GHSA-794M-32R5-9J84

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

SUNRPC: Reject a socket that already has an svc_sock attached

Writing the same socket descriptor to /proc/fs/nfsd/portlist twice attaches a second svc_sock to one socket. svc_setup_socket() saves the socket's callbacks before installing its own, so the second attach records svc_write_space() as the old write_space callback. svc_udp_init() invokes that callback by way of svc_sock_setbufsize(), and svc_write_space() then calls itself until the kernel stack is exhausted:

BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc900037d7ff8 svc_write_space+0x90/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:429 svc_write_space+0xe6/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:430 ... 700 more ... svc_sock_setbufsize+0x18d/0x220 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:386 svc_udp_init net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:854 [inline] svc_setup_socket+0xb2f/0x1090 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1498 svc_addsock+0x2fd/0x760 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1547 __write_ports_addfd fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:742 [inline] write_ports+0xa5b/0xcc0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:861 nfsctl_transaction_write+0x106/0x1a0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:112

svc_data_ready() and svc_tcp_state_change() chain through their saved callbacks the same way, so a TCP descriptor added twice recurses on the next incoming segment instead. Reaching any of this takes a writer on portlist, and the nfsd filesystem sets no FS_USERNS_MOUNT, so the reproducer needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace.

Reject a socket that already carries sk_user_data. svc_setup_socket() overwrites that field unconditionally, so a socket some other consumer has claimed is one NFSD would corrupt whether or not the callbacks recurse.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99353"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:46Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: Reject a socket that already has an svc_sock attached\n\nWriting the same socket descriptor to /proc/fs/nfsd/portlist twice\nattaches a second svc_sock to one socket. svc_setup_socket() saves\nthe socket\u0027s callbacks before installing its own, so the second\nattach records svc_write_space() as the old write_space callback.\nsvc_udp_init() invokes that callback by way of svc_sock_setbufsize(),\nand svc_write_space() then calls itself until the kernel stack is\nexhausted:\n\n  BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc900037d7ff8\n   svc_write_space+0x90/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:429\n   svc_write_space+0xe6/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:430\n   ... 700 more ...\n   svc_sock_setbufsize+0x18d/0x220 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:386\n   svc_udp_init net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:854 [inline]\n   svc_setup_socket+0xb2f/0x1090 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1498\n   svc_addsock+0x2fd/0x760 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1547\n   __write_ports_addfd fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:742 [inline]\n   write_ports+0xa5b/0xcc0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:861\n   nfsctl_transaction_write+0x106/0x1a0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:112\n\nsvc_data_ready() and svc_tcp_state_change() chain through their saved\ncallbacks the same way, so a TCP descriptor added twice recurses on\nthe next incoming segment instead. Reaching any of this takes a\nwriter on portlist, and the nfsd filesystem sets no FS_USERNS_MOUNT,\nso the reproducer needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace.\n\nReject a socket that already carries sk_user_data. svc_setup_socket()\noverwrites that field unconditionally, so a socket some other\nconsumer has claimed is one NFSD would corrupt whether or not the\ncallbacks recurse.",
  "id": "GHSA-794m-32r5-9j84",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99353"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0995447b8059c4d23853cdcddbe789c4a2b6bb88"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42923e0fc817a7e78d1a5e7cb82966d27919e332"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/514ce838b4f26780fa31da7d7f1e30d696ea6a9e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f44daa50489fede01012c575d9f5e7b11a212fe4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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