GHSA-7C47-VXFH-P7Q4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-06-24 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix BUG_ON in __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() due to stale blob size

The generic/642 test-case can reproduce the kernel crash:

[40243.605254] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [40243.605956] kernel BUG at fs/ceph/xattr.c:918! [40243.607142] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [40243.608067] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 498762 Comm: kworker/7:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(full) [40243.609700] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [40243.611820] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [40243.612715] RIP: 0010:__ceph_build_xattrs_blob+0x1b8/0x1e0 [40243.613731] Code: 0f 84 82 fe ff ff e9 cf 8e 56 ff 48 8d 65 e8 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 4c 8b 62 08 41 8b 85 24 07 00 00 49 83 c4 04 41 89 44 24 fc [40243.616888] RSP: 0018:ffffcc80c4d4b688 EFLAGS: 00010287 [40243.617773] RAX: 0000000000010026 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [40243.618928] RDX: ffff8a773798dee0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [40243.620158] RBP: ffffcc80c4d4b6a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [40243.621573] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a75f3b58000 [40243.622907] R13: ffff8a75f3b58000 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: 000000000000bffd [40243.624054] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a787d1b4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [40243.625331] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [40243.626269] CR2: 000072f390b623c0 CR3: 000000011c02a003 CR4: 0000000000372ef0 [40243.627408] Call Trace: [40243.627839] [40243.628188] __prep_cap+0x3fd/0x4a0 [40243.628789] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4e/0xe0 [40243.629474] ceph_check_caps+0x46a/0xc80 [40243.630094] ? __lock_acquire+0x4a2/0x2650 [40243.630773] ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90 [40243.631347] ? handle_cap_grant+0x79f/0x1060 [40243.632068] ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300 [40243.632696] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3e/0x340 [40243.633429] ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300 [40243.634052] handle_cap_grant+0xcf6/0x1060 [40243.634745] ceph_handle_caps+0x122b/0x2110 [40243.635415] mds_dispatch+0x5bd/0x2160 [40243.636034] ? ceph_con_process_message+0x65/0x190 [40243.636828] ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300 [40243.637431] ceph_con_process_message+0x7a/0x190 [40243.638184] ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0 [40243.638749] ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0 [40243.639268] process_message+0x16/0x1a0 [40243.639915] ? sg_free_table+0x39/0x90 [40243.640572] ceph_con_v2_try_read+0xf58/0x2120 [40243.641255] ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x300 [40243.641863] ceph_con_workfn+0x151/0x820 [40243.642493] process_one_work+0x22f/0x630 [40243.643093] ? process_one_work+0x254/0x630 [40243.643770] worker_thread+0x1e2/0x400 [40243.644332] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [40243.645020] kthread+0x109/0x140 [40243.645560] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [40243.646125] ret_from_fork+0x3f8/0x480 [40243.646752] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [40243.647316] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [40243.647919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [40243.648556] [40243.648902] Modules linked in: overlay hctr2 libpolyval chacha libchacha adiantum libnh libpoly1305 essiv intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common skx_edac_common nfit kvm_intel kvm irqbypass joydev ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel rapl input_leds mac_hid psmouse vga16fb serio_raw vgastate floppy i2c_piix4 pata_acpi bochs qemu_fw_cfg i2c_smbus sch_fq_codel rbd dm_crypt msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore [40243.654766] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Commit d93231a6bc8a ("ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS maximum xattr size") moved the required_blob_size computation to before the __build_xattrs() call, introducing a race.

__build_xattrs() releases and reacquires i_ceph_lock during execution. In that window, handle_cap_grant() may update i_xattrs.blob with a newer MDS-provided blob and bump i_xattrs.version. When __bui ---truncated---

