GHSA-732C-5RPV-QGR5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-07 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-07 12:31
VLAI
Details

The wpForo Forum plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.2 via the data[secondary_groupids] parameter of the wpforo_action_profile_update POST handler. This is due to a type-confusion flaw in the secondary_groupids authorization guard within the Members::update() function in classes/Members.php, where casting a scalar CSV string (e.g. "0,1") with (array) before array_map('intval', …) and array_filter() produces an empty array — causing the guard's outer conditional, and the else-branch that would otherwise strip the field from the update, to be bypassed entirely — while encode()/decode() downstream correctly explodes the original CSV and persists the attacker-supplied group IDs to wp_wpforo_profiles.secondary_groupids. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to escalate their forum privileges to wpForo Administrator by injecting the privileged Admin group ID, granting access to the Forum Accesses editor and the ability to rewrite forum-wide capability policies for all members and edit arbitrary content owned by other users. Exploitation requires the attacker to have at least 3 approved wpForo posts to satisfy the plugin's default min_number_posts_to_edit_account antispam gate, along with a valid wpforo nonce obtained from their own account profile form.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-119164"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-07T10:17:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The wpForo Forum plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.2 via the `data[secondary_groupids]` parameter of the `wpforo_action_profile_update` POST handler. This is due to a type-confusion flaw in the secondary_groupids authorization guard within the `Members::update()` function in `classes/Members.php`, where casting a scalar CSV string (e.g. `\"0,1\"`) with `(array)` before `array_map(\u0027intval\u0027, \u2026)` and `array_filter()` produces an empty array \u2014 causing the guard\u0027s outer conditional, and the else-branch that would otherwise strip the field from the update, to be bypassed entirely \u2014 while `encode()`/`decode()` downstream correctly explodes the original CSV and persists the attacker-supplied group IDs to `wp_wpforo_profiles.secondary_groupids`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to escalate their forum privileges to wpForo Administrator by injecting the privileged Admin group ID, granting access to the Forum Accesses editor and the ability to rewrite forum-wide capability policies for all members and edit arbitrary content owned by other users. Exploitation requires the attacker to have at least 3 approved wpForo posts to satisfy the plugin\u0027s default `min_number_posts_to_edit_account` antispam gate, along with a valid wpforo nonce obtained from their own account profile form.",
  "id": "GHSA-732c-5rpv-qgr5",
  "modified": "2026-11-07T12:31:49Z",
  "published": "2026-11-07T12:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119164"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.2.2/classes/Actions.php#L724"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.2.2/classes/Members.php#L1071"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.2.2/classes/Members.php#L731"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpforo/tags/3.2.2/classes/Members.php#L840"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3778162%40wpforo%2Ftags%2F3.2.3\u0026old=3717441%40wpforo%2Ftags%2F3.2.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/wpforo/#developers"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/8ef7232d-4acd-4db2-bfd0-d8e44bd59c19?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.