
unisoc # ./f2fs_io reserve_cblocks test.apk F2FS_IOC_RESERVE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS failed: No space left on device
adb reboot unisoc # df -h | grep dm-48 /dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 11M 100% /data unisoc # ./f2fs_io reserve_cblocks test.apk 0
This is because the file has only one direct_node. After returning to -ENOSPC, reserved_blocks += ret will not be executed. As a result, the reserved_blocks at this time is still 0, which is not the real number of reserved blocks. Therefore, fsck cannot be set to repair the file.
After this patch, the fsck flag will be set to fix this problem.
unisoc # df -h | grep dm-48 /dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 1.8M 100% /data unisoc # ./f2fs_io reserve_cblocks test.apk F2FS_IOC_RESERVE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS failed: No space left on device
adb reboot then fsck will be executed unisoc # df -h | grep dm-48 /dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 11M 100% /data unisoc # ./f2fs_io reserve_cblocks test.apk 924
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35844"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-17T15:15:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: compress: fix reserve_cblocks counting error when out of space\n\nWhen a file only needs one direct_node, performing the following\noperations will cause the file to be unrepairable:\n\nunisoc # ./f2fs_io compress test.apk\nunisoc #df -h | grep dm-48\n/dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 1.2M 100% /data\n\nunisoc # ./f2fs_io release_cblocks test.apk\n924\nunisoc # df -h | grep dm-48\n/dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 4.8M 100% /data\n\nunisoc # dd if=/dev/random of=file4 bs=1M count=3\n3145728 bytes (3.0 M) copied, 0.025 s, 120 M/s\nunisoc # df -h | grep dm-48\n/dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 1.8M 100% /data\n\nunisoc # ./f2fs_io reserve_cblocks test.apk\nF2FS_IOC_RESERVE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS failed: No space left on device\n\nadb reboot\nunisoc # df -h | grep dm-48\n/dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 11M 100% /data\nunisoc # ./f2fs_io reserve_cblocks test.apk\n0\n\nThis is because the file has only one direct_node. After returning\nto -ENOSPC, reserved_blocks += ret will not be executed. As a result,\nthe reserved_blocks at this time is still 0, which is not the real\nnumber of reserved blocks. Therefore, fsck cannot be set to repair\nthe file.\n\nAfter this patch, the fsck flag will be set to fix this problem.\n\nunisoc # df -h | grep dm-48\n/dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 1.8M 100% /data\nunisoc # ./f2fs_io reserve_cblocks test.apk\nF2FS_IOC_RESERVE_COMPRESS_BLOCKS failed: No space left on device\n\nadb reboot then fsck will be executed\nunisoc # df -h | grep dm-48\n/dev/block/dm-48 112G 112G 11M 100% /data\nunisoc # ./f2fs_io reserve_cblocks test.apk\n924",
"id": "GHSA-7f94-q32g-r8m7",
"modified": "2025-09-26T18:31:17Z",
"published": "2024-05-17T15:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35844"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f6d721e14b69d6e1251f69fa238b48e8374e25f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/569c198c9e2093fd29cc071856a4e548fda506bc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/889846dfc8ee2cf31148a44bfd2faeb2faadc685"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0bf89e84c3afb79d7a3a9e4bc853ad6a3245c0a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa3ac8b1a227d9b470b87972494293348b5839ee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc0aed88afbf6f606205129a7466eebdf528e3f3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/30/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/30/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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