GHSA-75R5-7CVH-H27P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix parent dentry lifetime in directory enumeration
ksmbd_populate_dot_dotdot_entries() builds the ".." entry from the open directory's d_parent and passes that pointer to ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs() without taking a reference. That pointer is only valid while the directory stays under this parent. If a concurrent rename moves the directory elsewhere, the old parent loses its last reference; a following rmdir then turns it into a negative dentry with d_inode cleared, and after the RCU grace period the dentry itself is freed. The worker still holds the raw pointer and dereferences d_inode through vfs_getattr() and vfs_getxattr().
A remote SMB client, authenticated or guest, triggers this by listing a directory while that directory is moved under a new parent and the old parent is deleted. It can be done by the client itself with write access or by other concurrent writers, triggering null-ptr-deref and slab-use-after-free on a KASAN build.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work RIP: 0010:xattr_permission+0x9d/0x160 Call Trace: vfs_getxattr+0x9c/0x1b0 ksmbd_vfs_getxattr+0x82/0x100 ksmbd_vfs_get_dos_attrib_xattr+0x7f/0x130 ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs+0x435/0x650 ksmbd_populate_dot_dotdot_entries+0x25e/0x630 smb2_query_dir+0xcf9/0x1a20 handle_ksmbd_work+0x5f1/0x1c80 process_one_work+0x90b/0x19d0
Fix by using the dentry reference counting APIs: take the parent with dget_parent(), take a matching dget() on ".", and dput() the dentry once ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs() has returned or the pattern does not match.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99540"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:10Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: fix parent dentry lifetime in directory enumeration\n\nksmbd_populate_dot_dotdot_entries() builds the \"..\" entry from\nthe open directory\u0027s d_parent and passes that pointer to\nksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs() without taking a reference. That pointer\nis only valid while the directory stays under this parent. If a\nconcurrent rename moves the directory elsewhere, the old parent loses\nits last reference; a following rmdir then turns it into a negative\ndentry with d_inode cleared, and after the RCU grace period the dentry\nitself is freed. The worker still holds the raw pointer and\ndereferences d_inode through vfs_getattr() and vfs_getxattr().\n\nA remote SMB client, authenticated or guest, triggers this by listing\na directory while that directory is moved under a new parent and the\nold parent is deleted. It can be done by the client itself with write\naccess or by other concurrent writers, triggering null-ptr-deref and\nslab-use-after-free on a KASAN build.\n\n KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range\n [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\n Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work\n RIP: 0010:xattr_permission+0x9d/0x160\n Call Trace:\n vfs_getxattr+0x9c/0x1b0\n ksmbd_vfs_getxattr+0x82/0x100\n ksmbd_vfs_get_dos_attrib_xattr+0x7f/0x130\n ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs+0x435/0x650\n ksmbd_populate_dot_dotdot_entries+0x25e/0x630\n smb2_query_dir+0xcf9/0x1a20\n handle_ksmbd_work+0x5f1/0x1c80\n process_one_work+0x90b/0x19d0\n\nFix by using the dentry reference counting APIs: take the parent with\ndget_parent(), take a matching dget() on \".\", and dput() the dentry\nonce ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs() has returned or the pattern does\nnot match.",
"id": "GHSA-75r5-7cvh-h27p",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99540"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/171df27077fb49b4af2c53ad2cedcd0e39664fe8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32934b13b1a63c86d2fa68df0bfb28c51ce38879"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93566781118cdff874023d5ca4e7b8054baaec31"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b62ef8cfec9351662e42cbf7da2d743068699bba"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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