GHSA-6XF8-M2PW-3CJV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: cancel quota sync work before freeing quota info
OCFS2 quota info owns dqi_sync_work and must outlive both its timer and qsync_work_fn(). ocfs2_local_free_info() frees that owner without cancelling the work, relying on the quota suspend/disable wrappers.
Loading quotas on a read-only to read-write remount can successfully queue the work in ocfs2_global_read_info() and then fail while attaching a dquot to an existing inode in add_dquot_ref(). The quota core unwinds that failure directly through dquot_disable(), bypassing the OCFS2 wrapper:
Remount task (s_umount write) Timer/workqueue ocfs2_global_read_info() schedules dqi_sync_work add_dquot_ref() returns an error dquot_disable() ocfs2_local_free_info() frees oinfo delayed-work timer expires qsync_work_fn() reads oinfo
The timer core can then write to the freed embedded timer, or qsync_work_fn() can read oinfo->dqi_gqinode before its s_umount trylock. The outer ocfs2_disable_quotas() cleanup skips the failed type because dquot_disable() has already cleared its loaded state.
Cancel dqi_sync_work synchronously at the start of ocfs2_local_free_info(), before dropping the global inode or freeing any owner state. The work is initialized whenever read_file_info() succeeds. dquot_disable() holds s_umount for write, so the callback skips its quota scan via down_read_trylock() and can finish without waiting for teardown. The synchronous cancel also handles its self-rearm.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888111b0aad0 by task swapper/3/0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
__run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10
? __pfx___run_timers+0x10/0x10
? __lock_acquire+0x5a3/0x2140
? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
timer_expire_remote+0xfa/0x160
? __pfx_timer_expire_remote+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160
tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x4ba/0x9d0
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
? tmigr_handle_remote+0x21a/0x340
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
__walk_groups_from+0x5a/0x160
tmigr_handle_remote+0x24f/0x340
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote+0x10/0x10
? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
run_timer_softirq+0x222/0x270
? __pfx_run_timer_softirq+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xb8/0x1a0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
handle_softirqs+0x1fa/0x8d0
? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __hrtimer_rearm_deferred+0x1fb/0x5d0
__irq_exit_rcu+0x113/0x1e0
irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0+0xc5/0xf0
? do_idle+0x3ae/0x650
default_idle+0x9/0x10
default_idle_call+0x6c/0xb0
do_idle+0x3ae/0x650
? cpuhp_online_idle+0x9c/0xb0
? __pfx_do_idle+0x10/0x10
? __entry_text_end+0x1020f6/0x1020f9
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xeb/0x1a0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160
? srso_a
---truncated---
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99431"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:56Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: cancel quota sync work before freeing quota info\n\nOCFS2 quota info owns dqi_sync_work and must outlive both its timer and\nqsync_work_fn(). ocfs2_local_free_info() frees that owner without\ncancelling the work, relying on the quota suspend/disable wrappers.\n\nLoading quotas on a read-only to read-write remount can successfully queue\nthe work in ocfs2_global_read_info() and then fail while attaching a dquot\nto an existing inode in add_dquot_ref(). The quota core unwinds that\nfailure directly through dquot_disable(), bypassing the OCFS2 wrapper:\n\n Remount task (s_umount write) Timer/workqueue\n ocfs2_global_read_info()\n schedules dqi_sync_work\n add_dquot_ref() returns an error\n dquot_disable()\n ocfs2_local_free_info()\n frees oinfo\n delayed-work timer expires\n qsync_work_fn() reads oinfo\n\nThe timer core can then write to the freed embedded timer, or\nqsync_work_fn() can read oinfo-\u003edqi_gqinode before its s_umount trylock.\nThe outer ocfs2_disable_quotas() cleanup skips the failed type because\ndquot_disable() has already cleared its loaded state.\n\nCancel dqi_sync_work synchronously at the start of\nocfs2_local_free_info(), before dropping the global inode or freeing any\nowner state. The work is initialized whenever read_file_info() succeeds.\ndquot_disable() holds s_umount for write, so the callback skips its quota\nscan via down_read_trylock() and can finish without waiting for teardown.\nThe synchronous cancel also handles its self-rearm.\n\nKASAN report as below:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10\n Write of size 8 at addr ffff888111b0aad0 by task swapper/3/0\n\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0\n print_report+0xce/0x630\n ? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420\n ? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10\n kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n ? __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10\n __run_timers+0x9e9/0xa10\n ? __pfx___run_timers+0x10/0x10\n ? __lock_acquire+0x5a3/0x2140\n ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n timer_expire_remote+0xfa/0x160\n ? __pfx_timer_expire_remote+0x10/0x10\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160\n tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x4ba/0x9d0\n ? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10\n ? tmigr_handle_remote+0x21a/0x340\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290\n ? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10\n __walk_groups_from+0x5a/0x160\n tmigr_handle_remote+0x24f/0x340\n ? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote+0x10/0x10\n ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290\n run_timer_softirq+0x222/0x270\n ? __pfx_run_timer_softirq+0x10/0x10\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xb8/0x1a0\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n handle_softirqs+0x1fa/0x8d0\n ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? __hrtimer_rearm_deferred+0x1fb/0x5d0\n __irq_exit_rcu+0x113/0x1e0\n irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80\n \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20\n ? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0+0xc5/0xf0\n ? do_idle+0x3ae/0x650\n default_idle+0x9/0x10\n default_idle_call+0x6c/0xb0\n do_idle+0x3ae/0x650\n ? cpuhp_online_idle+0x9c/0xb0\n ? __pfx_do_idle+0x10/0x10\n ? __entry_text_end+0x1020f6/0x1020f9\n ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xeb/0x1a0\n ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5\n ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160\n ? srso_a\n---truncated---",
"id": "GHSA-6xf8-m2pw-3cjv",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1dd1f005026d52642b994d63baa16b0b31f3b14f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ff0f92064ab9bb344e7389c198cc9fd7ed30e29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7873680692369bcdf65480a8d81ccd2f298a13b3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd3119eb1ebf8ea7631f68069addf109d4e77159"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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