GHSA-75R6-72M8-24V6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-23 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: tegra: do not call pinctrl for GPIO direction
tegra_gpio_direction_input() and tegra_gpio_direction_output() already program the GPIO controller direction registers directly. The additional pinctrl_gpio_direction_input/output() calls do not add a Tegra pinctrl operation, because the Tegra pinmux ops provide GPIO request/free handling but no gpio_set_direction hook.
The extra call still enters the pinctrl core and takes pctldev->mutex. Shared GPIO users can call the direction path while holding their per-line spinlock, so this otherwise redundant pinctrl direction call can sleep in an atomic context.
This was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by manual review of tegra_gpio_probe(), the Tegra GPIO direction callbacks and the Tegra pinctrl ops. The reviewed path has a default non-sleeping struct gpio_chip while the direction callback still enters the pinctrl mutex path.
A directed runtime validation kept the same non-sleeping chip registration and drove:
gpio_shared_proxy_direction_output() gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit() tegra_gpio_direction_output() pinctrl_gpio_direction_output()
Lockdep reported a sleep-in-atomic warning with the shared GPIO spinlock held and pinctrl_get_device_gpio_range() plus tegra_gpio_direction_output() on the stack.
Do not mark the whole chip as can_sleep to paper over this: can_sleep describes whether get()/set() may sleep, and Tegra value access is MMIO. Remove the redundant pinctrl direction calls and keep pinctrl involvement in the existing request/free path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72063"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:15Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngpio: tegra: do not call pinctrl for GPIO direction\n\ntegra_gpio_direction_input() and tegra_gpio_direction_output() already\nprogram the GPIO controller direction registers directly. The additional\npinctrl_gpio_direction_input/output() calls do not add a Tegra pinctrl\noperation, because the Tegra pinmux ops provide GPIO request/free\nhandling but no gpio_set_direction hook.\n\nThe extra call still enters the pinctrl core and takes pctldev-\u003emutex.\nShared GPIO users can call the direction path while holding their\nper-line spinlock, so this otherwise redundant pinctrl direction call can\nsleep in an atomic context.\n\nThis was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by manual\nreview of tegra_gpio_probe(), the Tegra GPIO direction callbacks and the\nTegra pinctrl ops. The reviewed path has a default non-sleeping\nstruct gpio_chip while the direction callback still enters the pinctrl\nmutex path.\n\nA directed runtime validation kept the same non-sleeping chip registration\nand drove:\n\n gpio_shared_proxy_direction_output()\n gpiod_direction_output_raw_commit()\n tegra_gpio_direction_output()\n pinctrl_gpio_direction_output()\n\nLockdep reported a sleep-in-atomic warning with the shared GPIO spinlock\nheld and pinctrl_get_device_gpio_range() plus tegra_gpio_direction_output()\non the stack.\n\nDo not mark the whole chip as can_sleep to paper over this: can_sleep\ndescribes whether get()/set() may sleep, and Tegra value access is MMIO.\nRemove the redundant pinctrl direction calls and keep pinctrl involvement\nin the existing request/free path.",
"id": "GHSA-75r6-72m8-24v6",
"modified": "2026-08-23T15:32:58Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72063"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/616188becd4a208afbae1653fc5241e1748bae80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/628c63f96f4564fa145f602af2d41daf9532201f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89904b4f1dc0f9550c3f206dcdfceed0b7ce7c49"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac761e66708d51dac35c4c7f1891ea991dc788f0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd17c5a1d9f186b57e9e2949be427803b7110a5c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3b92d16e1c4debec7526b6dbb2d98d0aeed796b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3e91a95b2b0fc6336dbf3ec90d831a1654d2720"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e57a4845b0da60a7b9f052160878097826320954"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.