GHSA-78HR-GPP6-3QPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: drain and invalidate before server-side copy/clone
cifs_file_copychunk_range() and the clone (FICLONE) path of cifs_remap_file_range() do not serialise the destination page cache against the server-side copy the way the other server-side range operations (smb3_zero_range(), smb3_punch_hole(), smb3_collapse_range() and smb3_insert_range()) do.
cifs_file_copychunk_range() invalidates the destination range with filemap_invalidate_inode(), which takes and drops the mapping's invalidate_lock internally, so the lock is no longer held when the copychunk ioctl is issued. It also never drains in-flight netfs I/O on the target. The clone path never takes the invalidate_lock at all (only i_rwsem), uses a bare truncate_inode_pages_range() and likewise does not drain outstanding I/O.
As a result an asynchronous destination writeback can complete after the server-side copy/clone has run and reinstate stale data over the region just written by the server, corrupting the file. This is the same class of corruption as commit d7d2adcd022b ("smb/client: flush dirty data before punching a hole") and has been seen randomly in generic/363 against Windows Server.
Fix both paths to follow the established ordering: hold the target mapping's invalidate_lock across the flush and invalidation of the destination and the server ioctl, and call netfs_wait_for_outstanding_io() on the target to drain in-flight writes before the ioctl is issued. Only the target inode's invalidate_lock is required, as the source is merely flushed and not invalidated; i_rwsem (already held via lock_two_nondirectories()) is acquired before the invalidate_lock, matching the VFS lock ordering. Since filemap_invalidate_inode() takes that same lock internally, replace it with its own unmap/flush/invalidate steps instead of calling it, and return early on a zero-length copy to avoid a range underflow.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98682"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:21Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: drain and invalidate before server-side copy/clone\n\ncifs_file_copychunk_range() and the clone (FICLONE) path of\ncifs_remap_file_range() do not serialise the destination page cache\nagainst the server-side copy the way the other server-side range\noperations (smb3_zero_range(), smb3_punch_hole(), smb3_collapse_range()\nand smb3_insert_range()) do.\n\ncifs_file_copychunk_range() invalidates the destination range with\nfilemap_invalidate_inode(), which takes and drops the mapping\u0027s\ninvalidate_lock internally, so the lock is no longer held when the\ncopychunk ioctl is issued. It also never drains in-flight netfs I/O on\nthe target. The clone path never takes the invalidate_lock at all (only\ni_rwsem), uses a bare truncate_inode_pages_range() and likewise does not\ndrain outstanding I/O.\n\nAs a result an asynchronous destination writeback can complete after the\nserver-side copy/clone has run and reinstate stale data over the region\njust written by the server, corrupting the file. This is the same class\nof corruption as commit d7d2adcd022b (\"smb/client: flush dirty data\nbefore punching a hole\") and has been seen randomly in generic/363\nagainst Windows Server.\n\nFix both paths to follow the established ordering: hold the target\nmapping\u0027s invalidate_lock across the flush and invalidation of the\ndestination and the server ioctl, and call netfs_wait_for_outstanding_io()\non the target to drain in-flight writes before the ioctl is issued. Only\nthe target inode\u0027s invalidate_lock is required, as the source is merely\nflushed and not invalidated; i_rwsem (already held via\nlock_two_nondirectories()) is acquired before the invalidate_lock,\nmatching the VFS lock ordering. Since filemap_invalidate_inode() takes\nthat same lock internally, replace it with its own unmap/flush/invalidate\nsteps instead of calling it, and return early on a zero-length copy to\navoid a range underflow.",
"id": "GHSA-78hr-gpp6-3qpr",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:31:59Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98682"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b1194e8ec99d95db25db45edd2fbf690f043ab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc71660f11ef2fecc0695a41e49cd496a9d255ab"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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