GHSA-7428-67H9-QJ3R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-21 21:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: xtables: avoid NFPROTO_UNSPEC where needed
syzbot managed to call xt_cluster match via ebtables:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:72 xt_cluster_mt+0x196/0x780 [..] ebt_do_table+0x174b/0x2a40
Module registers to NFPROTO_UNSPEC, but it assumes ipv4/ipv6 packet processing. As this is only useful to restrict locally terminating TCP/UDP traffic, register this for ipv4 and ipv6 family only.
Pablo points out that this is a general issue, direct users of the set/getsockopt interface can call into targets/matches that were only intended for use with ip(6)tables.
Check all UNSPEC matches and targets for similar issues:
- matches and targets are fine except if they assume skb_network_header() is valid -- this is only true when called from inet layer: ip(6) stack pulls the ip/ipv6 header into linear data area.
- targets that return XT_CONTINUE or other xtables verdicts must be restricted too, they are incompatbile with the ebtables traverser, e.g. EBT_CONTINUE is a completely different value than XT_CONTINUE.
Most matches/targets are changed to register for NFPROTO_IPV4/IPV6, as they are provided for use by ip(6)tables.
The MARK target is also used by arptables, so register for NFPROTO_ARP too.
While at it, bail out if connbytes fails to enable the corresponding conntrack family.
This change passes the selftests in iptables.git.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50038"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-21T20:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: xtables: avoid NFPROTO_UNSPEC where needed\n\nsyzbot managed to call xt_cluster match via ebtables:\n\n WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:72 xt_cluster_mt+0x196/0x780\n [..]\n ebt_do_table+0x174b/0x2a40\n\nModule registers to NFPROTO_UNSPEC, but it assumes ipv4/ipv6 packet\nprocessing. As this is only useful to restrict locally terminating\nTCP/UDP traffic, register this for ipv4 and ipv6 family only.\n\nPablo points out that this is a general issue, direct users of the\nset/getsockopt interface can call into targets/matches that were only\nintended for use with ip(6)tables.\n\nCheck all UNSPEC matches and targets for similar issues:\n\n- matches and targets are fine except if they assume skb_network_header()\n is valid -- this is only true when called from inet layer: ip(6) stack\n pulls the ip/ipv6 header into linear data area.\n- targets that return XT_CONTINUE or other xtables verdicts must be\n restricted too, they are incompatbile with the ebtables traverser, e.g.\n EBT_CONTINUE is a completely different value than XT_CONTINUE.\n\nMost matches/targets are changed to register for NFPROTO_IPV4/IPV6, as\nthey are provided for use by ip(6)tables.\n\nThe MARK target is also used by arptables, so register for NFPROTO_ARP too.\n\nWhile at it, bail out if connbytes fails to enable the corresponding\nconntrack family.\n\nThis change passes the selftests in iptables.git.",
"id": "GHSA-7428-67h9-qj3r",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:45Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T21:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0bfcb7b71e735560077a42847f69597ec7dcc326"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cdc55ec6222bb195995cc58f7cb46e4d8907056"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85ff9a0f793ca52c527e75cd40a69c948627ebde"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f482bb7e27b37f1f734bb9a8eeb28b23d59d189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/997f67d813ce0cf5eb3cdb8f124da68141e91b6c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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