GHSA-72QQ-P3R5-F7WQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 22:55 – Updated: 2026-10-02 22:55Summary
The openUrl function in @a2ui/web_core passes an agent-controlled URL directly to window.open() without validating the URI scheme. A malicious agent can supply a javascript: URI as the url argument of a Button component's functionCall action. When the user clicks the rendered button, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the victim application's browser origin, constituting a stored/reflected XSS. No non-default configuration is required; the Basic Catalog is enabled by default.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the openUrl function implementation within the Basic Catalog of @a2ui/web_core (commit 23a003248abbf59da6c376ea64ace91d82d209ff).
Sink — renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions.ts:428-430:
export const OpenUrlImplementation = createFunctionImplementation(OpenUrlApi, args => {
if (args.url && typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.open) {
window.open(args.url, '_blank');
}
});
window.open is called unconditionally with the agent-supplied args.url value. No scheme allowlist or blocklist is applied.
Insufficient schema validation — renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions_api.ts:453-458:
export const OpenUrlApi = {
name: 'openUrl' as const,
returnType: 'void' as const,
schema: z.object({
url: z.preprocess(v => (v === undefined ? undefined : String(v)), z.string()),
}),
};
The Zod schema only requires a string; javascript: URIs pass validation without any rejection.
Full source-to-sink data flow:
renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/components/basic_components.ts:356—ButtonApiacceptsaction: ActionSchema(entry point).renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/schema/common-types.ts:126-130—ActionSchemapermits{ functionCall: FunctionCallSchema }.renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/rendering/generic-binder.ts:243-255— on click, bound action callsresolveDeepSyncthendispatchAction.renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/rendering/data-context.ts:93-105—resolveDynamicValuedetects thecallkey and invokes the named function.renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/catalog/types.ts:177-186— catalog invoker runsfn.schema.parse(rawArgs)thenfn.execute().renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions_api.ts:453-458—OpenUrlApivalidatesurlasz.string()only (no scheme check).renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions.ts:428-430— sink:window.open(args.url, '_blank')executes thejavascript:URI.
All three renderers implemented in the A2UI repository are affected:
- React:
renderers/react/src/v0_9/catalog/basic/components/Button.tsx:33—onClick={props.action} - Lit:
renderers/lit/src/v0_9/catalogs/basic/components/Button.ts:112—@click=${() => props.action()} - Angular:
renderers/angular/src/v0_9/catalog/basic/button.component.ts:103-110—handleClick()→dataContext.resolveAction→dispatchAction
Any other A2UI renderer which depends on web_core and uses its basic catalog implementation is also affected.
Remediation
The issue was fixed in https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui/pull/1707 and released in web_core version 0.10.2, by blocking URLs that do not use the HTTP or HTTPS schemes, or those that are invalid.
Please fix this issue in your project by depending on a @a2ui/web_core version equal or greater than 0.10.2.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@a2ui/web_core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.9.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.10.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10032"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T22:55:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `openUrl` function in `@a2ui/web_core` passes an agent-controlled URL directly to `window.open()` without validating the URI scheme. A malicious agent can supply a `javascript:` URI as the `url` argument of a `Button` component\u0027s `functionCall` action. When the user clicks the rendered button, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the victim application\u0027s browser origin, constituting a stored/reflected XSS. No non-default configuration is required; the Basic Catalog is enabled by default.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `openUrl` function implementation within the Basic Catalog of `@a2ui/web_core` (commit `23a003248abbf59da6c376ea64ace91d82d209ff`).\n\n**Sink** \u2014 `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions.ts:428-430`:\n\n```ts\nexport const OpenUrlImplementation = createFunctionImplementation(OpenUrlApi, args =\u003e {\n if (args.url \u0026\u0026 typeof window !== \u0027undefined\u0027 \u0026\u0026 window.open) {\n window.open(args.url, \u0027_blank\u0027);\n }\n});\n```\n\n`window.open` is called unconditionally with the agent-supplied `args.url` value. No scheme allowlist or blocklist is applied.\n\n**Insufficient schema validation** \u2014 `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions_api.ts:453-458`:\n\n```ts\nexport const OpenUrlApi = {\n name: \u0027openUrl\u0027 as const,\n returnType: \u0027void\u0027 as const,\n schema: z.object({\n url: z.preprocess(v =\u003e (v === undefined ? undefined : String(v)), z.string()),\n }),\n};\n```\n\nThe Zod schema only requires a `string`; `javascript:` URIs pass validation without any rejection.\n\n**Full source-to-sink data flow:**\n\n1. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/components/basic_components.ts:356` \u2014 `ButtonApi` accepts `action: ActionSchema` (entry point). \n2. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/schema/common-types.ts:126-130` \u2014 `ActionSchema` permits `{ functionCall: FunctionCallSchema }`. \n3. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/rendering/generic-binder.ts:243-255` \u2014 on click, bound action calls `resolveDeepSync` then `dispatchAction`. \n4. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/rendering/data-context.ts:93-105` \u2014 `resolveDynamicValue` detects the `call` key and invokes the named function. \n5. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/catalog/types.ts:177-186` \u2014 catalog invoker runs `fn.schema.parse(rawArgs)` then `fn.execute()`. \n6. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions_api.ts:453-458` \u2014 `OpenUrlApi` validates `url` as `z.string()` only (no scheme check). \n7. `renderers/web_core/src/v0_9/basic_catalog/functions/basic_functions.ts:428-430` \u2014 **sink**: `window.open(args.url, \u0027_blank\u0027)` executes the `javascript:` URI.\n\n**All three renderers implemented in the A2UI repository are affected:**\n\n- React: `renderers/react/src/v0_9/catalog/basic/components/Button.tsx:33` \u2014 `onClick={props.action}` \n- Lit: `renderers/lit/src/v0_9/catalogs/basic/components/Button.ts:112` \u2014 `@click=${() =\u003e props.action()}` \n- Angular: `renderers/angular/src/v0_9/catalog/basic/button.component.ts:103-110` \u2014 `handleClick()` \u2192 `dataContext.resolveAction` \u2192 `dispatchAction`\n\nAny other A2UI renderer which depends on `web_core` and uses its basic catalog implementation is also affected.\n\n### Remediation\n\nThe issue was fixed in [https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui/pull/1707](https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui/pull/1707) and released in web\\_core version 0.10.2, by blocking URLs that do not use the HTTP or HTTPS schemes, or those that are invalid.\n\nPlease fix this issue in your project by depending on a @a2ui/web\\_core version equal or greater than 0.10.2.",
"id": "GHSA-72qq-p3r5-f7wq",
"modified": "2026-10-02T22:55:49Z",
"published": "2026-10-02T22:55:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui/security/advisories/GHSA-72qq-p3r5-f7wq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10032"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui/pull/1707"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui/commit/71573078c4168b2dc166bb847c3a85715dadc675"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/a2ui-project/a2ui"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@a2ui/web_core: `openUrl` permits `javascript:` URI execution via agent-supplied button actions"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.