GHSA-76P7-W946-WVCH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-29 03:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: n_gsm: Fix use-after-free in gsm_cleanup_mux
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gsm_cleanup_mux+0x77b/0x7b0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88815fe99c00 by task poc/3379 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3379 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.11.0+ #56 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 Call Trace: gsm_cleanup_mux+0x77b/0x7b0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm] __pfx_gsm_cleanup_mux+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3124 [n_gsm] __pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10 kernel/sched/clock.c:389 update_load_avg+0x1c1/0x27b0 kernel/sched/fair.c:4500 __pfx_min_vruntime_cb_rotate+0x10/0x10 kernel/sched/fair.c:846 __rb_insert_augmented+0x492/0xbf0 lib/rbtree.c:161 gsmld_ioctl+0x395/0x1450 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3408 [n_gsm] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x92/0xf0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107 __pfx_gsmld_ioctl+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3822 [n_gsm] ktime_get+0x5e/0x140 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:195 ldsem_down_read+0x94/0x4e0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:79 __pfx_ldsem_down_read+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:338 __pfx_do_vfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10 fs/ioctl.c:805 tty_ioctl+0x643/0x1100 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2818
Allocated by task 65: gsm_data_alloc.constprop.0+0x27/0x190 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:926 [n_gsm] gsm_send+0x2c/0x580 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:819 [n_gsm] gsm1_receive+0x547/0xad0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3038 [n_gsm] gsmld_receive_buf+0x176/0x280 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3609 [n_gsm] tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x101/0x1e0 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:391 tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x61/0xa0 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:39 flush_to_ldisc+0x1b0/0x750 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:445 process_scheduled_works+0x2b0/0x10d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3229 worker_thread+0x3dc/0x950 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2a3/0x370 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257
Freed by task 3367: kfree+0x126/0x420 mm/slub.c:4580 gsm_cleanup_mux+0x36c/0x7b0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm] gsmld_ioctl+0x395/0x1450 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3408 [n_gsm] tty_ioctl+0x643/0x1100 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2818
[Analysis] gsm_msg on the tx_ctrl_list or tx_data_list of gsm_mux can be freed by multi threads through ioctl,which leads to the occurrence of uaf. Protect it by gsm tx lock.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50073"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-29T01:15:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntty: n_gsm: Fix use-after-free in gsm_cleanup_mux\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gsm_cleanup_mux+0x77b/0x7b0\ndrivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm]\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff88815fe99c00 by task poc/3379\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3379 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.11.0+ #56\nHardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX\nDesktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n gsm_cleanup_mux+0x77b/0x7b0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm]\n __pfx_gsm_cleanup_mux+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3124 [n_gsm]\n __pfx_sched_clock_cpu+0x10/0x10 kernel/sched/clock.c:389\n update_load_avg+0x1c1/0x27b0 kernel/sched/fair.c:4500\n __pfx_min_vruntime_cb_rotate+0x10/0x10 kernel/sched/fair.c:846\n __rb_insert_augmented+0x492/0xbf0 lib/rbtree.c:161\n gsmld_ioctl+0x395/0x1450 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3408 [n_gsm]\n _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x92/0xf0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:107\n __pfx_gsmld_ioctl+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3822 [n_gsm]\n ktime_get+0x5e/0x140 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:195\n ldsem_down_read+0x94/0x4e0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:79\n __pfx_ldsem_down_read+0x10/0x10 drivers/tty/tty_ldsem.c:338\n __pfx_do_vfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10 fs/ioctl.c:805\n tty_ioctl+0x643/0x1100 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2818\n\nAllocated by task 65:\n gsm_data_alloc.constprop.0+0x27/0x190 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:926 [n_gsm]\n gsm_send+0x2c/0x580 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:819 [n_gsm]\n gsm1_receive+0x547/0xad0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3038 [n_gsm]\n gsmld_receive_buf+0x176/0x280 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3609 [n_gsm]\n tty_ldisc_receive_buf+0x101/0x1e0 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:391\n tty_port_default_receive_buf+0x61/0xa0 drivers/tty/tty_port.c:39\n flush_to_ldisc+0x1b0/0x750 drivers/tty/tty_buffer.c:445\n process_scheduled_works+0x2b0/0x10d0 kernel/workqueue.c:3229\n worker_thread+0x3dc/0x950 kernel/workqueue.c:3391\n kthread+0x2a3/0x370 kernel/kthread.c:389\n ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257\n\nFreed by task 3367:\n kfree+0x126/0x420 mm/slub.c:4580\n gsm_cleanup_mux+0x36c/0x7b0 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3160 [n_gsm]\n gsmld_ioctl+0x395/0x1450 drivers/tty/n_gsm.c:3408 [n_gsm]\n tty_ioctl+0x643/0x1100 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2818\n\n[Analysis]\ngsm_msg on the tx_ctrl_list or tx_data_list of gsm_mux\ncan be freed by multi threads through ioctl,which leads\nto the occurrence of uaf. Protect it by gsm tx lock.",
"id": "GHSA-76p7-w946-wvch",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:51Z",
"published": "2024-10-29T03:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50073"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0eec592c6a7460ba795d7de29f3dc95cb5422e62"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9462f4ca56e7d2430fdb6dcc8498244acbfc4489"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf171b5e86e41de4c1cf32fb7aefa275c3d7de49"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c29f192e0d44cc1cbaf698fa1ff198f63556691a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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