GHSA-74R7-3MJM-JC5V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 15:35 – Updated: 2026-05-18 15:35Impact
If the resolver parameter is passed, but the user does not exist, all failcounters of tokens in that resolver will be increased.
Patches
This, along with other issues, was fixed in eduMFA v2.9.1.
Workarounds
Limiting access to /validate/check to client applications (i.e. Shibboleth/FreeRADIUS) using an authorization policy with api_key_required or using e.g. the reverse proxy.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "edumfa"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T15:35:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIf the resolver parameter is passed, but the user does not exist, all failcounters of tokens in that resolver will be increased.\n\n### Patches\nThis, along with other issues, was fixed in eduMFA v2.9.1.\n\n### Workarounds\nLimiting access to `/validate/check` to client applications (i.e. Shibboleth/FreeRADIUS) using an authorization policy with `api_key_required` or using e.g. the reverse proxy.",
"id": "GHSA-74r7-3mjm-jc5v",
"modified": "2026-05-18T15:35:42Z",
"published": "2026-05-18T15:35:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eduMFA/eduMFA/security/advisories/GHSA-74r7-3mjm-jc5v"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/eduMFA/eduMFA"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "eduMFA: Unauthenticated Failcounter Increment on Resolver Tokens via /validate/check"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.