GHSA-79VX-V9MV-WVFF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup: serialize migrations of newly forked processes
With favordynmods enabled, a cgroup.procs migration takes the target threadgroup's cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem for writing. A process fork holds the forking threadgroup's semaphore for reading. These are different semaphores when fork creates a new process.
copy_process() publishes the child's PID before cgroup_post_fork() links the child to its css_set. A writer can find the child in that interval, take its uncontended semaphore, and migrate it while child->cgroups still points to init_css_set and child->cg_list is empty. Migration links the node into init_css_set.mg_tasks. cgroup_post_fork() then adds the same node to the intended css_set as though it were unlinked, corrupting both task lists and their css_set ownership.
This regresses the fork/migration race fixed by commit b12b533fa523 ("cgroups: add lock for child->cgroups in cgroup_post_fork()") and restored again in 2012 after the lock had been removed. The old task_lock protection was later superseded by global css_set and cgroup threadgroup locking. The change identified by the Fixes tag narrowed only the migration side back to a per-threadgroup lock, recreating the different-process exclusion failure.
Take the new threadgroup's semaphore for reading before the child becomes visible and hold it through cgroup_post_fork(). Use a nested lock subclass because fork already holds the parent's semaphore. CLONE_THREAD children share the parent's signal_struct and remain covered by the existing lock. Migrations of unrelated, fully initialized threadgroups remain concurrent.
An AI coding assistant was used to identify and reproduce the regression and to develop and test this fix.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99530"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:08Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncgroup: serialize migrations of newly forked processes\n\nWith favordynmods enabled, a cgroup.procs migration takes the target\nthreadgroup\u0027s cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem for writing. A process fork holds\nthe forking threadgroup\u0027s semaphore for reading. These are different\nsemaphores when fork creates a new process.\n\ncopy_process() publishes the child\u0027s PID before cgroup_post_fork() links\nthe child to its css_set. A writer can find the child in that interval,\ntake its uncontended semaphore, and migrate it while child-\u003ecgroups still\npoints to init_css_set and child-\u003ecg_list is empty. Migration links the\nnode into init_css_set.mg_tasks. cgroup_post_fork() then adds the same\nnode to the intended css_set as though it were unlinked, corrupting both\ntask lists and their css_set ownership.\n\nThis regresses the fork/migration race fixed by commit b12b533fa523\n(\"cgroups: add lock for child-\u003ecgroups in cgroup_post_fork()\") and\nrestored again in 2012 after the lock had been removed. The old task_lock\nprotection was later superseded by global css_set and cgroup threadgroup\nlocking. The change identified by the Fixes tag narrowed only the migration\nside back to a per-threadgroup lock, recreating the different-process\nexclusion failure.\n\nTake the new threadgroup\u0027s semaphore for reading before the child becomes\nvisible and hold it through cgroup_post_fork(). Use a nested lock subclass\nbecause fork already holds the parent\u0027s semaphore. CLONE_THREAD children\nshare the parent\u0027s signal_struct and remain covered by the existing lock.\nMigrations of unrelated, fully initialized threadgroups remain concurrent.\n\nAn AI coding assistant was used to identify and reproduce the regression\nand to develop and test this fix.",
"id": "GHSA-79vx-v9mv-wvff",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99530"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13610241843ccd928d83c6d51b5e044e4faf56c8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf6fbf46b5ff68c4eebad5aa52309eb124f4509c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3d5560fb7550e74fb9851826d7dab505ffd05e0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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