GHSA-76MX-GXXJ-5F36
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-08-22 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: evdev - sanitize event type index when fetching event masks
The user-supplied event type index passed to EVIOCGMASK / EVIOCSMASK ioctls is used to index the static counts array in evdev_get_mask_cnt() and client evmasks array in evdev_get_mask().
While the event type is architecturally bounded by EV_CNT, speculative execution may mispredict bounds checks and perform out-of-bounds loads.
Sanitize the event type index in evdev_get_mask_cnt() branchlessly using array_index_mask_nospec(). This clamps the index to 0 for safe array access and forces the returned count to 0 speculatively when the index is out of bounds.
We do not need additional array_index_nospec() calls in evdev_get_mask() because evdev_get_mask_cnt() speculatively forces the count (and resulting xfer_size) to 0 for out-of-bounds types, preventing any speculative memory access to client evmasks array.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74683"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-22T16:16:42Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: evdev - sanitize event type index when fetching event masks\n\nThe user-supplied event type index passed to EVIOCGMASK / EVIOCSMASK\nioctls is used to index the static counts array in evdev_get_mask_cnt()\nand client evmasks array in evdev_get_mask().\n\nWhile the event type is architecturally bounded by EV_CNT, speculative\nexecution may mispredict bounds checks and perform out-of-bounds loads.\n\nSanitize the event type index in evdev_get_mask_cnt() branchlessly using\narray_index_mask_nospec(). This clamps the index to 0 for safe array\naccess and forces the returned count to 0 speculatively when the index\nis out of bounds.\n\nWe do not need additional array_index_nospec() calls in evdev_get_mask()\nbecause evdev_get_mask_cnt() speculatively forces the count (and\nresulting xfer_size) to 0 for out-of-bounds types, preventing any\nspeculative memory access to client evmasks array.",
"id": "GHSA-76mx-gxxj-5f36",
"modified": "2026-08-22T18:30:29Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T18:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74683"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3abd29c61d2ef37c4102cf755b18be53bb9dbea6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4034ef247a9dde3f56660b01f0c3280dac6b1274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/433913b4a92214d76e9f0c03ad9128fec943d5f8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5db341189bb7ff041d570dbe36ecca7e32913927"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/810e1883d4815f29c30d900ad7333d03cc2515d1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c79b08d8fa230871a3634e34a66e591ac2d084ef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f27fa9b39f925d26e034a1f382cb45523138f4ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3fc329acad9a71b3c077237cbac20670d2358c8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.