GHSA-6XQ9-44C7-G88V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-19 09:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

perf/x86/intel: Improve validation and configuration of ACR masks

Currently there are several issues on the user space ACR mask validation and configuration. - The validation for user space ACR mask (attr.config2) is incomplete, e.g., the ACR mask could include the index which belongs to another ACR events group, but it's not validated. - An early return on an invalid ACR mask caused all subsequent ACR groups to be skipped. - The stale hardware ACR mask (hw.config1) is not cleared before setting new hardware ACR mask.

The following changes address all of the above issues. - Figure out the event index group of an ACR group. Any bits in the user-space mask not present in the index group are now dropped. - Instead of an early return on invalid bits, drop only the invalid portions and continue iterating through all ACR events to ensure full configuration. - Explicitly clear the stale hardware ACR mask for each event prior to writing the new configuration.

Besides, a non-leader event member of ACR group could be disabled in theory. This could cause bit-shifting errors in the acr_mask of remaining group members. But since ACR sampling requires all events to be active, this should not be a big concern in real use case. Add a "FIXME" comment to notice this risk.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53370"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T09:17:02Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf/x86/intel: Improve validation and configuration of ACR masks\n\nCurrently there are several issues on the user space ACR mask validation\nand configuration.\n- The validation for user space ACR mask (attr.config2) is incomplete,\n  e.g., the ACR mask could include the index which belongs to another\n  ACR events group, but it\u0027s not validated.\n- An early return on an invalid ACR mask caused all subsequent ACR groups\n  to be skipped.\n- The stale hardware ACR mask (hw.config1) is not cleared before setting\n  new hardware ACR mask.\n\nThe following changes address all of the above issues.\n- Figure out the event index group of an ACR group. Any bits in the\n  user-space mask not present in the index group are now dropped.\n- Instead of an early return on invalid bits, drop only the invalid\n  portions and continue iterating through all ACR events to ensure full\n  configuration.\n- Explicitly clear the stale hardware ACR mask for each event prior to\n  writing the new configuration.\n\nBesides, a non-leader event member of ACR group could be disabled in\ntheory. This could cause bit-shifting errors in the acr_mask of remaining\ngroup members. But since ACR sampling requires all events to be active,\nthis should not be a big concern in real use case. Add a \"FIXME\" comment\nto notice this risk.",
  "id": "GHSA-6xq9-44c7-g88v",
  "modified": "2026-07-19T09:31:37Z",
  "published": "2026-07-19T09:31:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53370"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ad732a56be46aabf158c16aa0c095291727aaef"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aab56b95bee3ff79176b13443cd9d7cfe9747df0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c05e01cef47d9b4969eae2dcf9467e2a555bcb4f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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