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52961"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:06Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix BUG_ON in __ceph_build_xattrs_blob() due to stale blob size\n\nThe generic/642 test-case can reproduce the kernel crash:\n\n[40243.605254] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[40243.605956] kernel BUG at fs/ceph/xattr.c:918!\n[40243.607142] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI\n[40243.608067] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 498762 Comm: kworker/7:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(full)\n[40243.609700] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 25.10 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, + 10.1 machine, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\n[40243.611820] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn\n[40243.612715] RIP: 0010:__ceph_build_xattrs_blob+0x1b8/0x1e0\n[40243.613731] Code: 0f 84 82 fe ff ff e9 cf 8e 56 ff 48 8d 65 e8 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d 31 d2 31 c9 31 f6 31 ff 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 c3 cc cc cc cc \u003c0f\u003e 0b 4c 8b 62 08 41 8b 85 24 07 00 00 49 83 c4 04 41 89 44 24 fc\n[40243.616888] RSP: 0018:ffffcc80c4d4b688 EFLAGS: 00010287\n[40243.617773] RAX: 0000000000010026 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000\n[40243.618928] RDX: ffff8a773798dee0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000\n[40243.620158] RBP: ffffcc80c4d4b6a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000\n[40243.621573] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a75f3b58000\n[40243.622907] R13: ffff8a75f3b58000 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: 000000000000bffd\n[40243.624054] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a787d1b4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[40243.625331] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[40243.626269] CR2: 000072f390b623c0 CR3: 000000011c02a003 CR4: 0000000000372ef0\n[40243.627408] Call Trace:\n[40243.627839]  \u003cTASK\u003e\n[40243.628188]  __prep_cap+0x3fd/0x4a0\n[40243.628789]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4e/0xe0\n[40243.629474]  ceph_check_caps+0x46a/0xc80\n[40243.630094]  ? __lock_acquire+0x4a2/0x2650\n[40243.630773]  ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90\n[40243.631347]  ? handle_cap_grant+0x79f/0x1060\n[40243.632068]  ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300\n[40243.632696]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3e/0x340\n[40243.633429]  ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300\n[40243.634052]  handle_cap_grant+0xcf6/0x1060\n[40243.634745]  ceph_handle_caps+0x122b/0x2110\n[40243.635415]  mds_dispatch+0x5bd/0x2160\n[40243.636034]  ? ceph_con_process_message+0x65/0x190\n[40243.636828]  ? lock_release+0xd9/0x300\n[40243.637431]  ceph_con_process_message+0x7a/0x190\n[40243.638184]  ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0\n[40243.638749]  ? kfree+0x311/0x4f0\n[40243.639268]  process_message+0x16/0x1a0\n[40243.639915]  ? sg_free_table+0x39/0x90\n[40243.640572]  ceph_con_v2_try_read+0xf58/0x2120\n[40243.641255]  ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x300\n[40243.641863]  ceph_con_workfn+0x151/0x820\n[40243.642493]  process_one_work+0x22f/0x630\n[40243.643093]  ? process_one_work+0x254/0x630\n[40243.643770]  worker_thread+0x1e2/0x400\n[40243.644332]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n[40243.645020]  kthread+0x109/0x140\n[40243.645560]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[40243.646125]  ret_from_fork+0x3f8/0x480\n[40243.646752]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[40243.647316]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[40243.647919]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n[40243.648556]  \u003c/TASK\u003e\n[40243.648902] Modules linked in: overlay hctr2 libpolyval chacha libchacha adiantum libnh libpoly1305 essiv intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common skx_edac_common nfit kvm_intel kvm irqbypass joydev ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel rapl input_leds mac_hid psmouse vga16fb serio_raw vgastate floppy i2c_piix4 pata_acpi bochs qemu_fw_cfg i2c_smbus sch_fq_codel rbd dm_crypt msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore\n[40243.654766] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nCommit d93231a6bc8a (\"ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS\nmaximum xattr size\") moved the required_blob_size computation to before\nthe __build_xattrs() call, introducing a race.\n\n__build_xattrs() releases and reacquires i_ceph_lock during execution.\nIn that window, handle_cap_grant() may update i_xattrs.blob with a\nnewer MDS-provided blob and bump i_xattrs.version.  When\n__bui\n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-7c47-vxfh-p7q4",
  "modified": "2026-06-24T18:32:41Z",
  "published": "2026-06-24T18:32:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52961"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c22d9511cbde746622f8e4c11aaa63fe76d45f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/368d21ae9081c93497b1c8163bed3eddcb2443ff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7eb72425c4e3234926502eb262f9d6193ccd572c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5bd8b4e39cfa8b087448adcd48088065cd629d5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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