GHSA-6XRQ-V3X4-XFC7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-23 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
super: fix emergency thaw deadlock on frozen block devices
do_thaw_all_callback() calls bdev_thaw() while holding sb->s_umount exclusively. If the block device was frozen via bdev_freeze() dropping the last block layer freeze reference calls fs_bdev_thaw() which reacquires s_umount:
do_thaw_all_callback(sb) super_lock_excl(sb) # holds sb->s_umount bdev_thaw(sb->s_bdev) mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex) # bd_fsfreeze_count drops 1 -> 0 bd_holder_ops->thaw == fs_bdev_thaw get_bdev_super(bdev) bdev_super_lock(bdev, true) super_lock(sb, true) down_write(&sb->s_umount) # same task: deadlock
The emergency thaw worker deadlocks against itself holding both s_umount and bd_fsfreeze_mutex. That fscks any subsequent unmount, freeze, or thaw of that filesystem and block device.
[ 81.878470] sysrq: Show Blocked State [ 81.880140] task:kworker/0:1 state:D stack:0 pid:11 tgid:11 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000 [ 81.884876] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all [ 81.886656] Call Trace: [ 81.887759] [ 81.888763] __schedule+0x579/0x1420 [ 81.890372] schedule+0x3a/0x100 [ 81.891794] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30 [ 81.893848] rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x1ea/0x900 [ 81.895191] ? __pfx_do_thaw_all_callback+0x10/0x10 [ 81.896528] down_write+0xbd/0xc0 [ 81.897505] super_lock+0x91/0x180 [ 81.898457] ? __mutex_lock+0xa99/0x1140 [ 81.900748] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1f/0x400 [ 81.902069] bdev_super_lock+0x5b/0x150 [ 81.903132] get_bdev_super+0x10/0x60 [ 81.904042] fs_bdev_thaw+0x23/0xf0 [ 81.904755] bdev_thaw+0x82/0x100 [ 81.905484] do_thaw_all_callback+0x2c/0x50 [ 81.906298] __iterate_supers+0x5d/0x130 [ 81.907067] do_thaw_all+0x20/0x40 [ 81.907739] process_one_work+0x206/0x5e0 [ 81.908545] worker_thread+0x1e2/0x3c0 [ 81.909339] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 81.910171] kthread+0xf4/0x130 [ 81.910799] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 81.911528] ret_from_fork+0x2e2/0x3b0 [ 81.912259] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 81.913010] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 81.913806]
bdev_super_lock() even documents the violated requirement with lockdep_assert_not_held(&sb->s_umount).
Acquiring bd_fsfreeze_mutex under s_umount also inverts the bd_fsfreeze_mutex vs. s_umount ordering established by bdev_{freeze,thaw}() and can thus ABBA against a concurrent block-layer freeze even when the recursive path isn't hit.
Fix this by not holding s_umount around the bdev_thaw() loop at all. Pin the superblock with an active reference instead as filesystems_freeze_callback() does. The active reference keeps the superblock from being shut down and so ->s_bdev stays valid without holding s_umount. The block-layer-held freeze is dropped by fs_bdev_thaw() with FREEZE_MAY_NEST | FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE exactly as a regular unfreeze would and thaw_super_locked() handles filesystem-level freezes as before.
