GHSA-772J-V3X2-5PRG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: fix overflow in dacloffset bounds check in build_sec_desc()

When the large dacl_offset is provided, dacl_offset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) overflows on 32-bit builds and the check is passed, Which makes le16_to_cpu(ppdacl_ptr->size) read out-of-bounds. This only happens for dacl_offset in range [0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFFF]. So the oob read is max 8 bytes preceding the allocated ppntsd.

unsigned int dacl_offset = le32_to_cpu(ppntsd->dacloffset);
int ppdacl_size, ntacl_size = ppntsd_size - dacl_offset;

if (!dacl_offset ||
(dacl_offset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) > ppntsd_size))
    goto out;

Commit beff0bc9d69b ("ksmbd: fix overflow in dacloffset bounds check") fixes similar checks in other functions. But leaves this one out, because it is only valid for 32-bit builds.

Reproduced on 32-bit ARM with KASAN, by a client sending SMB2 SET_INFO(SEC) with dacloffset=0xfffffff8, then QUERY_INFO(SEC) on the same file:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in build_sec_desc (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c:1105) Read of size 2 at addr c2a273fa by task kworker/1:1/35 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 35 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc2+ #5 Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work Call trace: kasan_check_range from build_sec_desc (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c:1105) build_sec_desc from smb2_query_info (fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:7676) smb2_query_info from handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:160) handle_ksmbd_work from process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3401) process_one_work from worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3473) worker_thread from kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)

Add overflow check.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99309"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:06Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix overflow in dacloffset bounds check in build_sec_desc()\n\nWhen the large dacl_offset is provided, dacl_offset + sizeof(struct\nsmb_acl) overflows on 32-bit builds and the check is passed,\nWhich makes le16_to_cpu(ppdacl_ptr-\u003esize) read out-of-bounds. This\nonly happens for dacl_offset in range [0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFFF]. So\nthe oob read is max 8 bytes preceding the allocated ppntsd.\n\n    unsigned int dacl_offset = le32_to_cpu(ppntsd-\u003edacloffset);\n    int ppdacl_size, ntacl_size = ppntsd_size - dacl_offset;\n\n    if (!dacl_offset ||\n\t(dacl_offset + sizeof(struct smb_acl) \u003e ppntsd_size))\n\t    goto out;\n\nCommit beff0bc9d69b (\"ksmbd: fix overflow in dacloffset bounds check\")\nfixes similar checks in other functions. But leaves this one out,\nbecause it is only valid for 32-bit builds.\n\nReproduced on 32-bit ARM with KASAN, by a client sending SMB2\nSET_INFO(SEC) with dacloffset=0xfffffff8, then QUERY_INFO(SEC) on the\nsame file:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in build_sec_desc (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c:1105)\n Read of size 2 at addr c2a273fa by task kworker/1:1/35\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 35 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc2+ #5\n Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work\n Call trace:\n  kasan_check_range from build_sec_desc (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c:1105)\n  build_sec_desc from smb2_query_info (fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:7676)\n  smb2_query_info from handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:160)\n  handle_ksmbd_work from process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3401)\n  process_one_work from worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3473)\n  worker_thread from kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n\nAdd overflow check.",
  "id": "GHSA-772j-v3x2-5prg",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99309"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f238380ea3803afdc815c615521c6f6b13989a3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd92e03122f33c159b552867a4abc098d405dfed"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1e92aa651caa352261fb3b78460b7722357835c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb96e2a0e817807c48dc8387ca6a5249fdeae3a0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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