GHSA-77Q7-746M-WX38

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PCI: Allow per function PCI slots to fix slot reset on s390

On s390 systems, which use a machine level hypervisor, PCI devices are always accessed through a form of PCI pass-through which fundamentally operates on a per PCI function granularity. This is also reflected in the s390 PCI hotplug driver which creates hotplug slots for individual PCI functions. Its reset_slot() function, which is a wrapper for zpci_hot_reset_device(), thus also resets individual functions.

Currently, the pci_create_slot() assigns the same pci_slot object to multifunction devices. This approach worked fine on s390 systems that only exposed virtual functions as individual PCI domains to the operating system. Since commit 44510d6fa0c0 ("s390/pci: Handling multifunctions") s390 supports exposing the topology of multifunction PCI devices by grouping them in a shared PCI domain. This creates a problem when resetting a function through the hotplug driver's slot_reset() interface.

When attempting to reset a function through the hotplug driver, the shared slot assignment causes the wrong function to be reset instead of the intended one. It also leaks memory as we do create a pci_slot object for the function, but don't correctly free it in pci_slot_release().

Add a flag for struct pci_slot to allow per function PCI slots for functions managed through a hypervisor, which exposes individual PCI functions while retaining the topology. Since we can use all 8 bits for slot 'number' (for ARI devices), change slot 'number' u16 to account for special values PCI_SLOT_PLACEHOLDER and PCI_SLOT_ALL_DEVICES.

Severity
8.4 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89795"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:44Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI: Allow per function PCI slots to fix slot reset on s390\n\nOn s390 systems, which use a machine level hypervisor, PCI devices are\nalways accessed through a form of PCI pass-through which fundamentally\noperates on a per PCI function granularity. This is also reflected in the\ns390 PCI hotplug driver which creates hotplug slots for individual PCI\nfunctions. Its reset_slot() function, which is a wrapper for\nzpci_hot_reset_device(), thus also resets individual functions.\n\nCurrently, the pci_create_slot() assigns the same pci_slot object to\nmultifunction devices. This approach worked fine on s390 systems that only\nexposed virtual functions as individual PCI domains to the operating\nsystem.  Since commit 44510d6fa0c0 (\"s390/pci: Handling multifunctions\")\ns390 supports exposing the topology of multifunction PCI devices by\ngrouping them in a shared PCI domain. This creates a problem when resetting\na function through the hotplug driver\u0027s slot_reset() interface.\n\nWhen attempting to reset a function through the hotplug driver, the shared\nslot assignment causes the wrong function to be reset instead of the\nintended one. It also leaks memory as we do create a pci_slot object for\nthe function, but don\u0027t correctly free it in pci_slot_release().\n\nAdd a flag for struct pci_slot to allow per function PCI slots for\nfunctions managed through a hypervisor, which exposes individual PCI\nfunctions while retaining the topology. Since we can use all 8 bits for\nslot \u0027number\u0027 (for ARI devices), change slot \u0027number\u0027 u16 to account for\nspecial values PCI_SLOT_PLACEHOLDER and PCI_SLOT_ALL_DEVICES.",
  "id": "GHSA-77q7-746m-wx38",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:27Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T12:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89795"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d1a7d67f45645106578d65181e4e492dd20ed79"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2050d900f9adbd6d6f38d30e182bcd9ad3108467"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afdd497ca3836eda13530ab75b416d52f6d6129a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4a80e9e639cf09ef5c66b7f262c9cb5ab37bdde"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcc5bec09e23bbc4f9de055a11fce9937244f2c8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecdcceed4d377b02d4ea036b65f83f962c38ede7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.