GHSA-77G4-PMV2-VCJJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 15:31 – Updated: 2025-02-18 18:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

clk: clk-loongson2: Fix potential buffer overflow in flexible-array member access

Flexible-array member hws in struct clk_hw_onecell_data is annotated with the counted_by() attribute. This means that when memory is allocated for this array, the counter, which in this case is member num in the flexible structure, should be set to the maximum number of elements the flexible array can contain, or fewer.

In this case, the total number of elements for the flexible array is determined by variable clks_num when allocating heap space via devm_kzalloc(), as shown below:

289 struct loongson2_clk_provider *clp; ... 296 for (p = data; p->name; p++) 297 clks_num++; 298 299 clp = devm_kzalloc(dev, struct_size(clp, clk_data.hws, clks_num), 300 GFP_KERNEL);

So, clp->clk_data.num should be set to clks_num or less, and not exceed clks_num, as is currently the case. Otherwise, if data is written into clp->clk_data.hws[clks_num], the instrumentation provided by the compiler won't detect the overflow, leading to a memory corruption bug at runtime.

Fix this issue by setting clp->clk_data.num to clks_num.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-53192"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-120"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T14:15:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nclk: clk-loongson2: Fix potential buffer overflow in flexible-array member access\n\nFlexible-array member `hws` in `struct clk_hw_onecell_data` is annotated\nwith the `counted_by()` attribute. This means that when memory is\nallocated for this array, the _counter_, which in this case is member\n`num` in the flexible structure, should be set to the maximum number of\nelements the flexible array can contain, or fewer.\n\nIn this case, the total number of elements for the flexible array is\ndetermined by variable `clks_num` when allocating heap space via\n`devm_kzalloc()`, as shown below:\n\n289         struct loongson2_clk_provider *clp;\n\t...\n296         for (p = data; p-\u003ename; p++)\n297                 clks_num++;\n298\n299         clp = devm_kzalloc(dev, struct_size(clp, clk_data.hws, clks_num),\n300                            GFP_KERNEL);\n\nSo, `clp-\u003eclk_data.num` should be set to `clks_num` or less, and not\nexceed `clks_num`, as is currently the case. Otherwise, if data is\nwritten into `clp-\u003eclk_data.hws[clks_num]`, the instrumentation\nprovided by the compiler won\u0027t detect the overflow, leading to a\nmemory corruption bug at runtime.\n\nFix this issue by setting `clp-\u003eclk_data.num` to `clks_num`.",
  "id": "GHSA-77g4-pmv2-vcjj",
  "modified": "2025-02-18T18:33:09Z",
  "published": "2024-12-27T15:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53192"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02fb4f0084331ef72c28d0c70fcb15d1bea369ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bf8877150128c3abd9d233886a05f6966fbf0c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b96fc194984d0c82de1ca2b4166b35b1298b216c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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