The emergency thaw path has deadlocked like this in one form or another for a long long time but the current exclusively-held shape dates back to commit [1] where thaw_bdev() already ended in thaw_super() with s_umount held by do_thaw_all_callback().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68132"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:19:58Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsuper: fix emergency thaw deadlock on frozen block devices\n\ndo_thaw_all_callback() calls bdev_thaw() while holding sb-\u003es_umount\nexclusively. If the block device was frozen via bdev_freeze() dropping\nthe last block layer freeze reference calls fs_bdev_thaw() which\nreacquires s_umount:\n\n do_thaw_all_callback(sb)\n super_lock_excl(sb) # holds sb-\u003es_umount\n bdev_thaw(sb-\u003es_bdev)\n mutex_lock(\u0026bdev-\u003ebd_fsfreeze_mutex)\n # bd_fsfreeze_count drops 1 -\u003e 0\n bd_holder_ops-\u003ethaw == fs_bdev_thaw\n get_bdev_super(bdev)\n bdev_super_lock(bdev, true)\n super_lock(sb, true)\n down_write(\u0026sb-\u003es_umount) # same task: deadlock\n\nThe emergency thaw worker deadlocks against itself holding both\ns_umount and bd_fsfreeze_mutex. That fscks any subsequent unmount,\nfreeze, or thaw of that filesystem and block device.\n\n [ 81.878470] sysrq: Show Blocked State\n [ 81.880140] task:kworker/0:1 state:D stack:0 pid:11 tgid:11 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000\n [ 81.884876] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all\n [ 81.886656] Call Trace:\n [ 81.887759] \u003cTASK\u003e\n [ 81.888763] __schedule+0x579/0x1420\n [ 81.890372] schedule+0x3a/0x100\n [ 81.891794] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30\n [ 81.893848] rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x1ea/0x900\n [ 81.895191] ? __pfx_do_thaw_all_callback+0x10/0x10\n [ 81.896528] down_write+0xbd/0xc0\n [ 81.897505] super_lock+0x91/0x180\n [ 81.898457] ? __mutex_lock+0xa99/0x1140\n [ 81.900748] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1f/0x400\n [ 81.902069] bdev_super_lock+0x5b/0x150\n [ 81.903132] get_bdev_super+0x10/0x60\n [ 81.904042] fs_bdev_thaw+0x23/0xf0\n [ 81.904755] bdev_thaw+0x82/0x100\n [ 81.905484] do_thaw_all_callback+0x2c/0x50\n [ 81.906298] __iterate_supers+0x5d/0x130\n [ 81.907067] do_thaw_all+0x20/0x40\n [ 81.907739] process_one_work+0x206/0x5e0\n [ 81.908545] worker_thread+0x1e2/0x3c0\n [ 81.909339] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n [ 81.910171] kthread+0xf4/0x130\n [ 81.910799] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n [ 81.911528] ret_from_fork+0x2e2/0x3b0\n [ 81.912259] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n [ 81.913010] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n [ 81.913806] \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nbdev_super_lock() even documents the violated requirement with\nlockdep_assert_not_held(\u0026sb-\u003es_umount).\n\nAcquiring bd_fsfreeze_mutex under s_umount also inverts the\nbd_fsfreeze_mutex vs. s_umount ordering established by\nbdev_{freeze,thaw}() and can thus ABBA against a concurrent block-layer\nfreeze even when the recursive path isn\u0027t hit.\n\nFix this by not holding s_umount around the bdev_thaw() loop at all. Pin\nthe superblock with an active reference instead as\nfilesystems_freeze_callback() does. The active reference keeps the\nsuperblock from being shut down and so -\u003es_bdev stays valid without\nholding s_umount. The block-layer-held freeze is dropped by\nfs_bdev_thaw() with FREEZE_MAY_NEST | FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE exactly as\na regular unfreeze would and thaw_super_locked() handles\nfilesystem-level freezes as before.\n\nThe emergency thaw path has deadlocked like this in one form or\nanother for a long long time but the current exclusively-held\nshape dates back to commit [1] where thaw_bdev() already ended in\nthaw_super() with s_umount held by do_thaw_all_callback().",
"id": "GHSA-6xrq-v3x4-xfc7",
"modified": "2026-08-23T15:32:56Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68132"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05536cad35f27b520d4b6f0e57c8cc5bfb6b0502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a1127c1c58b4f15a93f2fd56ff7c2c3d611d5c5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c483644d1a7709efe7d1be7dbf88cf4008a7864"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63d78b546eefc38ad9898dc839bfc94811ede547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/749d7aa0377aae32af8c0a4ad43371e7bf830ab5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96248aeddde794227a49af1a332a1e21b3c15d56"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99719b5da9320ed344daee87d9c73d321a98f252"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c202aa03388fd1889b7aa4f7d677c49e22cd9700"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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