GHSA-73P9-6HRP-8QHR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 19:20 – Updated: 2026-08-28 19:20Summary
Several of AIIR's verification and policy paths could return a success/"verified" result without actually enforcing the control they represent — they could fail open rather than fail closed. For a tool whose purpose is trustworthy verification, a consumer relying on these gates may have treated unverified or non-conforming input as verified.
Found during an internal adversarial hardening review of AIIR (not a third-party audit). All paths are fixed in 1.7.0.
Affected paths
- A
require_signingpolicy gate could be satisfied by a forgeable/empty field, so an unsigned or forged-bundle receipt could pass a "signing required" check without a valid signature. - A CI verification path could report
successregardless of the underlying verification result. - A release-verification gate could advertise policy limits it did not actually enforce.
- A signature-verification path could be silently skipped for certain input categories, exiting success without verifying.
Impact
A consumer relying on these gates (e.g. require_signing, release/policy verification, or the CI check) to block unsigned, forged, or non-conforming receipts could have received a false "verified"/"pass". Exploitation requires reliance on the affected gate; it does not forge valid signatures, nor does it compromise content-addressing or correctly-signed receipts.
Patches
Fixed in 1.7.0. Every affected path now fails closed, each with a regression test. Upgrade to aiir >= 1.7.0.
Workarounds
None for earlier versions other than upgrading. Full cryptographic Sigstore verification (pip install aiir[sign], --verify-signature with --signer-identity/--signer-issuer) provides defense in depth.
Scope note
This advisory covers code present in released versions (< 1.7.0). Separately, an unreleased agent-receipt feature had pre-release forgery findings fixed before it shipped — those were never in a released version and are out of scope.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "aiir"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347",
"CWE-636"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T19:20:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nSeveral of AIIR\u0027s verification and policy paths could return a success/\"verified\" result without actually enforcing the control they represent \u2014 they could **fail open** rather than fail closed. For a tool whose purpose is trustworthy verification, a consumer relying on these gates may have treated unverified or non-conforming input as verified.\n\nFound during an internal adversarial hardening review of AIIR (not a third-party audit). All paths are fixed in **1.7.0**.\n\n### Affected paths\n- A `require_signing` policy gate could be satisfied by a forgeable/empty field, so an unsigned or forged-bundle receipt could pass a \"signing required\" check without a valid signature.\n- A CI verification path could report `success` regardless of the underlying verification result.\n- A release-verification gate could advertise policy limits it did not actually enforce.\n- A signature-verification path could be silently skipped for certain input categories, exiting success without verifying.\n\n### Impact\nA consumer relying on these gates (e.g. `require_signing`, release/policy verification, or the CI check) to block unsigned, forged, or non-conforming receipts could have received a false \"verified\"/\"pass\". Exploitation requires reliance on the affected gate; it does not forge valid signatures, nor does it compromise content-addressing or correctly-signed receipts.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **1.7.0**. Every affected path now fails closed, each with a regression test. Upgrade to `aiir \u003e= 1.7.0`.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone for earlier versions other than upgrading. Full cryptographic Sigstore verification (`pip install aiir[sign]`, `--verify-signature` with `--signer-identity`/`--signer-issuer`) provides defense in depth.\n\n### Scope note\nThis advisory covers code present in released versions (`\u003c 1.7.0`). Separately, an unreleased agent-receipt feature had pre-release forgery findings fixed before it shipped \u2014 those were never in a released version and are out of scope.",
"id": "GHSA-73p9-6hrp-8qhr",
"modified": "2026-08-28T19:20:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T19:20:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/invariant-systems-ai/aiir/security/advisories/GHSA-73p9-6hrp-8qhr"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/invariant-systems-ai/aiir"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "AIIR verification and policy gates could report success without enforcing the control (fail-open)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.